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Abstract 
 
 Successful space-based technologies like satellite imagery and GPS have 
increased military demand for a rapid-response launch capability.  AF Space Command’s 
Operationally Responsive Spacelift program was developed to ensure that the AF has the 
capability to launch a payload into orbit within hours of a tasking notification, and 
requires development of a new space launch vehicle.  The Reusable Military Launch 
Vehicle (RMLV) is currently in the design phase.  The AF Research Laboratory 
sponsored development of the MILEPOST simulation model in order to assess the 
turnaround time, and thus responsiveness, of various design alternatives.  The focus of 
this thesis is to improve the fidelity of the MILEPOST model by assessing the logistics 
manpower required to support the modeled turnaround activities.   
      The research determined the appropriate AF organizational structure and 
manpower requirements for RMLV ground support agencies based on the activities 
modeled in MILEPOST.  This information will be incorporated into the model in future 
research efforts, resulting in the capability to evaluate RMLV design alternatives based 
on both turnaround time and workforce requirements.  
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DETERMINING LOGISTICS GROUND SUPPORT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
 
FOR A REUSABLE MILITARY LAUNCH VEHICLE 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
In an era of growing uncertainty and rapidly advancing technology, military 
superiority in space provides a critical asymmetric advantage over our enemies, securing 
“the ultimate high ground” for our warfighters (Air Force, AFDD 2-2, 2001: vii).  
Looking toward the future, the Air Force (AF) is seeking to “enhance modern military 
operations across the spectrum of conflict” (Air Force, AFDD 2-2, 2001: 1) through the 
continued development of space operations and the incorporation of space capabilities 
into every aspect of military operations.  Specifically, in support of developing space 
operations, the AF is in the development phase of a Reusable Military Launch Vehicle 
(RMLV)1 program that will provide quick-response access to space for the delivery of 
payloads and other operations. 
This chapter will first review the background leading to the development and 
design requirements for the RMLV, synthesizing national, AF, and AF Space Command 
(AFSPC) policy into the final requirements defined by the AF for RMLV development.  
Second, the research problem will be presented along with a definition of logistics 
support requirements and an explanation of their importance to the RMLV design and 
development process.  Next, research questions will be enumerated to define the scope of 
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research.  The chapter will conclude by identifying the assumptions and limitations that 
bound this research effort. 
Background 
 Requirements for the RMLV program were reviewed in national policy, AF 
doctrine, and AFSPC mission needs, concluding with the RMLV requirements defined by 
the Program Research and Development announcement to potential bidders in 2005.  
This background provides a comprehensive overview of the origins and intent of the 
concept of developing the RMLV, clearly defining the mission and required capabilities 
of this future vehicle. 
National Space Policy. 
 The importance of space operations has been recently reinforced in the 
President’s National Space Policy, delivered August 31, 2006.  This policy reiterated the 
vital nature of space operations to national interests and established the intent of the 
United States to: 
preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter 
others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do 
so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to 
interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities 
hostile to U.S. national interests (President, 2006: 1). 
 
In support of this policy, the Secretary of Defense is tasked to: 
[m]aintain the capabilities to execute the space support, force enhancement, space 
control, and force application missions;…[p]rovide, as launch agent for both the 
defense and intelligence sectors, reliable, affordable, and timely space access for 
national security purposes;…[and p]rovide space capabilities to support 
continuous, global strategic and tactical warning as well as multi-layered and 
integrated missile defenses (President, 2006: 4). 
 
 National space policy, then, as a source for the basic design goals of the RMLV, 
defines the requirement for a dependable, cost-effective, and responsive space launch 
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program capable of performing deterrence, protection, response to interference, and 
denial of access missions in support of national security.  Another source that defines the 
expectation of capabilities for an RMLV is AF doctrine concerning space operations. 
AF Space Operations Doctrine. 
AF doctrine regarding space operations “views air, space, and information as key 
ingredients for dominating the battlespace and ensuring superiority” (Air Force, AFDD 2-
2, 2001: 1); that is, air and space operations have a synergistic relationship in the military 
environment.  Indeed, since the successful use of GPS in Desert Storm, space-based 
capabilities have been recognized as providing the “ultimate high ground of US military 
operations” (Air Force, AFDD 2-2, 2001: vii).  As a result, space doctrine has been 
developed from the existing model of air power doctrine, defining how space operations 
support each of the “principles of war, tenets of air and space power, [and] Air Force 
functions” (Air Force, AFDD 2-2, 2001: 6). 
The nine principles of war and seven tenets of air and space power apply to space 
assets in a similar manner as they are applied to airpower assets, while recognizing the 
unique characteristics of space capabilities.  For instance, under the second tenet of air 
and space power, space capabilities should be employed in a manner to maximize 
flexibility and versatility.  Most satellites are not flexible by nature in their abilities to be 
quickly deployed, maneuvered, or adjusted; however, they provide increased flexibility 
of communications to ground forces (Air Force, AFDD 2-2, 2001: 7).  Similarly, each of 
the principles and tenets developed for the use of airpower is adapted to provide a guide 
for the employment of space capabilities.   
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There are 16 AF functions that space capabilities are aligned against, sometimes 
in a primary role, and sometimes as a supporting capability.  These functions include 
counterspace (offensive and defensive), spacelift, counterinformation, command and 
control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and timing, weather 
services, combat search and rescue, counterair, counterland, countersea, special 
operations, strategic attack, and airlift and air refueling.  Of these functions, this paper is 
primarily concerned with spacelift, which “projects power by delivering satellites, 
payloads, and materiel to or through space” (Air Force, AFDD 2-2, 2001: 11).  The AF 
defines three strategies and one emerging strategy for spacelift: 
1.  Launch to deploy achieves a satellite system’s designed initial operational 
capability. This strategy uses a launch-on-schedule approach where launches are 
planned in advance and executed in accordance with the current launch schedule.  
2.  Launch to sustain replaces satellites nearing the end of their useful life, 
predicted to fail, or that have failed.  
3.  Launch to augment increases operational capability above the designed 
operational capability in response to war, crisis, or contingency.  
4.  Launch to operate is an emerging strategy to increase the useful life of space 
assets through scheduled or on-demand launches providing space support such as 
refueling or repair (Air Force, AFDD 2-2, 2001: 11). 
According to this doctrine, the AF seeks to realize a spacelift platform with all-weather 
capability and responsiveness on the order of days or hours (Air Force, AFDD 2-2, 2001: 
11).  
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AF doctrine, then, as a source for the basic design goals of the RMLV, defines the 
requirement for an all-weather launch-vehicle capable of performing deployment, 
sustainment, augmentation, and operation missions within days or hours of initial tasking.  
A third source for design requirements is the Operationally Responsive Spacelift program 
directed by AFSPC. 
Operationally Responsive Spacelift. 
In support of national space policy and AF doctrine, AFSPC has developed an 
ORS program to ensure that the AF has the capability to “rapidly put payloads into orbit 
and maneuver spacecraft to any point in earth-centered space, and to logistically support 
them on orbit or return them to earth” (AFSPC, 2001: 1).  ORS is cited as the “key 
enabler for conducting the full spectrum of military operations in space and for achieving 
space superiority” (AFSPC, 2001: 2).  The ORS mission, as defined by AFSPC, requires 
four key capabilities: 
1) Rapid satellite deployment in support of crises and combat operations; 
2) Peacetime launch for sustainment of satellite constellations; 
3) “Recoverable, rapid-response transport to, through, and from space;” 
4) Integrated mission planning to enable quick-response execution (AFSPC, 
2001: 2). 
The following characteristics should be part of any system developed in support of ORS:  
responsive, maneuverable, operable, economical, survivable, interoperable and flexible 
(AFSPC, 2001: 2).  Essentially, any vehicle supporting the ORS mission must be able to 
launch within hours in response to a mission tasking; maneuver among orbits; be reliable, 
supportable, and maintainable enough to consistently meet mission requirements; be cost-
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effective; be hardened against a threat environment; be able to be integrated into a joint 
and allied operating environment; and be able to deliver a variety of payloads to multiple 
theaters (AFSPC, 2001: 2).   
 These requirements apply to the vehicle as a whole.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, the RMLV is primarily concerned with the first stage of the vehicle, which is 
reusable and will be recovered and re-launched, driving turnaround time capabilities.  As 
a result, we will not be addressing the orbital capabilities required of the vehicle.   
The ORS program, then, as a source for the basic design goals of the RMLV, 
defines the requirement for a reliable, maintainable, cost-effective vehicle that can be 
launched within hours of tasking in support of wartime or peacetime operations.  Given 
the consistency of launch vehicle requirements throughout national, AF, and Space 
Command policy, the RMLV concept has been developing as described in the following 
section to support mission requirements. 
Reusable Military Launch Vehicles. 
 In 2004, the AF Requirements for Operational Capabilities Council approved the 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for ORS, establishing the Hybrid Launch Vehicle (HLV) 
as the standard for AF reusable launch vehicle acquisition.  The AoA evaluated a wide 
range of current and developmental space launch options, including Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicles (EELVs) like the Delta 4 and Atlas 5 currently in use; new Expendable 
Launch Vehicles with three solid stages or two liquid stages; fully reusable Two-Stage-
to-Orbit vehicles with a variety of fuel alternatives; and HLVs with reusable boosters and 
liquid or solid expendable upper stages.  “The HLV concept was conceived specifically 
to [provide] affordability, responsiveness, simplicity of operations, and reliability for a 
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wide range of payload classes” (Hybrid Launch Vehicle, 2005) and, indeed, the AoA 
determined that the HLV provided the best projected combination of low development 
cost, low per-launch cost, potential 2-4 day turnaround time, and low technical risk 
(Hickman, 2005: 7).  As a result, the Statement of Objectives (SOO) and the Program 
Research and Development Announcement (PRDA) for the RMLV have specified an 
HLV with the operational requirements outlined in Table 1 as the AF platform for 
Operationally Responsive Spacelift. 
Table 1. RMLV Performance Requirements (HQ SMC, SOO, 2005: 3) 
 
No Foreign Designed  
Components 
Domestic Production 
Required
Use of Foreign Designed Critical Components
Blue Suit Blue Suit & ContractorBlue Suit Operators  
90%*50%*First Stage RTB  – Intact Abort  
6 Operational First  
Stages 
6 Operational First 
StagesHLV OS Initial Production Size 
$5M per unit $10M per unitHLV OS Upper Stages Production Costs
Required RequiredFirst Stage Return to Base (RTB) – Nominal 
Mission  
1/6 current EELV - M  
launch costs 
1/3 current EELV -M 
launch costs
HLV OS Recurring Flight Cost  
24 hours 48 hoursFirst Stage Turn - Around Time  
Objective Threshold Operational Parameter
 
 
In summary, the current expectation is a fleet of six reusable RMLV boosters, each with a 
24-hour turnaround time.  Conceptually, the mission sequence shown in Figure 1 has 
been envisioned for RMLV Operations: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Pictorial Representation of RMLV Operations  
(HQ SMC, HLV Photos, 2005: 3, 6, 8) 
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In general, a vertical-launch, horizontal-landing vehicle is envisioned, but the 
Industry Day instructions to bidders allow for any launch and landing configuration that 
meets the operational parameters outlined in Table 1 (HQ SMC Q&A, 2005: 1st Set, 
Question 21).  Thrust and lift capability requirements are also outlined in the Statement 
of Objectives, but designers are free to use any engine and propellant combinations they 
like to achieve those objectives in an initial demonstrator, with the limitation that the 
final RMLV should use domestic components as indicated in the operational parameters 
(HQ SMC Q&A, 2005: 1st Set, Question 32). 
As with any developmental platform, particularly one using advanced 
technologies, several different design alternatives may be proposed to meet the objectives 
outlined in this section.  These alternatives will be evaluated based on technical, risk, and 
cost/price criteria (HQ SMC PRDA, 2005: J).  The technical evaluation is based on the 
bidders’ ability to meet the requirements outlined in the Statement of Objectives; 
however, the ability to meet these requirements is based on more than simply the 
technical composition of the vehicle.  Identifying the logistics support required by a 
future fleet of RMLVs is a critical aspect of ensuring the best vehicle to support national 
and Air Force spacelift objectives. 
Problem  
The ability to meet turnaround time and recurring flight cost goals is heavily 
influenced by a platform’s logistics support requirements.  Lessons learned from the 
Space Shuttle indicate that there is room for improvement in designing for “operability, 
supportability, and dependability” of future launch vehicles (McCleskey, 2005: 131).  
The AF requires that ORS be “completely supportable within DoD maintenance 
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principles and emphasize lean, responsive, and economical support systems” (AFSPC, 
2001: 5.1.2).  Any systems developed in support of ORS are expected to utilize AF 
standard logistics support and maintenance procedures in order to meet mission 
requirements.  “Reliability, maintainability, supportability, and disposal considerations 
must be emphasized to meet readiness and life cycle cost objectives” (AFSPC, 2001: 
5.1.2).  Clearly, logistics support is an important factor in the mission success of the 
RMLV, and it is a factor that can begin to be evaluated even in this early stage of 
development. 
“Logistics requirements for launch systems are largely driven by the choices 
made during the design process and decisions about how the design will be supported in 
its operating environment” (Morris, 1997: 1).  In order to support the assessment of 
design impact on turnaround times, AFIT graduate researchers developed MILEPOST, a 
discrete-event simulation tool that models the ground support process from an RMLV 
landing to its next launch.  Ground support operations, or regeneration activities, include 
vehicle recovery, maintenance, and pre-launch activities, and were developed using a 
synthesis of similar activities required for aircraft, EELVs, Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBMs), and the Space Shuttle to provide the most comprehensive and accurate 
model of possible RMLV turnaround operations (Stiegelmeier, 2006; Pope, 2006; 
Martindale, 2006).  The development and characteristics of the MILEPOST model are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, Introduction to MILEPOST.  The primary 
benefit of this model, however, is that it allows users to input certain design features, 
such as number of engines, type of propellant, and integration sequence, and receive an 
output of average turnaround time based on the ground support actions required for their 
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design.  At the same time, computer simulation models are being used to map the 
operation cycle of the vehicle from launch to landing using a continuous simulation 
model developed by the AF Research Laboratory (AFRL).  The intent of these models is 
to introduce logistics support considerations into RMLV operations in the design phase.   
In its current form, MILEPOST assumes infinite resource availability for ground 
support actions.  Like other models, the end goal of MILEPOST is to assess the 
turnaround time and logistics support requirements for a proposed RMLV; also like other 
models, MILEPOST is “predicated on the assumption that these requirements should be 
based on the maintenance actions generated by each mission” (Morris, 1997: 2).  This 
research will seek to improve the fidelity of the model by assessing the manpower 
resources required to perform the ground maintenance actions necessary to meet the 
operational requirements for a fleet of RMLVs.   
Research Objective  
The objective of this research is to develop an estimate of the logistics workforce 
required to support the regeneration activities identified in MILEPOST.  This workforce 
will be based on AF standards for organization and manpower assignment and designed 
to meet operational requirements as defined by ORS objectives and captured by the 
MILEPOST model.  The following research questions provide a framework for the 
research and a step-by-step process for assessing the logistics manpower support 
requirements for a fleet or RMLVs. 
1.  How do current AF Specialty Codes (AFSCs) support the performance of the 
ground support tasks identified in MILEPOST? 
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2.  What AF organizational structure is most appropriate for RMLV logistics and 
maintenance support? 
3.  What are the projected total AF manpower requirements to support RMLV 
regeneration? 
4.  What will the life cycle cost and training ramifications be as the RMLV 
platform enters the AF inventory? 
Following a literature review, an introduction to the MILEPOST model, and a description 
of research methodology, each of these questions was addressed in turn to achieve the 
final objective of capturing the logistics workforce implications of the RMLV program. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
 Based on the RMLV requirements outlined above in the PRDA, this research 
assumed an RMLV fleet size of six vehicles, each with a reusable first stage booster and 
expendable second-stage rockets.  The six boosters formed the basis of the logistics 
support requirements assessed in this research. 
 Additionally, although not strictly required by the PRDA, this research assumed 
that the vehicle would take off vertically and land horizontally from either Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station or Vandenberg Air Force Base.  For the purposes of 
assessing the organizational structure and manpower requirements, a blue-suit workforce 
was assumed.  This provides an analysis of the capability of the AF to provide the 
required support; portions of this support may, at a later time, be awarded to contractors 
or government civilians as deemed appropriate by the RMLV user. 
 This assessment was also limited to supporting the regeneration tasks identified in 
MILEPOST.  Other support functions may be required based on the final RMLV design 
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characteristics; however, those tasks identified in MILEPOST have been validated by 
experts in the field as representative of the significant design alternatives under 
consideration, as is further discussed in Chapter III, Introduction to MILEPOST.   
Finally, in order to establish the appropriate organizational structure and thereby 
project total manpower requirements, an RMLV mission statement must be assumed.  
Based upon the objectives and requirements defined by National Space Policy, AF Space 
Operations Doctrine, and AF Space Command Policy, the RMLV mission was defined in 
the following manner:  The mission of the RMLV fleet is to preserve the nation’s 
freedom of operations in space by providing dependable, responsive spacelift capability 
to deliver payloads supporting deployment, sustainment, augmentation, and operations 
missions within hours or days of initial tasking. 
Summary 
 This chapter has provided a review of the background concerning ORS and the 
development of requirements for a reusable launch vehicle, as well as a definition of the 
problem facing RMLV development regarding the assessment of logistics support 
requirements.  A definition of the research scope and process has been presented for 
identifying the logistics manpower required to support a fleet of RMLVs.  Assumptions 
and limitations, including the RMLV mission statement, have been addressed that will 
provide the foundation for reaching the research objective.  The next chapter will present 
a review of the literature relevant to each of the research questions, investigating AF 
policy and information from aircraft, EELVs, missiles, and NASA to provide the most 
comprehensive framework for developing the RMLV logistics workforce. 
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II.  Literature Review 
A great deal of literature, from both commercial and government sources, exists 
concerning logistics support requirements for aerospace platforms.  Literature was 
reviewed to first provide a solid justification for this line of research, and then to address 
each of the research questions in turn.  The progression of this chapter follows the 
investigation of the body of knowledge concerning: 
1.  The importance of logistics manpower considerations in aerospace vehicle 
design; 
2.  The definition of “logistics support” manpower as it will be utilized in this 
thesis, and the correlation to current AFSCs; 
3.  Organizational structure; 
4.  The process of determining manpower requirements for aerospace vehicles; 
5.  And life cycle cost considerations for aerospace platforms. 
The purpose of this review was to establish a clear direction for the research effort of 
each investigative question, culminating in an overall estimate of the RMLV logistics 
workforce. 
Vehicle Design and Logistics Manpower Considerations 
 As discussed in Chapter I, Introduction, the objective of this research was to 
develop an estimate of the logistics manpower required to support the regeneration 
activities identified in MILEPOST for an RMLV.  Past experience and current 
engineering disciplines suggest that adopting a comprehensive view of systems 
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comprising an aerospace platform early in and throughout the design process is critical to 
its success over the span of its life cycle.   
Systems Engineering and Vehicle Design. 
 Systems Engineering is defined by the International Council on Systems 
Engineering (INCOSE) as “an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the 
realization of successful systems” (What is, 2006).  It can be generically applied to any 
system under development, and focuses on “defining customer needs and required 
functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding 
with design synthesis and system validation” while considering, throughout the process, 
all operations, cost and schedule, performance, training and support, test, and disposal 
aspects of the finished system (What is, 2006).  As an organization, INCOSE was 
originally formed in response to the need for “qualified engineers…who could think in 
terms of a total system…rather than just a specific discipline” (Genesis, 2006).  The need 
for a system-wide approach had, in turn, been generated by the increasing complexity of 
systems under development and the extensive integration requirements of system 
components. 
This trend holds particularly true in the aerospace industry as technologies like 
Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) “become increasingly important to 
fighters and bombers, commercial and military transports, rotorcraft, spacecraft, and 
satellites” and demand input regarding the “health of the entire vehicle including 
avionics, propulsion, actuators, environmental control, electrical components, and 
structures” (Ofsthun, 2002: 21).  In fact, the increasing interest in IVHM for developing 
platforms reinforces the systems engineering principles described above as IVHM design 
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“must be part of the overall design process and viewed as a system engineering 
discipline” if it is to overcome the limitations currently imposed by retrofitting IVHM 
systems into existing platforms at a component level and achieve the full capability of 
total vehicle health management (Barrientos, 2005: 3).   
Specifically as regards spacecraft, the complexity of the systems under 
development has led to the incorporation of systems engineering principles as a 
fundamental aspect of spacecraft design.  Space systems engineering is defined as “the art 
and science of developing an operable system capable of meeting mission requirements 
within imposed constraints including (but not restricted to) mass, cost, and schedule” 
(Griffin, 2004: 2).  In recognition of the importance of Systems Engineering in aerospace 
design, NASA formally adopted Systems Engineering as an organization-wide standard 
in 1989, developing a training program and accompanying handbook to assist engineers 
in applying the practice to NASA projects (Shishko, 2006: ix). 
In addition to the wealth of support for systems engineering principles in the 
commercial sector and at NASA, the Department of Defense has established them as part 
of its acquisition process.  “DoD policy and guidance recognize the importance of and 
introduce the application of a systems engineering approach in achieving an integrated, 
balanced system solution” (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 4.0).  The Defense 
Department’s goal is to apply systems engineering processes early in concept definition 
and throughout the system life cycle in order to develop reliable and maintainable 
systems that optimize performance while minimizing total ownership costs (Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 4.0-4.1).   
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Logistics Considerations and Systems Engineering. 
In short, systems engineering will be critical to the RMLV design process; and 
logistics considerations are critical to sound systems engineering processes.  The ability 
to achieve operationally effective systems at an affordable cost is reliant upon many 
factors, represented below.  Of these, logistics considerations directly address the 
Maintainability, Operations, Maintenance, and Logistics components of the Defense 
Department’s overall goal of affordable operational effectiveness for developmental 
systems, depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Achieving Affordable System Operational Effectiveness  
(Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 4.4) 
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Previous AF design efforts like the B-2 stealth bomber have recognized the importance of 
logistics considerations in systems engineering efforts. 
A key aspect of the implementation of the B-2 systems engineering process was 
the integration of the S[ystem] P[rogram] O[ffice] requirement’s team with the 
contractor’s design team, including manufacturing, Quality Assurance, and 
logistics functionals into a cohesive program (Griffin, 2006: 51). 
 
Further, changes in the acquisition process like incremental or spiral development 
strategies have blurred the chronological boundaries between design, development, 
deployment, and sustainment phases of system development.  The Department of 
Defense now recognizes that: 
Effective sustainment of weapons systems begins with the design and 
development of reliable and maintainable systems through the continuous 
application of a robust systems engineering methodology that focuses on total 
system performance.  L[ife] C[ycle] L[ogistics] should be considered early and 
iteratively in the design process, and life cycle sustainment requirements are an 
integral part of the systems engineering process (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
2006: 5.2 ). 
 
While systems engineering incorporates a wide range of disciplines, it is clear that 
logistics considerations are an important part of the process. 
 Additionally, NASA attributes the “primary influence in the high costs of current 
launch systems…[to] the operations, maintenance and infrastructure portion of the 
program's total life cycle costs” (Fox, 2001: 439).  While exact figures vary, it is well-
established that operation and maintenance costs, which can be generally categorized as 
logistics support, form a significant factor in the total life cycle cost considerations for an 
aerospace vehicle.  In fact, the Defense Acquisition Guide, which defines Operating and 
Support Costs as “the costs…of personnel, equipment, supplies, software, and services 
associated with operating, modifying, maintaining, supplying, training, and supporting a 
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system in the DoD inventory” (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 3.1.3), depicts 
them as the largest portion of total life cycle costs, as shown in Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3.  Life-Cycle Cost Components (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 3.1.2) 
 Given the significant role of logistics elements in effective systems engineering 
principles as well as their contribution to total system cost, it can be concluded that 
logistics considerations will be critical throughout the RMLV design process. 
 Manpower Estimates and Logistics Considerations. 
 Logistics considerations, as a general category, include many elements addressed 
in the previous sections, including maintenance, supplies, and personnel.  The personnel 
element is the primary focus of this thesis, and is specifically targeted by the Department 
of Defense as a critical component of the affordability considerations of the system 
acquisition process.  Program affordability “is part of the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System analysis process, which balances cost versus performance in 
establishing key performance parameters” before a project is even approved for initiation 
(Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 3.2.1).  Assessing program affordability requires 
demonstrating that the “program’s projected funding and manpower requirements are 
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realistic and achievable” within the context of the DoD component’s corporate long-term 
goals (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 3.2.2). 
For Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 10 U.S.C. 2434 requires the Secretary 
of Defense to consider the estimate of the personnel required to operate, maintain, 
support, and provide system-related training, in advance of approval of the 
development, or production and deployment of the system (Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, 2006: 3.5). 
 
NASA, likewise, recognizes the importance of the role of manpower considerations 
within logistics planning.  Having identified Integrated Logistics Support as one of eight 
engineering specialties within the overall Systems Engineering Process (Shisko, 2006: 
91), NASA goes on to specify Human Resources and Personnel Planning as one of the 
nine elements that fall within the responsibilities of the Integrated Logistics engineers 
(Shisko, 2006: 99).  Specifically, these activities include “actions required to determine 
the best skills-mix, considering current and future operator, maintenance, engineering, 
and administrative personnel costs” (Shisko, 2006: 99). 
 In summary, professional and trade-specific literature identify systems 
engineering as a critical aspect of aerospace vehicle design, logistics considerations as a 
critical aspect of systems engineering, and manpower considerations as a critical aspect 
of logistics.  This thesis, therefore, will proceed on the conclusion that determining the 
logistics manpower requirements for supporting an RMLV fleet is a valuable contribution 
to the current design process. 
Defining Logistics Support Manpower 
 In order to address the first investigative question, regarding how current AFSCs 
support the performance of the ground support tasks identified in MILEPOST, a 
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definition is required for ground support and logistics support and their relationship to the 
current AFSC structure. 
   Defining Logistics Support and Ground Support. 
Logistics, as officially defined by the Council of Supply Chain Management 
Professionals (CSCMP), is a broad concept that includes the “process of planning, 
implementing, and controlling procedures for the efficient and effective transportation 
and storage of goods including services” (Supply Chain, 2006).  Logistics Management is 
defined as “that part of supply chain management that plans, implements, and controls 
the efficient, effective forward and reverse flow and storage of goods, services, and 
related information between the point of origin and the point of consumption in order to 
meet customers’ requirements” (Supply Chain, 2006).  These generic, commercial 
definitions concentrate on the market aspects of providing goods and services in response 
to requirements.   
Unfortunately, by focusing on transportation and storage of finished goods or 
services, these definitions shed little light on the role of logistics in development and 
deployment of a launch vehicle.  In the military arena, however, logistics is more 
specifically defined as:  
those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, 
acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and 
disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of 
personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition 
of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services (DoD, JP-1, 2006). 
 
As relates to the RMLV, the logistics arena would be defined under the construct of 
“materiel” as dealing with all aspects of its life cycle from design to disposition. 
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  The airport concept of ground support provides further insight into the types of 
activities that will be the focus of this thesis.  Within the air transportation system, 
ground time “includes all processes and activities from wheels-on to wheels-off” 
(Andersson, 2006: 1).  These processes and activities are typically subcontracted to an 
airline, airport, or handling agent “to handle the many needs of passenger aircraft” 
including cabin service, catering, ramp service, maintenance and engineering service, and 
field operation service (Aircraft, 2007).  Subcontracted agencies, such as GAT Airline 
Ground Support and Airport Terminal Services (ATS) further define the scope of ground 
support within the specific services that they provide: cargo management, janitorial, 
cabin grooming, ground support equipment maintenance, facilities maintenance, Skycap 
and porter service, passenger check-in and ticketing, passenger boarding, VIP lounge 
staffing, baggage services and lost and found, aircraft loading and unloading, aircraft 
marshalling, aircraft pushback, aircraft fueling, aircraft deicing, warehouse receiving and 
delivery functions, document processing, and fuel farm management (Services, 2006; 
What We Do: Service, 2006).  While many of these functions are not directly applicable 
to the RMLV mission as currently defined, they do establish the comprehensive nature of 
ground support activities. 
 In previous AFIT research efforts, the MILEPOST model was developed to 
identify the regeneration activities required between subsequent RMLV launches.  These 
activities were broken into three phases—post-landing recovery, maintenance, and pre-
launch—and included such processes as towing, inspection and repair, fueling, and 
payload integration (Martindale, 2006; Pope, 2006; Stiegelmeier, 2006).  Thus, as defined 
by MILEPOST, the activities that require manpower resources for support encompass all 
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actions from touch-down to subsequent launch, and incorporate the maintenance aspect 
of military logistics with some handling aspects of ground support.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, logistics support, ground support, and regeneration support will be used 
interchangeably to indicate those activities identified in MILEPOST as being necessary 
to recover and subsequently launch an RMLV.  These activities will be covered in greater 
detail in Chapter III, Introduction to MILEPOST. 
Logistics Support AFSCs. 
Having determined the range of RMLV support activities that will be addressed in 
this thesis, the next portion of the research question addressed the capability of the 
current AFSC structure to support those activities.  AFSCs are governed by AF Officer 
and Enlisted Classification Directories, which are updated and published semi-annually 
(Air Force, AFMAN 36-2101, 2006: 55).  Of these available AFSCs, only certain 
classifications are considered Logisticians, who would directly be responsible for 
performing the logistics support activities defined in the previous section. 
The AF professional association for logistics officers, the Logistics Officers 
Association, defines logisticians as “key aircraft and munitions maintenance, logistics 
readiness, transportation, supply, contracting and logistics plans decision-makers” 
(Matthews, 2006).  The headquarters component for logistics support within the AF is the 
A4/7 Directorate, Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support, and encompasses six sub-
directorates including the offices of Transformation, Maintenance, Resource Integration, 
Logistics Readiness, the Civil Engineer, and Security Forces and Force Protection 
(Headquarters Air Force, 2006).  Within these organizations, the offices of 
Transformation and Resource Integration address strategic-level considerations for long-
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range planning (Headquarters Air Force, 2006).  The Directorates of Maintenance, 
Logistics Readiness, Civil Engineer, and Security Forces oversee functions that directly 
relate to aerospace platform operation and infrastructure (Headquarters Air Force, 2006).  
Since the focus of this research effort is on those activities directly supporting the RMLV 
from landing to subsequent takeoff, Civil Engineer and Security Forces personnel 
performing infrastructure support will not be addressed 
Thus, within the established AFSC structure, Maintenance and Logistics 
Readiness AFSCs will provide the basis for consideration for the RMLV logistics support 
workforce.  The specific AFSCs within these functions will be addressed in detail in 
Chapter V, Analysis of Required Technical Expertise. 
Organizational Structure 
 In order to accurately determine the logistics workforce characteristics for the 
RMLV, it is necessary to determine the manner in which the required technical experts 
will be organized.   
Organization Theory. 
 A formal organization arises out of the need to coordinate a group of people 
toward the “explicit purpose of achieving certain goals” (Blau, 2004: 1).  The 
organization will “formulate procedures that govern the relations among the 
members…and the duties each is expected to perform” and then tend to “assume an 
identity of its own” which enables it to “persist for several generations, not without 
change but without losing [its] fundamental identity as [a] distinct unit” (Blau, 2004: 1).  
If organizations will arise naturally out of the need to accomplish certain tasks, and if 
they will continue to support those tasks even as members and structures change, the 
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original definition of the structure is of great interest to the successful performance of the 
task over time.   
 Organizational structure “describes the division of work and the division of 
authority found in any organization” (Andersen, 2002: 344).  Organizations address 
division of work and authority in a variety of structures, each of which manifest varying 
degrees of specialization, centralization, and formalization.   
Specialization.   
Specialization, or complexity, describes the number, type, and location of 
specialties or departments within an organization (Andersen, 2002: 344).  The grouping 
of jobs, professions, and specialties into departments or workcenters is a critical aspect of 
forming an organization, and one of the most difficult aspects of this managerial decision 
is “whether to group activities primarily by product or by function” (Walker, 2005: 208).  
Product-oriented departments will incorporate all of the functional specialists needed for 
an individual product line while function-oriented departments will be composed of a 
single functional specialty supporting all product lines (Walker, 2005: 208).  This 
decision is a tradeoff, and the mission of the organization will play a role in determining 
which type of structure will provide the greatest overall benefit, and may result in the 
utilization of a mixed approach to address different activities within the organization.  For 
example, cross-functional (product-oriented) teams may be formed for certain projects 
that require a higher degree of coordination, while functional departments are sufficient 
for the development of standard products (Walker, 2005: 218).  In general, functional 
organizations are appropriate when tasks are routine and repetitive, integration can be 
achieved through a master plan, and conflict can be resolved through the established 
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management hierarchy (Walker, 2005: 217).  Product organization is more appropriate 
for tasks “of a problem-solving nature…especially…where there is a need for tight 
integration among specialists” (Walker, 2005: 217).  While RMLV development would 
be most appropriately supported by a product-oriented organization, the logistics ground 
support of the operational RMLV will most likely require a hybrid structure due to the 
repetitive nature of certain ground processes and the high degree of coordination required 
by activities like scheduling and quality control.  
Centralization.  
Centralization (or decentralization) describes the organizational location 
of decision-making capabilities.  An organization is highly centralized when decision-
making authority rests only at high levels of management; conversely, an organization is 
decentralized when decision-making authority is granted at the lowest possible 
hierarchical levels (Andersen, 2002: 345).  Decentralized decision-making, which 
includes the popular concept of empowerment, is often considered to reflect an 
“organization’s interest in employee-maintenance issues” and takes advantage of the 
capabilities of lower-level managers and employees (Osborn, 1980: 300).  Certainly, 
decentralization allows “each administrative unit [to] deal efficiently with its own sector” 
(March, 1993: 230), freeing upper level management to address more global corporate 
concerns.   
However, there is a price to decentralization, one that has been particularly 
noted within NASA as a consistent contributor to inefficiencies and even disasters in 
major programs.  NASA’s ten field centers have evolved into autonomous agencies, as 
reduced budgets have driven them to broaden competencies, form alliances with 
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Congressional delegations, and lobby for projects outside their traditional functional 
specialties in order to assure individual survival (Levine, 1992: 199).  The fragmented 
management structure has been identified as a contributing cause to the Challenger 
disaster, a source of serious inefficiencies during Space Station program development, 
and a compounding factor in the oversight that led to the inoperable primary mirror on 
the Hubble telescope (Levine, 1992: 201).  In the case of the Challenger, program 
managers for individual elements were overly concerned with accountability to their 
respective field centers, so that internal flight safety problems were not properly routed 
through the established Shuttle management system.  The Space Station program began 
with 107 missions, as each of the four field centers involved submitted individual 
requirements, and no centralized review process was established to coordinate them with 
one another or with NASA capabilities.  Finally, the initial measurement error that 
resulted in the Hubble mirror flaw was never double-checked throughout the course of 
development, in part due to a lack of funding; however, the other five Hubble instruments 
were protected from such detrimental cost-saving measures by independent principal 
investigators, based outside of NASA in universities, while NASA had sole responsibility 
for the mirrors (Levine, 1992: 201).  It is clear from these examples that reduced budgets 
have led to autonomy and competition among the NASA field centers, with damaging 
effects on key programs.  The decentralized system that has developed is not conducive 
to effective program management for such large-scale, complex projects as NASA 
typically handles.  It follows that centralization will be a critical issue during the 
development of the RMLV; as well, within the logistics support organization for the 
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operational RMLV, careful consideration of the degree of centralization will be critical to 
launch mission success.   
Formalization.   
Formalization describes the degree of standardization of tasks and 
procedures within the organization (Andersen, 2002: 344).  Bureaucracies are typically 
associated with a high degree of formalization, and have been criticized for their 
inflexibility and tendency toward mediocrity (Osborn, 1980: 276).  Large companies, 
however, typically benefit from formalization, which allows them to ensure consistency 
throughout the organization (Osborn, 1980: 339). 
The benefits of formalizing organizational procedures can be identified in 
specific arenas within aerospace organizations.  For example, the adoption of a robust 
Quality Management System like the AS9100 aerospace standard can “stabilize and 
standardize” organizations in an industry in which perceived reliability is critical and, 
when coupled with consistent adaptation to external market changes, can lead to 
sustainable organizational growth over time (West, 2005: 80-82).  In addition, the 
importance of learning from successes as well as mistakes in aerospace ventures has led 
NASA to adopt a formalized learning process, patterned after the military After Action 
Review (AAR) system (Rogers, 2006: 2).  By formalizing the procedures for reviewing 
and assessing activities at multiple stages in project development, the Goddard Space 
Flight Center hopes to support agency-wide improvements in learning and knowledge 
management to ensure future mission success (Rogers, 2006: 7).   
Beyond specific organizational benefits, however, the aerospace industry 
is required to conform to standardized requirements for the safety of its customers and the 
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general public.  The Federal Aviation Administration, whose mission is to provide the 
“safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world,” formalizes the tasks and 
procedures associated with aerospace activities by administering certification 
requirements for aircraft, airports and spaceports, pilots, and aircraft mechanics; 
operating a standardized air traffic control system for civil and military aircraft; and 
regulating noise and environmental effects of air traffic (What we do, 2007).  As such, a 
high degree of formalization in operational activities is established as an aerospace 
industry standard. 
AF Policy. 
 The RMLV is envisioned as an AF asset; therefore, the suitability of AF 
organizational structure policy to RMLV logistics support will be addressed next. 
  Specialization.   
One of the principles of AF organization is Functional Grouping, in which 
personnel that form a “logical, separable activity” report to a single supervisor (Air 
Force, AFI 38-101, 2006: 6).  These functional activities are primarily identified by an 
AF Specialty Code (AFSC), the “basic grouping of positions requiring similar skills and 
qualifications” (Air Force, AFMAN 36-2101, 2006: 52).  However, a Squadron, the AF’s 
most basic organizational unit, may be “either a mission unit, such as an operational 
flying squadron, or a functional unit, such as a civil engineer, security forces, or 
maintenance squadron” (Air Force, AFI 38-101, 2006: 12).  As such, the AF is a hybrid 
organization in which departments may be aligned around missions (products) or 
functions depending upon the operational requirements. 
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Specifically within the logistics community, the hybrid nature of the 
organization continues to apply.  Within a Maintenance Group, the Maintenance 
Squadron (MXS) (conducting backshop repair operations) is typically aligned 
functionally, consisting of “personnel from various AFSCs organized into flights” like 
propulsion, avionics, and fabrication (Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 98).  However, the 
Aircraft Maintenance Squadrons (AMXS) (conducting flightline operations) and 
Maintenance Operations Squadron (MOS) may include many different functional 
specialists performing cross-functional activities like quality assurance, flightline 
expediting, and debriefing (Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 70-166).  For example, the 
Specialist section within the AMXS is responsible for: 
troubleshooting, on-equipment repairs, component removal and 
replacement, aircraft avionics systems classified item management, and 
aircraft ground handling, servicing, and cleaning…[and] may include 
avionics, propulsion, hydraulics, and electro/environmental technicians 
(Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 78). 
 
The Logistics Readiness Squadron is also organized primarily in a hybrid manner, with 
Materiel Management, Traffic Management, Vehicle Management, and Fuels 
Management Flights organized functionally by AFSC, while Readiness and Management 
& Systems Flights perform cross-functional duties and are manned by a variety of AFSCs 
(Air Mobility Command, AMCMD 716, 2004: 1).   
As regards the RMLV, this hybrid organizational structure provides a 
balance between the benefits of functional organization for repetitive tasks like engine 
maintenance or wheel and tire repair (MXS functions) and the advantage of cross-
functional teams to address objectives like quality assurance and expedited flightline 
operations (MOS and AMXS functions).   
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Centralization.   
Decentralization is established as a key characteristic of AF organizations, 
so that “lower echelons can achieve objectives without needing continuous control from 
above” (Air Force, AFPD 38-1, 1996: 1).  However, Unambiguous Command is an 
equally important characteristic, in which organizational structure provides a “clear 
chain-of-command running from the President to the most junior airman” (Air Force, 
AFPD 38-1, 1996: 1).  Essentially, the AF organization is tasked to strike a balance 
between empowerment of lower-level managers for operational decision-making and a 
centralized management structure for oversight and conflict resolution.  This balanced 
approach provides exactly the type of support structure that can maximize the benefits of 
decentralization and avoid the consequences of fragmentation experienced at NASA. 
Formalization.   
Another key characteristic of AF organizations is Standardization, which 
stipulates that organizations “with like responsibilities should have similar organizational 
structures” (Air Force, AFPD 38-1, 1996: 1).  Additionally, each of the Organizational 
Entities available to form a structure is defined in detail, so that even organizations with 
different missions will be composed using Standard Levels of AF organization (Air 
Force, AFI 38-101, 2006: 10).  The result is that all AF organizations are composed of 
Major Commands (MAJCOMs), of which most are composed of Wings, made up of 
Squadrons, broken down into Flights.  This constitutes a high degree of formalization 
within the formation of the organizational structure itself.   
AF logistics tasks and procedures are highly formalized, as well, governed 
by AF Instructions, Technical Orders (TOs), and checklists.  For example, procedures for 
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issuing and managing spare parts are governed by Air Force Manual 23-110, USAF 
Supply Manual; aircraft refueling operations are regulated by Air Force Instruction 23-
201, Fuels Management, and applicable TOs; and aircraft maintenance operations fall 
under Air Force Instruction 21-101, Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management, 
which also mandates strict “adherence to and compliance with TOs and supplements” for 
all aircraft and equipment (Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 18). 
 This type of procedural standardization is consistent with FAA 
requirements to ensure the safety of aerospace activities.  The establishment of a logistics 
support organization with this degree of formalization will be of great benefit to the safe 
operation of the RMLV. 
In summary, the AF principles for establishing organizational structure provide a 
balanced approach to specialization and centralization, and high degree of formalization.  
Organizational behavior literature and specific examples from the aerospace industry 
support these approaches as effective within the aerospace context.  Therefore, the 
current AF organizational structure provides a suitable framework for developing the 
RMLV logistics support organization, which will be addressed in detail in Chapter VI, 
Analysis of Organizational Structure.     
Developing Manpower Requirements 
 Having established AF policy as the standard for developing organizational 
structure, AF policy also provides the foundation for establishing the manpower 
requirements of the RMLV logistics support organization. 
 The method for determining AF manpower requirements is clearly established 
within the governance of Air Force Instruction 38-201, Determining Manpower 
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Requirements.  The goal of AF manpower requirements determination is to 
“systematically identif[y] minimum essential manpower required for the most effective 
and economical accomplishment of approved missions and functions within 
organizational and resource constraints” (Air Force, AFI 38-201, 2003: 5).  In order to 
accomplish this goal, the AF has established Management Engineering Programs which 
form the basis for the development of manpower standards and conduct of manpower 
studies (Air Force, AFI 38-201, 2003: 5).  Under this construct, all AF units adhere to a 
standardized process of determining manpower requirements.  The manpower 
determination process begins with the development of an AF Manpower Standard 
(AFMS) for the unit of interest, which considers the product or service provided by the 
unit, the quantity or frequency of the workload, product/service prioritization, any 
variations to basic requirements, and a detailed breakdown of required grades, skill 
levels, and officer-enlisted-civilian mix in order to generate a total man-hour requirement 
(Air Force, AFI 38-201, 2003: 10).  AFMS total man-hour requirements are divided by a 
Man-hour Availability Factor (MAF), reflecting the percentage of work-hours per month 
an individual is available to perform primary duties, and an Overload Factor, which 
“ensures effective use of Air Force manpower resources” by assessing different 
percentages of overload capacity to different duty scenarios, in order to determine the 
authorized number of manpower positions (Air Force, AFI 38-201, 2003: 13-14).   
 Certain units may determine Aircraft Maintenance manpower requirements 
through the use of “aircraft specific maintenance man-hour per flying hour (MMH/FH) 
factors when more rigorous methods (i.e., conventional manpower standards or Logistics 
Composite Model manpower determinants) are not available” (Air Force, AFI 38-201, 
 33 
2003: 16).  For instance, in some cases, the small number or impending retirement of 
certain airframes render rigorous manpower studies non-cost effective and justify the use 
of MMH/FH data instead.   
 Additionally, the AFI endorses the use of the Logistics Composite Model 
(LCOM), a “dynamic computer simulation model that evaluates the interaction between 
operations and logistics” (Air Force, AFI 38-201, 2003: 18).  Guidance for conducting an 
LCOM study is contained in Air Force Manual 38-208, Volume 3, Air Force 
Management Engineering Program (MEP)—Logistics Composite Model (LCOM).  
LCOM is designed to provide an assessment of the “best mix [of different support 
resources] to support a given requirement,” and may be applied to a range of weapons 
systems, from the very large to the very small (Air Force, AFMAN 38-208, 1995: 1).  
LCOM outputs are based on a specific scenario which includes detailed operational and 
maintenance data, including: operational environment, primary aircraft assigned, 
organizational structure with workcenter functional account codes, MAFs, shift data, not-
mission-capable supply rates, maintenance policy, failure data, and sortie rates (Air 
Force, AFMAN 38-208, 1995: 2-3).  Maintenance data, specifically, should ideally 
consist of “at least six months of historical data from the units or locations under study” 
(Air Force, AFMAN 38-208, 1995: 4).  LCOM simulation is an approved manpower-
determination method even for “evolving weapons systems” (Air Force, AFI 38-201, 
2003: 18); however, the lack of a directly-comparable existing platform within the AF 
inventory (or the commercial sector) may initially impose significant challenges to 
establishing a successful LCOM simulation for the RMLV.  Still, the process through 
which the LCOM simulation assigns aircraft support resources to operational 
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requirements will be relevant to accomplishing a similar function within MILEPOST, 
until such time as sufficient data is amassed for an LCOM simulation.  This functionality 
is addressed in greater detail in Chapter VIII, Conclusions and Future Research. 
 In summary, while the preferred method to exactly establish RMLV manpower 
requirements begins with an LCOM simulation study, there is a challenging lack of data 
availability, particularly in the realm of historical maintenance data.  A secondary method 
involves applying existing AFMS documents, but this method will face additional 
challenges in adapting those AFMS assumptions to the specific nature of RMLV support 
requirements.  Utilizing MMH/FH factors would likely be acceptable due to small fleet 
size; however, again, there is a lack of platform-specific data to establish these factors.  
Therefore, in Chapter VII, Manpower Assessment, data from all available areas will be 
investigated to derive the most realistic manpower requirements assessment from a 
combination of AF methods. 
Life Cycle Costing 
 Finally, Department of Defense policy will also be applied to determine how to 
address the Life Cycle Cost implications of logistics support to the RMLV fleet.   
 RMLV development will be considered a “major defense acquisition program” 
and, as such, falls under the review responsibility of the Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (CAIG).  The CAIG receives a “comprehensive assessment of program Lifecycle 
cost” at each major milestone decision point from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) CAIG (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 3.4-3.4.1).  The OSD CAIG 
assessment contains both the program office’s estimate of total life cycle cost and the cost 
analysis of each relevant DoD component (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2006: 3.4.1). 
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 Program costs are divided into seven standardized categories:  Development Cost, 
Flyaway Cost, Weapon System Cost, Procurement Cost, Program Acquisition Cost, 
Operating and Support (O&S) Cost, and Life Cycle Cost.  Each of these cost terms is 
defined in relation to the elements of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), the source 
of budget appropriations, and the life-cycle cost categories included (Department of 
Defense, DoD 5000.4-M, 1992: 44).  The life-cycle cost categories define whether the 
cost term is contractor or in-house, recurring or nonrecurring, and whether it is relevant to  
the Research and Development (R&D), Investment, or O&S phases of the program life  
cycle, as depicted in Table 2: 
Table 2.  Life Cycle Costs (Department of Defense, DoD 5000.4-M, 1992: 50) 
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Life Cycle Cost, shown across the bottom row, includes “ALL WBS elements; ALL 
affected appropriations; and encompasses the costs, both contractor and in house effort, 
as well as existing assets to be used, for all cost categories” (Department of Defense, 
DoD 5000.4-M, 1992: 49).  As such, it is the total program cost to the government over 
the entire life cycle of the system, from research to disposal.  The Life Cycle Cost of a 
program under consideration is assessed early in the life of the project, and continuously 
reassessed throughout. 
The cost assessment process is highly structured.  First, the acquisition program 
office is responsible for preparing a Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) 
describing the “salient features of the program and of the system being acquired…as a 
basis for cost-estimating” (Department of Defense, DoD 5000.4-M, 1992: 8).  The CARD 
follows a standardized outline addressing 12 aspects of the program:  System Overview, 
Risk, System Operational Concept, Quantity Requirements, System Manpower 
Requirements, System Activity Rates, System Milestone Schedule, Acquisition Plan 
and/or Strategy, System Development Plan, Element Facilities Requirements, Track to 
Prior CARD, and Contractor Cost Data Reporting Plan (Department of Defense, DoD 
5000.4-M, 1992: 10-20).  Within these 12 aspects, several sub-categories are of interest 
from the logistics support perspective:  Reliability; Maintainability, including 
maintenance man-hours per operating hour and personnel requirements and associated 
skill levels at the maintenance unit level; Portability and Transportability and their effect 
on logistics support requirements; Organizational Structure including a UMD, notional, if 
necessary; Logistics Support Concept, including organic versus contractor, scheduled 
maintenance and overhaul points, maintenance levels and repair responsibilities, and 
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repair versus replacement criteria; Supply; Training for operators, maintainers, and 
support personnel; and System Manpower Requirements (Department of Defense, DoD 
5000.4-M: 14-18).   
Second, cost estimates are developed by the program office and DoD component, 
as applicable, in accordance with standardized estimation practices.  Cost estimates are 
required to capture “all sunk costs and a projection for all categories of the life-cycle 
costs for the total planned program” to include: R&D, Investment, and O&S (Department 
of Defense, DoD 5000.4-M, 1992: 29-30).  Statistical Estimates, Engineering and 
Analogy Estimates, and Actual Costs will be utilized as practical for the program 
milestone.  For example, Actual Costs will not be available in the early phases of the 
program, during which estimates will rely more heavily on statistical techniques 
(Department of Defense, DoD 5000.4-M, 31-32).  Comparison of multiple methods is 
encouraged, and the estimate should identify and quantify uncertainty, address 
contingencies, and include sensitivity analysis (Department of Defense, DoD 5000.4-M, 
33). 
The CARD, program office estimate, and DoD component cost analysis for each 
alternative under consideration are presented for review and revision to the OSD CAIG 
upon the approach of major milestone decisions (Department of Defense, DoD 5000.4-M, 
1992: 28-29).  The presentation format is also highly structured, including the following 
elements:  Overview, Alternative Descriptions, Program Manager Presentation, 
Presentation of the DoD Component Cost Analysis, Present Value of Alternatives, 
Preferred Alternative, Time-Phased Program Estimates, Estimate Detail, Relation to 
FYDP, Cost Estimating Relationship Presentation, Contractor Cost Data Reporting 
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Status, Cost Track, Unit Cost Comparisons, Design-to-Cost, Personnel Requirements, 
and O&S Comparisons of alternatives to include fuel, crew size, maintenance man-hours 
per operating hour, manpower requirements by skill-level, and annual O&S costs for the 
required force structure unit (Department of Defense, DoD 5000.4-M, 1992: 34-36).  
These last two presentation elements reinforce the importance of logistics support 
manpower requirements throughout the course of program development. 
The OSD CAIG then presents the CARD, the estimates, and supporting 
documentation to the CAIG, who will provide a final report on the program to the 
Defense Acquisition Board. 
 While a comprehensive cost estimate in accordance with DoD policy is outside 
the scope of this thesis, certain elements of the Life Cycle Cost estimate will be addressed 
in response to the fourth research question.  Chapter VIII, Conclusions and Future 
Research, will include an assessment of the costs of logistics support Personnel 
Requirements and Training to the maximum degree possible. 
Summary 
 In summary, a thorough literature review has established the importance of 
defining logistics manpower support requirements early in the development of the 
RMLV.  Logistics manpower support will be assessed based on the regeneration 
activities identified in MILEPOST, and will be supported from within the Maintenance, 
Logistics Readiness, Civil Engineer, and Security Forces functions under the existing 
AFSC structure.  The RMLV organizational structure will be determined in accordance 
with AF organizational development policy.  Manpower requirements will, likewise, be 
assessed in accordance with AF policy.  Finally, Life Cycle Cost implications will be 
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addressed in accordance with DoD guidance. Chapter IV, Methodology, will specifically 
address the research methods that will be utilized within each of these research areas.  
First, however, a more thorough introduction to the MILEPOST model that forms the 
foundation for this research will be provided in the following chapter. 
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III.  Introduction to MILEPOST 
The MILEPOST model is composed of three independently-developed, sequential 
processes that are linked within the Arena construct to provide a timeline of all the 
activities that occur from RMLV landing until the pre-launch sequence for its subsequent 
mission.  In this section, we will review each segment of the regeneration process.  This 
process, along with the activities identified therein, forms the foundation for assigning 
workforce requirements in support of the RMLV.  
Part 1: Post-Landing Operations 
 The activities identified in this portion of the model were developed based on a 
comparison of Space Shuttle Orbiter and F-16 post-landing recovery operations.  The 
results of the comparison showed that the Orbiter required four processes that are not 
performed on the F-16.  Of the remaining processes, some of the simpler activities were 
held in common; however, a greater number of activities shared a common purpose, but 
involved much greater complexity and longer completion times for the Shuttle 
(Martindale, 2006: 17).  This implies that the AF will experience a few shortfalls in 
expertise for RMLV ground support; will have sufficient expertise for some activities; 
and will have sufficient technical background, but require additional training, for a 
greater number of support activities.  Following is a by-segment assessment of the Post-
Landing Operations portion of the MILEPOST model.  
Segment 1, Landing, Taxi, and Initial Safing, is shown in Figure 4.  This process 
segment addresses the RMLV landing, travel to the recovery apron, and various initial 
safing procedures for the ground support crew.  It incorporates elements of both aircraft 
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and Shuttle Recovery operations.  A vehicle that can taxi to the recovery apron is aircraft-
like, and APU shutdown procedures are common to all airframes.  However, the Ground 
Support Equipment (GSE) positioned for the vehicle, the drag chute pyrotechnic safing, 
and the LOX safing operations are derived from Shuttle recovery procedures (Martindale, 
2006: 32). 
 
Figure 4.  Landing, Taxi, and Initial Safing (Martindale, 2006: 32) 
Segment 2, Safety Assessment and Final Safety Call, is depicted in Figure 5.  This 
segment deals with ensuring that the RMLV is safe for the ground crews to perform 
recovery operations and transport the vehicle to the maintenance facility.  The specialties 
required for this segment of the process depend upon whether the RMLV design is fueled 
by hypergolics and whether an RMLV that does require hypergolic fuel includes internal 
gas detection equipment.  If there are no hypergolic fuels involved, or once the vehicle 
passes its safety inspection, the rest of the recovery operation can proceed (Martindale, 
2006: 32). 
 
Figure 5.  Safety Assessment and Final Safety Call (Martindale, 2006: 32) 
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Segment 3, RMLV Preparation for Transportation, is shown in Figure 6.  This 
segment begins the actions required to prepare the RMLV for transportation to a 
maintenance facility.  It includes several processes that occur in parallel, including the 
hazardous gas purge, external coolant requirement, and TPS inspection required in 
Shuttle operations.  Installing lock pins and protective covers for vents are common 
actions for a variety of aircraft (Martindale, 2006: 34). 
 
Figure 6.  RMLV Preparation for Transportation (Martindale, 2006: 34) 
Segment 4, Handling External Stores, is depicted in Figure 7.  The model 
accounts for the possibility that the RMLV may be designed with the capability to land  
with external stores attached.  This portion of the model is best represented by fighter or  
 
 43 
bomber aircraft that land with unexpended ordnance (Martindale, 2006: 35). 
 
Figure 7.  Handling External Stores (Martindale, 2006: 35) 
Segment 5, Safing Sequence, which is shown in Figure 8, addresses the final 
safing procedures prior to towing operations.  While the Orbital Maneuvering System/ 
Reaction Control System (OMS/RCS), Main Engine (ME) Tank Venting, and hypergolic 
fuel process requirements are unique to spacecraft, propulsion system configuration and 
Inertial Navigation System (INS) safing are common practices to aircraft (Martindale, 
2006: 36). 
 
Figure 8.  Safing Sequence (Martindale, 2006: 36) 
Segment 6, depicting Part 2 of RMLV Preparation for Transportation operations, 
is shown in Figure 9.  The second stage of preparation occurs at the same time as the 
safing sequence described above.  In this process the recovery team installs protective 
covers on equipment as necessary, positions the tow vehicle, and monitors on-board 
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systems.  These actions were modeled on Shuttle recovery operations, but the basic 
processes are consistent with operations performed by aircraft maintenance personnel 
(Martindale, 2006: 37). 
 
Figure 9.  RMLV Preparation for Transportation, Part 2 (Martindale, 2006: 37) 
Segment 7, Tow Preparations and Towing to the Maintenance Facility, is shown 
in Figure 10.  Final tow preparations also occur in parallel with the safing sequence, and 
include standard airframe actions like connecting the tow vehicle, checking connections, 
and removing chocks (Martindale, 2006: 37).  Towing is the final action within Post-
Landing Operations, after which the entity in the model is transitioned into Ground 
Maintenance Operations (Martindale, 2006: 38). 
 
Figure 10.  Tow Preparations and Towing to Maintenance Facility (Martindale, 2006: 38) 
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Because the RMLV launch and reentry patterns are most similar to those of the 
Space Shuttle Orbiter, it was the primary source of activities in the Post-Landing 
Operations phase.  As we have seen in each segment, however, many of the activities 
contained within the processes are similar to activities performed after an aircraft landing.  
These similarities will be examined in greater detail in Chapter V, Analysis of Technical 
Expertise. 
Part 2: Ground Maintenance Operations Cycle 
 The Ground Maintenance Operations Cycle is the portion of the model that most 
closely relates to aircraft support operations, simply because the design of a spacecraft 
includes the same major components as the design of an aircraft: fuel systems, hydraulic 
systems, propulsion systems, electrical and environmental systems, and structural 
systems.  Maintenance of unique systems like the Thermal Protection System (TPS) may 
be compared to maintaining the specialized surface material applied to the B-2.  Bomber 
aircraft exhibit more similarities to Shuttle maintenance than fighter aircraft, as the larger 
size and greater complexity of the platform require a higher degree of maintenance 
interaction between missions (Pope, 2006: 15).  In general, the B-2 provides a strong 
source for model development due to its mission, maintenance footprint, and specialized 
structural material (Pope, 2006: 17).  Key differences identified between Shuttle and B-2 
maintenance operations include the even larger size and greater complexity of the 
Shuttle; performance of Shuttle refueling operations immediately prior to launch rather 
than as part of ground maintenance operations; and more frequent landing gear and tire 
replacement maintenance actions due to the Shuttle’s higher landing speeds and fewer, 
lighter tires (Pope, 2006: 15). 
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 Segment 1, Transportation to Maintenance Bay, is depicted by Figure 11.  In this 
portion of the model, the vehicle is transitioned via the towing operation established in 
Post-Landing Operations.  For the maintenance activities to follow, this segment allows 
the user to define the number of engines on the RMLV.  The remaining operations result 
in the RMLV being positioned in the maintenance bay, ready for assessment and repair 
actions (Pope, 2006: 26). 
 
Figure 11.  Transportation to Maintenance Bay (Pope, 2006: 26) 
Segment 2, Initial Maintenance Assessment, is shown in Figure 12 below.  The 
first step in RMLV maintenance is to download information from the Integrated Vehicle 
Health Monitoring (IVHM) system.  If IVHM is not part of the RMLV design, 
maintenance personnel will have to perform system health assessments through other 
means.  Afterwards, maintenance stands are positioned and electrical connections are 
established to provide power as required to various on-board systems.  After performance 
of these actions, the model allows for a series of maintenance actions performed in 
parallel, beginning with battery testing (Pope, 2006: 27). 
 
Figure 12.  Initial Maintenance Assessment (Pope, 2006: 27) 
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Segment 3, Avionics, Flight Controls, and Sensors, is modeled in Figure 13.  This 
segment occurs in parallel with battery testing.  Maintenance personnel test the avionics 
equipment to ensure that it is communicating properly and properly controlling the flight 
surfaces.  At the same time, the lower module “allows for the removal of experimental 
data or telemetry information” collected by on-board sensors (Pope, 2006: 28). 
 
Figure 13.  Avionics, Flight Controls, and Sensors (Pope, 2006: 28) 
Segment 4, shown in Figure 14, addresses Second Stage Connection Testing.  
After completion of Segments 2 and 3, maintenance personnel test the RMLV electrical 
connections for the second stage, after which the vehicle enters a series of parallel 
processes (Pope, 2006: 29). 
 
Figure 14.  Second Stage Connection Testing (Pope, 2006: 29) 
Segment 5 initiates a set of Parallel Processes, shown in Figure 15.  This segment 
involves drag chute replacement, TPS inspection and repair actions, Stage 2 mechanical 
and hardware component assessment, and removal/replacement (R2) of the buffer plug  
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which “offers a secure connection that allows for separation between two vehicles in 
motion” (Pope, 2006: 29). 
 
Figure 15.  Parallel Processes (Pope, 2006: 29) 
Segment 6 is a continuation of those Parallel Processes, as shown in Figure 16.  
To complete the processes initiated above, RMLV mechanics will continue TPS repair 
activities while fluid systems are being assessed and repaired as necessary.  Because 
maintenance repair access requires the removal of TPS tiles, the RMLV undergoes a full 
systems check prior to TPS waterproofing.  On the bottom branch, the RMLV enters the 
engine repair process.  As each engine is assessed and/or repaired, the Number of Motors 
module will be increased; the RMLV will exit the cycle when the count is equal to the 
total number of engines assigned prior to the start of Ground Maintenance Operations 
(Pope, 2006: 31).   
 
Figure 16.  Parallel Processes, Continued (Pope, 2006: 29) 
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Segment 7, Engine Maintenance, is depicted in Figure 17.  “One aspect of the 
launch vehicle that will differ from aircraft maintenance is the fact that the engine will 
require certain tasks to be performed after every flight” (Pope, 2006: 31).  However, 
these maintenance repair actions are performed in parallel with TPS, avionics, and fluids 
actions, reducing the overall maintenance time.  A design including modular motors that 
can simply be removed and replaced would further reduce overall maintenance time.   
 
Figure 17.  Engine Maintenance (Pope, 2006: 31) 
Engine Maintenance operations are continued in Segment 8, shown in Figure 18.  
This section of the model completes engine diagnostics and repair.  Segments 7 and 8 are 
repeated for each engine (Pope, 2006: 33). 
 
Figure 18.  Engine Maintenance, Continued (Pope, 2006: 33) 
Segment 9, modeling Maintenance Completion, is shown in Figure 19.  The final 
segment of the Ground Maintenance Operations Cycle brings together all of the parallel 
processes that have been performed in the maintenance bay.  It culminates in the 
completion of TPS waterproofing and engine maintenance while preplanned 
maintenance, Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) actions, and landing gear and 
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tire maintenance are completed in parallel.  The final action is an engine check which, if 
good, routes the RMLV to Pre-launch Operations (Pope, 2006: 34). 
 
 
Figure 19.  Maintenance Completion (Pope, 2006: 34) 
RMLV ground maintenance operations exhibit many similarities to aircraft 
maintenance operations.  The primary differences between the two processes are the 
complexity and completion time of certain activities and the requirement for more 
extensive maintenance between each flight in areas such as the engines and landing gear.  
This implies that while an RMLV maintenance workforce may be larger than an aircraft 
maintenance workforce, it will not differ significantly in its composition of technical 
expertise. 
Part 3: Pre-launch Operations 
  RMLV pre-launch operations contain the highest degree of variability within the 
model.  Because the RMLV design concept is not yet solidified, Stiegelmeier had to 
account for many potential pre-launch scenarios based on a variety of existing platforms.  
These scenarios include horizontal or vertical integration of the three stages, pre-
integration of the first and second stages, pre-integration of the second stage and payload, 
and integration occurring on or off of the launch pad.  Models for each of these scenarios 
Waterproof TPS
     0
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were drawn from the Shuttle, aircraft, Atlas V, Delta IV, Zenit 3SL, and ICBM 
operations (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 26).  This set of processes differs most significantly from 
standard aircraft operations, but still incorporates skill sets that are available in today’s 
AF manpower structure. 
 Segment 1, Pre-integration of Second Stage and Payload, is shown in Figure 20.  
The first determination, which occurs simultaneously with ground maintenance 
operations, is whether pre-integration of the second stage and payload will occur 
(Stiegelmeier, 2006: 63).  These operations require support personnel using specialized 
GSE to secure the payload, align it with the second stage, and make all mechanical and 
electrical connections.  Although the pre-integration concept is modeled on the Shuttle 
pre-integration of boosters and external tanks (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 70), this process is 
similar to loading external munitions on aircraft. 
 
Figure 20.  Pre-integration of Second Stage and Payload (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 70) 
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Segment 2, Vehicle Integration Preliminary Considerations, is shown in Figure 
21.  This segment depicts three possible vehicle integration scenarios: integration on the 
launch pad, integration in the maintenance or storage facility, or integration in a separate 
facility (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 64).  On-pad integration is modeled on Expendable Launch 
Vehicle operations, while off-pad integration scenarios are based on the Atlas V and 
Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 70).  This segment 
is primarily composed of decision modules and will only require manpower if the vehicle 
must be transported to the launch pad or integration facility. 
 
Figure 21.  Vehicle Integration Preliminary Considerations (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 70) 
Segment 3, shown in Figure 22, addresses operations required for Vehicle 
Integration, Integrate on Pad.  The upper branch represents a payload previously 
integrated to the second stage, while the lower branch depicts a sequential integration of 
all three stages (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 65).  As in Segment 1, the positioning, alignment,  
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and connection of each of stage are similar to (though more complex than) loading 
aircraft ordnance.  
 
Figure 22.  Vehicle Integration, Integrate on Pad (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 65) 
Segment 4, addressing the modeled option for Vehicle Integration, Integrate off 
Pad, is shown in Figure 23.  This portion of the model, in which vehicle integration 
occurs at a facility away from the launch pad, includes a long series of processes 
depending upon how many and what type of integration actions are required 
(Stiegelmeier, 2006: 66).  It accounts for pre-integration, vertical or horizontal, on the 
upper branch, or sequential integration, vertical or horizontal, on the second branch.  
Atlas V provided the model for vertical integration activities, while Delta IV and Zenit 
3SL were referenced for horizontal integration (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 71).  After each stage 
integration action, electrical and mechanical connection checks are required, culminating 
with an entire vehicle check.  Once stages are mated, this portion of the model depicts the 
capability to load the payload, hypergolic fuel, and/or ordnance in the integration facility 
or on the launch pad (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 66).  The activities within the integration  
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process, regardless of the design alternatives, will require personnel with loading 
expertise as discussed in Segments 1 and 3 as well as fueling expertise. 
 
Figure 23.  Vehicle Integration, Integrate off Pad (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 66) 
Segment 5 depicts Launch Pad Operations for Vehicle not Integrated on Pad, and 
is shown in Figure 24.  The upper branch is based on the Zenit program and represents an 
RMLV that is transported to the launch pad horizontally on GSE that includes the vehicle 
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erector mechanism (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 71).  The lower branch depicts a vehicle that is 
transported to the pad in a vertical orientation, like the Shuttle, and accounts for the 
possibility of payload integration on the launch pad (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 67).  The 
primary activities during this process are the operation GSE and integration of the 
payload, if necessary. 
 
Figure 24.  Launch Pad Operations for Vehicle not Integrated on Pad  
(Stiegelmeier, 2006: 67) 
 
Segment 6, Launch Pad Operations, is depicted in Figure 25.  In this segment, 
ground support personnel make umbilical connections to the RMLV as required, based 
on the design configurations of the Shuttle, Atlas V, and Zenit programs, respectively 
(Stiegelmeier, 2006: 71).  The model then allows alternative paths based on the use of 
hypergolic fuels and RP-1 in each of the first and second stages, as well as the ability to 
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conduct parallel fueling operations (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 68).  Cryogenic fueling 
operations are represented in the next, and final, segment. 
 
Figure 25.  Launch Pad Operations (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 68) 
Finally, Segment 7, Propellant Loading, is depicted in Figure 26.  This segment is 
the final operation prior to launch and depicts the loading of cryogenic fuels, if required, 
via three alternatives: stages loaded in parallel, oxidizer and fuel loaded in parallel (Box 
1); stages loaded in parallel, oxidizer and fuel loaded sequentially (Box 2); or stages 
loaded sequentially with fuel and oxidizer loaded sequentially (Box 3) (Stiegelmeier, 
2006: 69).  The fueling activities depicted in Segments 7 and 8 have some degree of 
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similarity to aircraft fueling operations; however, this model depicts a much more 
complicated array of fueling possibilities, and the design alternatives will dictate the 
amount of additional training needed in the aircraft fuel workforce. 
 
Figure 26.  Propellant Loading (Stiegelmeier, 2006: 69) 
Summary 
 The MILEPOST model diagrams the series of activities required to recover, 
maintain, and prepare an RMLV for launch.  As such, it provides the foundation for 
ground support requirements that must be upheld by the RMLV logistics workforce.  In 
this segment-by-segment review of the model, we have identified the ways in which 
RMLV operations differ from aircraft operations in order to gain preliminary 
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understanding of the AF manpower structure’s ability to support this vehicle.  Chapter 
VI, Analysis of Organizational Structure, will further assess the type of AF organization 
that would best support the mission sequence defined by the model, while Chapter V, 
Analysis of Required Technical Expertise, will examine in greater detail the relationship 
between current AFSCs and the activities defined by the model. 
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IV. Methodology 
 This research effort was primarily a qualitative study, an effort to “answer 
questions about the complex nature” of providing logistics support to a newly-emerging 
space launch platform (Leedy, 2005: 94).  As such, the research process exhibited the 
following characteristics: 
Purpose: The purpose of the research effort was to gain a greater understanding of 
the logistics ground support implications of the RMLV.  Research was exploratory in 
nature, and research and observations throughout the research period were used to 
develop a workforce projection by synthesizing information from comparable sources. 
Process: Throughout the research process, research focus and research and 
analysis methods evolved as a more complete understanding of RMLV support 
requirements and logistics implications was developed. 
Data Collection: Logistics support requirements can only be “easily divided into 
discrete, measurable variables” (Leedy, 2005: 96) based upon historical data for a 
platform.  Since this type of data was not available for the RMLV, data was collected 
from previous research efforts, AF and DoD policy, and historical data from comparable 
platforms, focusing on gaining increased insight from these sources rather than trying to 
collect quantitative data from a sample. 
Data Analysis: The data analysis method in this study was partially subjective in 
nature, relying on inductive reasoning and synthesis to gather many specific observations 
from aircraft, EELV, ICBM, and Shuttle operations that led to inferences about the 
logistics support structure for the RMLV (Leedy, 2005: 95-96).  However, manpower 
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analysis also utilized a designed experiment approach to assessing the impact of 
individual factors on logistics manpower.  This approach is described in greater detail in 
the Data Collection and Analysis Strategies section of this chapter. 
 The research method selected for this thesis, described in the following section, 
was uniquely tailored to the objective of determining the logistics ground support 
workforce for an RMLV fleet, and provided a solid analytical framework for conducting 
a thorough qualitative study. 
An Analytical Framework for Projecting an RMLV Ground Support Workforce 
The RMLV will be an AF asset and, as such, the support organization for the 
vehicle was developed in accordance with AF policy as defined by AF Policy Document 
38-2, Manpower, and AF Instruction 38-201, Determining Manpower Requirements.  The 
purpose of the guidance outlined in these documents is to ensure that AF units 
“successfully accomplish assigned missions using [the] minimum levels of manpower 
needed to effectively and efficiently execute missions” (Air Force, AFPD 38-2, 1995: 1).  
AFI 38-201 provided a step-by-step process by which to determine unit manpower 
requirements under this construct.  These instructions, therefore, provided the analytical 
framework for this research project. 
Identifying the Requirements. 
 The AF manpower requirements determination process begins with a well-defined 
mission requirement.  This research began with a comparison of the MILEPOST model 
to the current AFSC structure in order to fully describe the RMLV support requirements 
and determine the capability of existing AFSCs to perform support operations.  This 
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enabled the selection of an appropriate manpower standard or alternate method of 
manpower requirements calculation in later steps of the research process. 
Identifying the Organizational Structure. 
 The AF requires that “[o]rganizations with like responsibilities should have 
similar organizational structures” (Air Force, AFPD 38-1, 1996: 2.7).  Based on the 
RMLV mission statement defined in Chapter I, Introduction, the research proceeded to 
determine the most appropriate AF organizational structure for an RMLV unit by 
comparing the RMLV mission to other AF organizational missions to discover the most 
appropriate structure for the new vehicle.  This information also contributed to the 
selection of the most appropriate method of manpower requirements determination. 
Determining the Manpower Requirements. 
 Methods of determining manpower requirements are established in AFI 38-201, 
Determining Manpower Requirements.  These methods were explored, assessed, and 
applied in the next phase of research in order to staff the organization created in the 
previous section. 
Assessing Life Cycle Cost and Training Implications. 
 Due to the unique nature of the RMLV, there may be ground logistics support 
shortfalls in the technical expertise of the current AF manpower pool.  The final stage of 
this research addressed the training requirements and estimated life cycle costs generated 
by the manpower determination formed in the previous section. 
Data Collection and Analysis Strategies 
Initial data collection relied heavily upon the MILEPOST model and the 
developers’ sources of RMLV information.  To complete Step 1 in the research method, 
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MILEPOST activities were compared to AF manpower resources as defined by AF 
guidance, developing a matrix assigning applicable AFSCs to each activity.  For the 
purpose of projecting how AF manpower support may develop in response to the 
introduction of a new weapons system into the AF inventory, supplemental data was 
collected from observations during a tour of the B-2 maintenance facility and historical 
information on the development of the B-2 logistics support structure.   
Data for the assessment of organizational structure was collected for agencies of 
interest primarily from their homepages or from the AF Portal.  Organizational structure 
information was collected only from AF organizations because the RMLV unit will need 
to be organized in accordance with current AF policy.   
In order to determine manpower requirements, procedural guidance was provided 
by the AF Materiel Command manpower office to determine the best method to project 
manpower requirements for the RMLV.  Input data for the manpower numbers 
themselves was based on a synthesis of maintenance man-hour and other logistics support 
data from aircraft, ELVs and EELVs, the Shuttle, and ICBMs, as applicable, to maintain 
consistency with the MILEPOST model.  As factors affecting manpower numbers were 
identified, they were assigned to a designed experiment where the response variable, Y, 
represents manpower and the total number of factors, k, are represented by individual 
variables, Xk.  The generalized form of the experiment design is depicted in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Design of Experiment 
Design Factors 
Point X1 X2 X3 
1 0 0 1 
2 0 1 1 
3 1 0 0 
4 1 1 0 
5 1 1 1 
 63 
 
Factors are identified in Chapter VII, Manpower Assessment, and combinations of 
factors were sampled methodically to avoid the pitfall of “investigation of a handful of 
design points where many factors change simultaneously” (Sanchez, 2005: 71).  This 
research assumed that there were no interactions among factors. 
Finally, in evaluating training requirements and life cycle cost implications, 
historical data was collected from AF ground support training methods for new aircraft 
acquisitions and from DoD and AF policy on life cycle costing.  By collecting multiple 
sources of data, the potential for bias in the analysis was reduced.   
Assessing the Validity of the Research Method 
 In order to provide a useful tool to RMLV design and planning personnel, the 
research method outlined above must be validated.  Quantitative researchers typically 
focus on ensuring the internal and external validity of their research design.  Internal 
validity is defined as “the extent to which [the] design and the data it yields allow the 
researcher to draw accurate conclusions about cause-and-effect and other relationships 
within the data” (Leedy, 2005: 97).  External validity is “the extent to which…results 
apply to situations beyond the study itself” (Leedy, 2005: 99).  In the case of this 
research, external validity is not of great concern, as the results of the research are meant 
to provide insight into this specific problem.  However, the research method modeled 
upon the AF process for determining manpower requirements should be proven to yield 
an accurate representation of what the true AF manpower requirements for support of an 
RMLV fleet will be.   
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 Qualitative researchers rely on various methods of supporting validity of their 
findings.  One method that supported the validity of this research was triangulation, or 
“comparing multiple data sources in search of common themes” (Leedy, 2005: 100).  
Additionally, following manpower determination methods outlined in AF policy ensured 
that the findings of this research were valid within the AF construct.  Finally, sensitivity 
analysis was performed where applicable to account for as much variability in RMLV 
design as possible and maximize the utility of research findings to the RMLV 
development process. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, a step-by-step qualitative research methodology was outlined.  
This method was based upon AF guidance for manpower determination and the synthesis 
of logistics support data from MILEPOST and its source platforms.  Validity was 
achieved through synthesizing multiple data sources, following standardized AF 
procedures, and performing sensitivity analysis.  The next chapter will begin execution of 
this research methodology by comparing MILEPOST activities to available AF technical 
expertise. 
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V.  Analysis of Required Technical Expertise 
  
Although the RMLV will differ considerably from any weapons system in the AF 
inventory, the AF manpower pool offered a great deal of applicable technical expertise.  
Because one of the objectives of RMLV design is to achieve “aircraft-like” operations, 
many of the activities identified in MILEPOST were based on aircraft operations, and 
AFSCs were applied directly.  Additionally, activities that were derived from Shuttle or 
ICBM operations correlated strongly to AFSCs for Aircraft Maintenance or Space and 
Missile Operations and Maintenance.  This chapter provides an introduction to the 
AFSCs that apply to ground support operations for the RMLV, identifies the correlation 
between those AFSCs and each stage of the regeneration process, and identifies any 
manpower shortfalls for the RMLV. 
AFSC Analysis 
The AF manpower structure currently accounts for many career fields for aircraft, 
space, and missile mission support.  As established in Chapter II, Literature Review, any 
AFSCs related to Maintenance and Logistics Readiness formed the available support pool 
for RMLV regeneration activities.  In order to specifically identify the career fields 
within these categories, the AF Officer and Enlisted Classification Directories, which list 
all approved AF standard AFSCs, were reviewed.  AFSCs were divided into Direct 
Support and Indirect Support categories with respect to the RMLV.  Additionally, it was 
noted that certain functions performed in support of mission requirements were not 
captured by one specific AFSC.  Personnel performing these functions are critical to 
mission success, but they may be assigned from a variety of AFSCs, and were addressed  
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under a third category, Cross-Functional Requirements.  Finally, as specified in Chapter 
II, Literature Review, base support and infrastructure functions such as Civil Engineering 
and Security Forces were not addressed in this research.  
Direct Support AFSCs. 
 Aircraft operations were a direct input to the development of the MILEPOST 
model, particularly in the Recovery and Ground Maintenance segments (Martindale, 
2006; Pope, 2006).  As a result, the Manned Aerospace Maintenance AFSCs listed in 
Table 4, developed to support AF aircraft, form part of the Direct Support manpower 
pool available for RMLV support. 
Table 4.  Manned Aerospace Maintenance AFSCs  
(Air Force, AFOCD, 2006: 74; Air Force, AFECD, 2006: 71-99) 
Manned Aerospace 
Maintenance 21AX Maintenance Officer
Avionics 2A600 Chief Enlisted Manager 2A0X1
Avionics Test Station and 
Components
2A090 Superintendent
Aerospace Maintenance 2A300 Chief Enlisted Manager 2A5X1 Aerospace Maintenance
2A590 Superintendent 2A5X3 Integrated Avionics
Aerospace Propulsion 2A600 Chief Enlisted Manager 2A6X1 Propulsion
2A691 Superintendent
Aerospace Ground 
Equipment (AGE) 2A600 Chief Enlisted Manager 2A6X2 AGE
2A692 Superintendent
Aircraft Systems 2A600 Chief Enlisted Manager 2A6X4 Fuel Systems
2A690 Superintendent 2A6X5 Hydraulics
2A6X6 Electrical and Environmental
Aircraft Fabrication 2A600 Chief Enlisted Manager 2A7X1 Metals Technology
2A790 Superintendent 2A7X2 NDI
2A7X3 Structural Maintenance
Manned Aerospace Maintenance
Management and Supervision Technicians
  
 In addition to personnel supporting Manned Aerospace Maintenance, Munitions 
and Weapons personnel may also contribute to Direct Support.  As indicated in the 
Recovery segment of MILEPOST, the potential ability of the RMLV to return with 
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External Stores is equated to operations conducted when an F-16 lands with unexpended 
ordnance.  This suggests that the functions of integrating and possibly unloading 
payloads and/or ordnance could be the responsibility of AF personnel with the AFSCs 
listed in Table 5. 
Table 5.  Munitions and Weapons AFSCs  
(Air Force, AFOCD, 2006: 74; Air Force, AFECD, 2006: 153-157) 
Munitions Systems 2W000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2W0X1 Munitions Systems
2W091 Superintendent
Aircraft Armament Systems 2W100 Chief Enlisted Manager 2W1X1 Aircraft Armament Systems
2W191 Superintendent
Munitions and Weapons
Management and Supervision Technicians
  
 Finally, the AF Missile and Space Systems Maintenance Career Field offers 
capabilities that are well-suited to RMLV operations.  AF personnel in this career field 
are responsible for the AF inventory of ICBMs, one of the platforms referenced in 
MILEPOST development.  Additionally, one of the competency sets encompassed by this 
career field is the ability to “acquire, activate, and supervise assembly, transportation, 
maintenance, inspection, modification, and launch processing of spacelift boosters,  
satellites, and subsystems” (Air Force, AFECD, 2006: 125).  The AFSCs in Table 6 are 
included in Missile and Space Systems Maintenance. 
Table 6.  Missile and Space Systems Maintenance AFSCs  
(Air Force, AFOCD, 2006: 75; Air Force, AFECD, 2006: 125-130) 
21MX Missile Maintenance Officer
Missile and Space Systems 
Maintenance 2M000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2M0X1
Missile and Space Electronic 
Maintenance
2M090 Superintendent 2M0X2
Missile and Space Systems 
Maintenance
Missile and Space Systems Maintenance
Management and Supervision Technicians
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Indirect Support AFSCs. 
 In addition to the hands-on, technical operation and maintenance of each RMLV, 
indirect support functions in the categories of Logistics Ground Support, Maintenance 
Support and Other Ground Support will be required to support regeneration activities.   
 Logistics Ground Support AFSCs, listed in Table 7, perform the functions of an 
AF Logistics Readiness Squadron: procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies and 
fuels; development and supervision of logistics and support plans and agreements; 
packaging, handling, and shipment of freight; operation and maintenance of mission 
support vehicles; and inspection, preparation, and loading of freight onto military aircraft. 
Table 7.  Logistics Ground Support AFSCs  
(Air Force, AFOCD, 2006: 77; Air Force AFECD, 2006: 119-124, 137-152) 
Logistics Management 21RX Logistics Readiness Officer
Fuels Management 2F000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2F0X1 Fuels
2F091 Superintendent
Logistics Plans 2G000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2G0x1 Logistics Plans
2G091 Superintendent
Supply Management 2S000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2S0X1 Supply
2S090 Superintendent
Traffic Management 2T000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2T0X1 Traffic Management
2T091 Superintendent
Management and Supervision
Logistics Ground Support
Technicians
Vehicle Maintenance 
Management 2T300 Chief Enlisted Manager 2T3X1
Vehicle/Vehicular Equip 
Maintenance
2T391 Superintendent 2T3X2 Special Vehicle Maintenance
2T3X4
General Purpose Vehicle 
Maintenance
2T3X5 Vehicle Body Maintenance
2T3X7
Vehicle Management and 
Analysis
Air Transportation 2T200 Chief Enlisted Manager 2T2X1 Air Transportation
2T291 Superintendent  
Maintenance Support functions include analyzing repair data, scheduling 
maintenance activities, and managing maintenance facilities.  Aircraft and space and  
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missile Maintenance Support personnel are categorized under the AFSCs in Table 8.  
Table 8.  Maintenance Support AFSCs (Air Force, AFECD, 2006: 133-136, 125-130) 
Maintenance Support 2R000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2R0X1
Maintenance Management 
Analysis
2R091 Superintendent 2R1X1
Maintenance Management 
Production
Missile and Space  Support 2M000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2M0X3 Missile and Space Facilities
2M091 Superintendent
Maintenance Support
Management and Supervision Technicians
 
 In addition to Logistics and Maintenance Support, Other Ground Support 
functions are required to ensure a safe and successful mission.  Safety personnel ensure 
the safety of the launch pad, vehicle, and all personnel involved in regeneration activities.  
Space Systems Operations personnel provide “space lift operations support to fulfill war 
fighting and national requirements” (Air Force, AFECD, 2006: 40).  Precision 
Measurement Equipment Laboratory personnel provide “maintenance, modification, 
repair, calibration, and certification for test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment,” 
(Air Force, AFECD, 2006: 132), which will be especially critical if the RMLV utilizes an 
IVHM system.  AFSCs assigned to these specialties are listed in Table 9. 
Table 9.  Other Ground Support AFSCs  
(Air Force, AFECD, 2006: 40, 59-60, 132; Air Force, AFOCD, 2006: 49) 
Safety 1S000 Chief Enlisted Manager 1S0X1 Safety
1S090 Superintendent
Space Systems Operations 13SX
Space and Missile Operations 
Officer 1C6X1 Space Systems Operations
1C600 Chief Enlisted Manager
1C691 Superintendent
PMEL 2P000 Chief Enlisted Manager 2P0X1 PMEL
2P091 Superintendent
Other Ground Support
Management and Supervision Technicians
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Cross-Functional Support. 
 Certain oversight and operations management positions authorized in an AF unit 
manpower structure are staffed based on a desired level of experience and excellence in 
an overall discipline, and may be performed by personnel with varying AFSCs within 
that discipline.  The cross-functional nature of these positions prevents us from capturing 
them directly from the AFSC data, but they are critical to the mission success of any unit.  
These functions include:  Quality Assurance (QA), Inspection, and Maintenance 
Operations Center (MOC). 
Quality Assurance (QA). 
The QA function within the Maintenance Support discipline is responsible 
for managing an organization’s Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation Program, 
through which “the quality of equipment and the proficiency of maintenance personnel” 
are evaluated (Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 190).  QA inspectors may be  drawn from 
individual maintenance workcenters once they have six months of time in the unit, and 
are assigned to QA duties for 24 to 36 months (Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 194).  The 
QA function is aligned administratively within the Maintenance Operations Squadron, 
but reports directly to the Group Commander due to its unique role as the centralized 
management point for “identify[ing] underlying causes of poor quality in the 
maintenance production effort…and recommending corrective actions to supervisors” 
(Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 190). 
Inspection.  
The consolidated Inspection function within a Logistics Readiness 
Squadron is managed by the Procedures and Accountability flight (Air Mobility 
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Command, AMCMD 716, 2004: 5), with the assistance of established Inspection 
functions within each of the functional areas.  Specifically, the Supply discipline requires 
that qualified inspection personnel are assigned “as required to effect maximum 
surveillance through a minimum expenditure of effort in applying adequate identification, 
condition, and status markings to items received, stored, issued, and shipped” (Air Force, 
AFMAN 23-110, 2006: Vol 1, Part 1, 4-1).  Within the Logistics Fuels specialty, a 
separate flight is established for Compliance and Environmental, responsible for 
evaluating the following:  management effectiveness, administrative/LAN procedures, 
FISC accounting procedures, operator performance, ground safety and fire prevention, 
environmental compliance, corrosion control, care of equipment and facilities, training, 
[and] procedures for product quality” (Air Force, AFI 23-201, 2004: 53).  Thus, for 
Logistics Support activities, the Inspection function will have to be taken into account in 
the manpower of each AFSC as well as the cross-functional oversight personnel in 
Procedures and Accountability. 
Maintenance Operations Center (MOC).   
The MOC “monitors and coordinates sortie production, maintenance 
production, and execution of the flying and maintenance schedules while maintaining 
visibility of fleet health indicators” (Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 143).  Essentially, this 
center acts as the centralized control system for all maintenance activities, coordinating 
those activities to maximize flying missions.  In order to be assigned to the MOC, the 
AFI requires that personnel “be experienced with the MIS [Maintenance Information 
System] and be qualified by formal training or experience on at least one of the assigned 
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weapons systems” (Air Force, AFI 21-101, 2006: 145), which allows personnel from any 
AFSC to staff the center. 
AFSC Assignment to MILEPOST Activities 
 While the current AF manpower structure incorporates a considerable variety of 
technical capabilities supporting air and space missions, it may still be insufficient for 
support of the unique hybrid characteristics of the RMLV.  In order to determine the 
suitability of current AFSCs to RMLV ground support operations, a matrix was 
developed listing all of the RMLV regeneration activities defined in MILEPOST and an 
appropriate AFSC was assigned to each activity, drawing from the Direct Support, 
Indirect Support, and Cross-Functional AFSC pools identified above.  The primary 
purpose of this matrix, located at Appendix A, was to identify those regeneration 
activities that require technical expertise that is wholly or partially absent from current 
AFSC resources.  
As such, the matrix focused only on assigning at least one AFSC to each activity, 
and does not capture the entire scope of support required for any activity.  For example, 
the activity in which the Launch Vehicle is towed to the maintenance hangar would be 
performed primarily by the Aerospace Ground Equipment troop operating the tow 
vehicle and the maintenance personnel acting as spotters, as depicted in Table 10. 
Table 10.  AFSC Assignment to MILEPOST Activity (Pope, 2006) 
Ground Maintenance Operations 
Disconnection from the Launch Vehicle 
Activity Platform AFSC Comments 
Transport to Mx Bay Aircraft 2A6X2, 2AXXX 
AGE, spotters/wing-walkers (any 
maintenance AFSC) 
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However, assigning the 2A6X2 and 2AXXX AFSCs to this activity fails to 
capture the MOC personnel scheduling the maintenance bay and repair actions, the 
Missile and Space Facilities personnel responsible for the hangar, the Supply personnel 
responsible for providing spares for the RMLV and tow vehicle, the Vehicle 
Management personnel responsible for the maintenance of the tow vehicle, and the 
Quality Assurance and Inspection personnel overseeing all of these actions.  As a result, 
this tool does not translate directly into manpower requirements for support of the 
RMLV.  Total requirements will be determined in Chapter VII, Manpower Assessment, 
in accordance with AF policy. 
Assumptions. 
In populating the matrix, it was assumed that specific training for RMLV 
activities or support equipment operations would be provided in the same manner that it 
is provided for any new AF platform; therefore, as long as an AFSC met the general 
expertise requirement for the activity (propulsion, for example), the additional expertise 
required to repair an RMLV jet engine rather than an aircraft jet engine did not constitute 
a shortfall. 
Additionally, I assumed that the integration configuration of the RMLV 
(horizontal or vertical) would impact the AFSCs responsible for integration operations.  
Given a horizontal integration scenario, I assumed that AGE personnel would maintain 
responsibility for maneuvering the RMLV, while Air Transportation personnel would be 
responsible for aligning and attaching the second stage and payload (whether pre-
integrated or not).  In the horizontal configuration, the first stage is easily accessible to 
Air Transportation personnel to maneuver and “load” the second stage and payload.  This 
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configuration allows responsibility for the “aircraft” stage and the “cargo” stages to 
reasonably remain within their current AFSC constructs.  In a vertical integration 
scenario, however, the nature of the process necessitates that a single set of equipment be 
used to erect, align, and attach each stage.  As a result, it does not make sense to assign 
the stages of integration to multiple AFSCs, and I assigned the entire operation to AGE.  
Under this scenario, Air Transportation personnel would be responsible for preintegrating 
the second stage and payload (if applicable), and delivering the second stage and payload 
to AGE for final integration.  This assumption had little impact on identifying shortfalls, 
as both AFSCs are available and sufficient for these operations.  However, the 
assignment choices will impact the Manpower Assessment in Chapter VII. 
While the matrix verified that current AFSCs sufficiently capture many of the 
technical specialties required for RMLV ground operations, there are shortfalls in the AF 
manpower structure that will need to be addressed. 
Shortfalls 
 Shortfalls identified in the matrix occurred in the Recovery and Pre-Launch 
Operations phases of MILEPOST.  Maintenance activities exhibited no shortfalls because 
the systems contained within the RMLV (fuel systems, hydraulic systems, propulsion 
systems, structures) are also contained within AF aircraft and ICBMs.  Recovery and Pre-
Launch Operations, however, included several processes that differ significantly from 
similar operations performed on aircraft. 
Shortfalls can be classified into two categories: Lack of Expertise and Lack of 
Experience.  A Lack of Expertise shortfall occurs when an RMLV regeneration activity 
requires a skill set that is not required by any platform currently in the AF inventory.  
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Such a shortfall would require the addition of the entire skill set to a current AFSC or 
procurement of the required support through a contract.  This type of shortfall is not 
historically unprecedented.  When the B-2 was introduced into the AF inventory, the 
unique maintenance requirements generated by its Low Observable and Thermal 
Protection structural components required both specific training for personnel with the 
Structural Repair AFSC and contracted support from Northrop Grumman to ensure the 
continuity of maintenance operations (B-2 Visit, 2006).  The training commitment for 
this type of shortfall may be significant due to the lack of previously existing, similar 
training.  A Lack of Experience shortfall occurs when current AF weapons systems 
require some general level of knowledge that could be applied to the RMLV activity, but 
the scope of the RMLV activity is much greater than that currently experienced in the 
AF.  A Lack of Experience shortfall can be reasonably solved through additional training. 
Lack of Expertise Shortfalls. 
 Lack of Expertise shortfalls occurred primarily as a result of the unique propellant 
alternatives for the RMLV, and the hazardous conditions that can result from their use.  
Hazardous Gas Purge, Coolant Ground Support Equipment, Vaccuum Vent Duct 
Inerting, Load Hypergolic Fuel, and Load RP-1 Fuel MILEPOST activities all require 
technical expertise beyond that currently inherent to any AFSC. 
Hazardous Gas Purge.   
The propellants utilized by the launch vehicle have the potential to create 
hazardous gas conditions within the RMLV, requiring that the vehicle be purged upon 
landing for the safety of personnel involved in the regeneration activities.   
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Coolant Ground Support Equipment (GSE).   
The extreme heat generated by the high speed takeoff and reentry into the 
earth’s atmosphere require that the RMLV be hooked up to coolant support immediately 
upon landing.  The Coolant GSE maintains a suitable temperature for electronic and 
control systems as the vehicle’s onboard cooling system is powering down (Martindale, 
2006: 10).  
Tank Vent RMLV Main Engine.   
This process addresses the “venting of fuels and fumes from the RMLV 
main engine (ME) tanks to ensure potential hazards are eliminated prior to the vehicle 
entering the maintenance facility” (Martindale, 2006: 36). 
Lack of Experience Shortfalls. 
 The Lack of Experience shortfalls occurred in safing and fueling operations that 
are commonly performed on AF aircraft.  The RMLV, however, introduces new and 
more hazardous materials to the operations. 
Drag Chutes.   
This operation involves safing the drag chute pyrotechnics.  While the     
F-104A employed drag chutes, it is no longer active in the AF inventory (F104A, 2007).  
The B-52 maintains the capability to deploy drag chutes for landing, but this is not part of 
normal operating procedures (What a Drag, 2007).  However, pyrotechnics are used in 
ejection seats, and this activity simply reflects a greater scope of a similar operation. 
LOX Safing.   
In addition to the pyrotechnics, the ground crew must safe the LOX tanks 
to “ensure no venting occurs which could produce a fire hazard condition” (Martindale, 
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2006: 32).  While utilized in small quantities as a crew oxygen source, LOX is not used 
as a major fuel source in AF weapons systems, so the presence of LOX in these quantities 
constitutes a shortfall in experience.  
Hypergolic Leak Detection.  
If the RMLV design includes hypergolic fuels, leak detection will be part 
of the safety assessment upon landing.  The hypergolic fuel hydrazine is used in small 
quantities in the Emergency Power Unit of the F-16.  As this unit is only used in 
emergencies, AF personnel have limited exposure to hydrazine.  The RMLV will require 
greater experience in detecting and managing hypergolic fuel leaks. 
Load Hypergolic Fuel/Load RP-1 fuel.   
Neither of these fuel alternatives is common to current AF platforms. 
Chill and Load LOX and Fuel.   
“RMLVs require both fuel and oxidizer for engine operation” 
(Stiegelmeier, 2006: 34).  This propellant combination is not common to any other AF 
airframe, and Fuels personnel will require additional qualification and training to handle 
and distribute this fuel type. 
Summary 
 All of the ground support activities identified in MILEPOST can be supported by 
the AFSC structure in its current form; however, as with the introduction of any new 
platform, there will be shortfalls in expertise and experience.  These shortfalls will have 
to be addressed in a training program; training implications will be discussed in Chapter 
VIII, Conclusions and Future Research. 
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VI.  Analysis of Organizational Structure 
Air Force Policy Docurment 38-1, Organization, states that the principal 
characteristics desired in Air Force organizations are mission-orientation, unambiguous 
command, decentralization, agility, flexibility, simplicity, and standardization (Air Force, 
AFPD 38-1, 1996: 1).  Air Force Policy specifically requires that “[o]rganizations with 
like responsibilities should have similar organizational structures” (Air Force, AFPD 38-
1, 1996: 1).  The key to assessing the future organizational structure required to support 
an RMLV fleet, then, is to determine what current Air Force organization possesses “like 
responsibilities” to the RMLV mission, and model the organizational structure on that 
example.  Because the RMLV is not exactly like anything in the current inventory, but is 
a synthesis of a space mission with the desire for an aircraft-like operational capacity, we 
will examine the Air Force organizational structures of operational units within AF Space 
Command (AFSPC), Air Combat Command (ACC), and Air Mobility Command (AMC) 
to determine which aspects of each structure appear to be most appropriate to the RMLV 
mission.  
In Chapter I, Introduction, the RMLV mission was defined as:  to preserve the 
nation’s freedom of operations in space by providing dependable, responsive spacelift 
capability to deliver payloads supporting deployment, sustainment, augmentation, and 
operations missions within hours or days of initial tasking.  The following sections 
summarize a comparison of this mission statement to the mission statements of Air Force 
organizations at the MAJCOM, Wing, and Unit levels to capture similarities and 
determine the organizational structure that will define the RMLV fleet.  Additionally, 
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similarities and differences in the maintenance and ground support missions will be 
addressed to further pinpoint the optimal logistics support structure for the RMLV.  
MAJCOM-Level Evaluation  
AFSPC would appear to be the natural organizational location for an RMLV 
wing.  The mission of AFSPC is “to defend the United States through the control and 
exploitation of space” (Air Force Space Command, 2006).  AFSPC is a combat-oriented 
command, seeking to “provide a full-spectrum Space Combat Command preeminent in 
the application of space power for national security and joint warfare” through the 
application of four strategic focal points: securing the space domain and providing space 
combat capabilities to warfighters, maintaining deterrent capabilities and pursuing new 
triad capabilities, excelling in space acquisition, and providing world-class professional 
development and quality-of-life support to AFSPC personnel (Air Force Space 
Command, 2006).  The RMLV, as currently envisioned, is a combat support vehicle, and 
seems to fit within the AFSPC mission and strategic focus only in that its payload may 
provide combat, deterrent, or triad capabilities, and it would be obtained through the 
space acquisition process.  However, AFSPC assets do include all of the current AF space 
and missile launch vehicles, so that while the mission statement does not reflect similar 
organizational responsibilities, those responsibilities are supported by assets within the 
AFSPC organization.  This will be examined in greater detail at the Wing and Unit levels, 
as we evaluate the missions of Space Launch Wings and their sub-organizations.  
Air Combat Command encompasses the AF’s fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, 
battle-management, and electronic-combat platforms, and is the “primary force provider 
of combat airpower to America's warfighting commands” in support of global 
 80 
implementation of national security strategy (Air Combat Command, 2006).  ACC also 
provides “command, control, communications and intelligence systems, and conducts 
global information operations” as well as maintaining “combat-ready forces for rapid 
deployment and employment while ensuring strategic air defense forces are ready to meet 
the challenges of peacetime air sovereignty and wartime air defense” (Air Combat 
Command, 2006).  ACC assets are highly-deployed, providing support and augmentation 
to geographical commands and AOR commanders.  The RMLV mission includes 
launching and maintaining satellites that directly support information operations for the 
warfighter, as well as providing deterrence, response, or denial of access against agents 
that seek to challenge our peacetime space sovereignty or wartime space defense.  In 
these respects, the mission of the RMLV fleet is similar to that of ACC assets; again, 
however, the vehicles themselves simply provide the delivery mechanism for the 
payloads that directly carry out these operations.  In terms of ground support operations, 
previous research has identified the B-2 as a platform that is “similar in many ways to the 
launch vehicle,” and as a result the B-2 was used as a source of input for constructing the 
Ground Maintenance Operations segment of MILEPOST (Pope, 2006: 22).  This 
constitutes a basis for “like responsibilities,” particularly regarding logistics support, and 
indicates that an appropriate organizational structure may be similar to an ACC bomber 
wing.  We will explore the bomber mission comparison in greater detail at the Wing and 
Unit levels.  Finally, since the RMLV is to be unmanned, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) like the Predator and Global Hawk, both ACC assets due to their reconnaissance 
mission, may provide a relevant comparison platform for organizational structures.  
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These organizations, as well, will be explored in further detail at the Wing and Unit 
levels.   
Finally, the spacelift function of the RMLV fleet would seem to align with the Air 
Mobility Command’s mission to provide “rapid, global mobility and sustainment for 
America's armed forces” (Air Mobility Command, 2006).  As AMC recognizes, “without 
the capability to project forces, there is no conventional deterrent” (Air Mobility 
Command, 2006).  The same will be true in space, and the RMLV fleet will provide the 
asset projection capability that enables its mission focus of deterrence.  Additionally, the 
projected use of the RMLV fleet to provide space cargo-delivery capability, and even 
future space refueling operations as part of satellite maintenance, bears significant 
similarity to AMC’s fleets of airlifters and air refuelers.  AMC is focused on providing a 
“rapid, tailored response” (Air Mobility Command, 2006) that directly correlates with the 
RMLV requirement for responsiveness, and AMC’s combat support role is similar to the 
role we expect RMLVs to play in the combat environment.  Based on these similarities, 
we will continue to assess the applicability of an AMC organizational structure at the 
Wing level. 
The mission of the RMLV contains elements that align it with portions of each of 
the operational MAJCOMs examined.  While the mission statement bears the greatest 
direct resemblance to the mission and operations of an AMC wing, the RMLV is a space 
vehicle like those assigned to AFSPC, and it also supports reconnaissance and 
information support missions that traditionally fall under ACC.  Additionally, the RMLV 
maintenance requirements bear significant similarities to B-2 logistics support.  In the 
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next section, an examination of individual Wing missions within these MAJCOMs will 
attempt to narrow the organizational correlations to the RMLV. 
Wing-Level Evaluation 
 Since AFSPC, ACC, and AMC missions all correlated in some manner to the 
RMLV mission, this section will provide an evaluation of aircraft Wings within all three 
MAJCOMs.  Additionally, while the AF does not operate a Wing for any unmanned 
aircraft, the section will conclude with an examination of UAV Squadrons for similarities 
to the RMLV. 
Air Force Space Command Wings. 
 AFSPC is made up of Space Wings, which encompass both missile and space 
launch assets.  The mission statements of both types of Space Wing will be reviewed to 
determine similarities to the RMLV mission. 
Missile Wings.   
The mission of the 90th Space Wing at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, is to 
“defend America with the world’s premier combat ready ICBM force: On time, Every 
time, Any time” (90th Space Wing Mission, 2006).  In like manner, the mission of the 91st 
Space Wing at Minot AFB, North Dakota, is to “defend the United States with safe, 
secure intercontinental ballistic missiles, ready to immediately put bombs on target” 
(Rough Riders, 2006).  The nature of the ICBM mission requires maintaining a constant 
state of readiness to launch, without actually launching.  Unlike an aircraft wing, ICBMs 
are not regularly launched and recovered, though they will be frequently tested for system 
readiness.  At current Shuttle launch rates, which have historically achieved a maximum 
of seven to eight flights per year (McCleskey, 2005: 3), RMLVs would not often be 
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actively employed, but primarily maintained in a constant state of readiness to respond to 
a space launch need.  In this sense, the RMLV mission could be very much like the 
mission at an ICBM wing, and the ICBM maintenance support structure may provide a 
comparable foundation for the RMLV logistics support organization, which will be 
further explored at the Unit level. 
Space Launch Wings.   
At the 45th Space Wing, Patrick AFB, Florida, host unit to Cape Canaveral 
Air Force Station, the mission is to “assure access to the high frontier and to support 
global operations” (45th Space Wing, 2006).  Again, in a similar fashion, the mission of 
the 30th Space Wing, Vandenberg AFB, California, is to “defend the United States 
through Launch, Range, and Expeditionary Operations” (30th Space Wing Mission & 
Vision, 2006).  Cape Canaveral, as the launch site for the Space Shuttle, the nation’s only 
current form of reusable launch vehicle, provides a potential for commonality that does 
not exist with any other AF organizational structure.  In fact, as stated in the Introduction, 
Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg have been identified as the two most likely bases of 
operation for the RMLV fleet.  Additionally, the mission of providing space access to 
defend the US and provide global support to our forces is consistent with the RMLV 
operational responsibilities.  However, there are key differences that suggest that the 
logistics support organizations at these two bases will not provide a sufficient framework 
for RMLV organizations.  First, at Cape Canaveral, the United Space Alliance exercises 
“prime responsibility for the day-to-day operations of NASA’s Space Shuttle Program,” 
while RMLV support is assumed to be a blue-suit operation (USA History, 2006).  
Second, at Vandenberg, AF launch missions are accomplished through EELV Launch 
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Capability (ELC) and Launch Services (ELS) contracts, in which the contractor provides 
“engineering; program management; launch and range site activities; and mission 
integration” for individual missions which are purchased two years in advance of launch 
(Air Force Awards EELV Funding, 2006).  As a result, neither of these Wings, while 
possessing similar mission responsibilities to the RMLV, will provide an accurate 
foundation for its logistics manpower support structure. 
Air Combat Command Wings. 
 As indicated by the missions outlined at the MAJCOM level, ACC Wings support 
a wide variety of combat and direct combat support missions.  Specifically, in this 
section, Fighter and Bomber Wings will be evaluated for similarities to the RMLV 
mission. 
Fighter Wings.   
While the 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Virginia “trains, organizes and 
equips expeditionary Airmen; [to] deploy, fight and win” (1st Fighter Wing, 2006), the 4th 
Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina “provides worldwide deployable 
aircraft and personnel capable of executing combat missions in support of the Aerospace 
Expeditionary Force” (Seymour Johnson AFB Mission, 2006).  Similarly, at Eglin AFB, 
Shaw AFB, Cannon AFB, Holloman AFB, Mountain Home AFB, and Hill AFB, the 
mission focus is on force projection, expeditionary operations, and global, rapid 
deployment capability (33rd Fighter Wing, 2006; Shaw AFB Mission, 2006; 27th Fighter 
Wing, 2006; Holloman AFB Mission, 2006; 366th Fighter Wing Mission, 2006; 388th 
Fighter Wing Mission, 2006).  Additionally, while Fighter aircraft inventories are large, 
with multiple squadrons in a wing, the RMLV fleet will be small, a single unit with only 
 85 
six vehicles.  The logistics support organization for a Fighter Wing has a vastly different 
magnitude and mission focus than what will be required for the RMLV. 
Bomber Wings.   
Bomber Wings provide some greater degree of similarity to the RMLV.  
While platforms like the B-1 are primarily expeditionary (Dyess AFB Mission, 2006; 
Ellsworth AFB Mission, 2006), long-range bombers like the B-52s focus on the ability 
“to provide responsive, flexible and accurate” support (2nd Bomb Wing Mission, Vision 
& Vector, 2006) or on providing the capability to deliver a payload anywhere in the 
world (Whiteman AFB Mission, 2006).  This mission is more similar to the RMLV 
responsibility to provide responsive spacelift to deliver payloads in response to global 
warfighter requirements.  Specifically, the B-2 logistics support infrastructure encounters 
unique challenges that are similar to the maintenance requirements of the RMLV.  First, 
the B-2 structural elements have Low Observable (LO) components, including thermal 
protection tiles, that require special maintenance procedures that are not common to other 
airframes (B-2 Spirit, 2006; Visit, 2006).  In fact, much like the Shuttle’s Thermal 
Protection System tiles account for 30% of its maintenance man-hours (McCleskey, 
2005: 38), the B-2’s LO system is its most maintenance-intensive.  A 2006 program that 
replaced 60% of the LO material with a new, more maintenance-friendly Alternate High 
Frequency Material yielded a 50% decrease in total maintenance man-hour requirements 
(Boston Program, 2006).  Additionally, with only 21 aircraft in the AF inventory (B-2 
Spirit, 2006), maintainers face a unique challenge: maintenance problems simply do not 
occur with enough frequency for personnel to achieve the same level of proficiency as in 
larger units.  This problem is compounded by the typical turnover rate of AF personnel, 
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and introduces inefficiency into maintenance operations (Visit, 2006).  The B-2 
maintenance unit overcame this obstacle by partnering with Northrop Grumman 
contractors, who had achieved a greater level of proficiency by performing the same type 
of activities repetitively on the production line (Visit, 2006).  The same maintenance 
challenges faced by the B-2 will be obstacles for the RMLV, with its unique systems 
requirements and small fleet size.  As a result, the B-2 logistics support infrastructure will 
provide a sound basis for developing an RMLV ground support organization. 
Air Mobility Command Wings. 
 Air Mobility Command provides for all of the airlift and air refueling 
requirements of the armed forces.  In this section, both Airlift and Air Refueling Wings 
will be examined, as each function is part of the proposed RMLV mission. 
Airlift Wings.   
Airlift Wings utilize a wide variety of platforms in the performance of 
their mission.  Some, like the C-20 and C-21, are specialized to aeromedical evacuation 
or support of high-ranking government officials (C-20, 2006; C-21, 2006), while others, 
like the C-130, C-17, and C-5, specialize in the movement of cargo in support of global 
missions.  In this section, C-130, C-17, and C-5 Wings will be the primary focus due to 
the more generalized nature of their missions.  Pope AFB, with its fleet of C-130s, “is 
capable of deploying a self-sustaining war fighting package anywhere in the world at a 
moment’s notice, to form our nation’s premiere forced entry capability with the United 
States Army,” and also deploys to provide intra-theater airlift for global areas of 
operation (43rd Airlift Wing, 2006).  This mission lacks similarity to the RMLV mission, 
which does not include a focus on forced entry capability or deployment to theater.  The 
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62nd Airlift Wing, on the other hand, utilizes C-17s to “deliver global airlift, focused 
logistics, and agile combat support for America” (62nd Airlift Wing, 2006).  This mission 
is similar in nature to that of the RMLV, which carries payloads to provide spacelift, 
space logistics support, and combat support capabilities.  However, the specifics of the 
mission requirements will differ.  The 437th Airlift Wing at Charleston AFB, also 
operating C-17s, is tasked to “provide for the airlift of troops and passengers, military 
equipment, cargo and aeromedical airlift and to participate in operations involving the 
airland or airdrop of troops, equipment and supplies when required” (437th Airlift Wing, 
2006).  C-5s out of Dover AFB are focused on “providing worldwide movement of 
outsized cargo and personnel on scheduled, special assignment, exercise and contingency 
airlift missions” (436th Airlift Wing, 2006).  The RMLV, as currently conceived, will 
primarily deliver equipment and cargo payloads, with little focus at this time on 
personnel movement.  Payloads will be delivered to provide a space capability, rather 
than to transport personnel and cargo into a theater of operations.  In summary, while the 
spacelift function is a critical aspect of the RMLV mission, the mission specifics of airlift 
aircraft do not provide a strong basis for comparison for a future RMLV unit. 
Air Refueling Wings.   
Air Force air refueling is provided by KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft, 
operating as part of Air Mobility Wings or Air Refueling Wings, respectively.  In their 
role as refuelers, both KC-10 units and KC-135 wings recognize their primary 
contribution to providing “global reach by conducting air refueling and airlift where and 
when needed” (McConnell AFB, 2006).  While space refueling may be part of the RMLV 
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mission of satellite maintenance, there is not a great enough similarity for a tanker unit to 
provide a useable framework for an RMLV unit. 
UAV Squadrons. 
 The MQ-1, Predator, is classified as a UAV, but consists of an entire system of 
equipment including “four aircraft (with sensors), a ground control station, a Predator 
Primary Satellite Link, and approximately 55 personnel for deployed 24-hour operations” 
(MQ-1 Predator, 2006).  As such, it does not provide a high degree of similarity to the 
RMLV, regardless of the overlapping reconnaissance mission characteristics.  The RQ-
4A, Global Hawk, is an unmanned reconnaissance platform that, once programmed with 
mission data, can “autonomously taxi, take off, fly, remain on station capturing imagery, 
return and land” (Global Hawk, 2006).  Similarly, the RMLV will be expected to take 
off, fly to disengagement altitude, return and land with no crew onboard.  The Global 
Hawk is still undergoing testing, but one operational squadron is assigned at Beale AFB, 
tasked to operate and maintain “deployable, long-endurance RQ-4A aircraft and ground-
control elements to fulfill training and operational requirements generated by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in support of unified commanders and the Secretary of Defense” (12th 
Reconnaissance Squadron, 2006).  Like the RMLV, fleet size is small, and results in a 
single squadron of vehicles assigned to a wing along with U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.  
Due to the similarities in operational profile, combat support mission, and small fleet 
size, the Global Hawk Squadron provides a comparable organizational framework for an 
RMLV unit, and will be explored in further detail at the Unit level. 
 
 
 89 
Unit-Level Evaluation 
Up to this point, examination of the mission statements of various wing-level 
organizations has revealed that an ICBM Wing, a B-2 Bomber Wing, and a Global Hawk 
Squadron all provide reasonable foundations for modeling an RMLV logistics support 
structure, while Space Launch Wings, Fighter Wings, Airlift Wings, and Air Refueling 
Wings do not.  In this section, the logistics support units for these wings will be examined 
and evaluated to arrive at a final estimation of an RMLV organizational structure.  
ICBM Units. 
 The 90th Space Wing at F.E. Warren AFB is made up of the following groups:  
Operations Group, Maintenance Group, Security Forces Group, Mission Support Group, 
and Medical Group (Units at F.E. Warren AFB, 2006).  Of these, the Maintenance Group, 
Security Forces Group, and Mission Support Group include functions that may apply to 
logistics ground support requirements for an RMLV.  The high value of the RMLV and 
its critical role in providing for the national defense initially seem to justify a Security 
Forces Group, rather than the typical Squadron.  However, the specific role of the 90th 
Security Forces Group is to protect “15 Missile Alert Facilities and 150 Minuteman III 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles on 24-hour alert throughout a 12,600 square mile area 
spanning three states” (Units at F.E. Warren AFB, 2006).  The magnitude of this mission 
justifies a separate Security Forces Group, and will not be present in an RMLV unit.  The 
90th Maintenance Group works “24 hours a day, 365 days a year to ensure the world’s 
most powerful ICBM force remains safe, reliable, and effective” (Units at F.E. Warren 
AFB, 2006), and is made up of a Missile Maintenance Squadron and Maintenance 
Operations Squadron (90th Space Wing, 2006).  This degree of support is what will be 
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expected from an RMLV Maintenance Group.  The 90th Logistics Readiness Squadron 
within the Mission Support Group is another agency that would be expected to provide 
ground support in an RMLV unit. 
The 91st Space Wing at Minot AFB, in comparison, is comprised of an Operations 
Group, Maintenance Group, and Security Forces Group (Rough Riders, 2006).  The 91st 
Maintenance Group provides both maintenance and logistics support to the ICBM fleet 
through the Missile Maintenance Squadron and the Maintenance Operations Squadron 
(Rough Riders, 2006).  Due to the small RMLV fleet size, it can be expected that a single 
group could provide both maintenance and logistics support, and the RMLV ground 
support organization modeled after an ICBM Wing would be constructed as depicted in 
Figure 27.  
 
Figure 27.  RMLV Organization Based on ICBM Structure 
Unlike Maintenance Groups supporting aircraft, this organization does not include 
a Maintenance Squadron, which performs backshop maintenance support.  While this 
function is not necessary for ICBM support, it is assumed by the MILEPOST model to be 
necessary for RMLV support, as the model includes activities such as wheel and tire 
replacement and engine maintenance that will occur in backshops.  Additionally, there is 
no Munitions Squadron as is present in the aircraft units that follow; however, a similar 
Squadron will likely be required by the RMLV due to the presence of an externally-
attached payload on every mission.  As a result, although the ICBM maintenance 
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operations tempo may be similar to that expected for the RMLV, the organizational 
structure of the logistics elements is not sufficient to support the RMLV mission. 
B-2 Units. 
 The 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman AFB is made up of an Operations Group, 
Maintenance Group, Mission Support Group, and Medical Group (Units at Whiteman 
AFB, 2006).  As with the Space Wings, the Maintenance Group and Mission Support 
Group contain functions that align with logistics ground support.  The 509th Maintenance 
Group is comprised of a Munitions Squadron, Maintenance Operations Squadron, 
Maintenance Squadron, and Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (Units at Whiteman AFB, 
2006).  While the Munitions Squadron, which handles the bombs loaded onto the B-2, 
does not directly correlate to the RMLV, there may be a similar squadron that handles 
payloads.  Also as with the Space Wings, the Logistics Readiness Squadron within the 
Mission Support Group would provide some ground support functions.  If structured like 
a  B-2 Wing, the RMLV organization would require the units shown in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28.  RMLV Organization Based on B-2 Structure 
The organization supporting the B-2 includes all of the elements required to 
perform MILEPOST regeneration activities for the RMLV, and does not exhibit any 
functional activities that differ significantly from the RMLV mission or envisioned 
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operations.  As such, the B-2 organizational structure is a viable candidate for RMLV 
organizational development. 
UAV Units. 
 The 9th Reconnaissance Wing at Beale AFB is structured like the B-2 Wing, with 
an Operations Group, Maintenance Group, Mission Support Group, and Medical Group 
(Units at Beale AFB, 2006).  Again, the 9th Mission Support Group includes a Logistics 
Readiness Squadron which would support ground operations, and the 9th Maintenance 
Group is comprised of a Maintenance Squadron, Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 
Maintenance Operations Squadron, and Munitions Squadron (Units at Beale AFB, 2006).  
The RQ-4A, Global Hawk, is flown by the 12th Reconnaissance Squadron, one of four 
flying squadrons within the Operations Group (Units at Beale AFB, 2006).  All four 
flying squadrons are supported by the Maintenance Group, so its mission requires 
“providing worldwide maintenance support for the U-2, T-38, and RQ-4 aircraft” (9th 
Maintenance Group, 2006).  As such, the structure for logistics support, depicted in 
Figure 29, would include the same components as a B-2 wing, but these units would 
provide maintenance support to the RMLV fleet as one of several operational squadrons. 
 
Figure 29.  RMLV Organization Based on UAV Structure 
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The logistics support structures of the UAV and the B-2 are essentially the same; 
the only difference is whether the same organization will be supporting other aerospace 
platforms, or will be dedicated to RMLV support.  This will be determined by the 
aerospace platforms currently on-station at the RMLV’s future base of operations, which 
will be discussed in the next section. 
Evaluation of Operational Locations 
 Recall from Chapter I, Introduction, that the RMLV fleet is likely to be stationed 
either at Vandenberg AFB or Cape Canaveral AFS, a unit at Patrick AFB, both of which 
are currently operational Space Wings.  Each of these locations has been found in this 
chapter to be lacking the “like responsibilities” necessary to establish the RMLV 
organization under its current structure.  More appropriate organizational structures have 
been identified from a B-2 Wing and a Reconnaissance Wing supporting the Global 
Hawk Squadron.  This section will explore how an appropriate RMLV logistics ground 
support organization may fit into the Space Wing structures at Patrick AFB or 
Vandenberg AFB. 
Patrick AFB. 
 The 45th Space Wing at Patrick AFB is made up of a Medical Group, Mission 
Support Group, Operations Group, and Launch Group.  Space Shuttle maintenance is 
performed through a contract with USA, so no Maintenance Group is currently present.  
Within the Launch Group, the 1st Space Launch Squadron is responsible for Delta II 
launch vehicles while the 5th Space Launch Squadron supports the Atlas V and Delta IV 
vehicles (45th Launch Group, 2006).  The Reusable Military Launch Vehicles would 
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operate as a separate squadron within this Launch Group.  The resulting wing structure at 
Patrick AFB is depicted in Figure 30 (changes denoted by dashed lines and italics): 
 
Figure 30.  RMLV Organization at Patrick AFB (Units at Patrick AFB, 2006) 
 As indicated by the organizational chart, supporting an RMLV fleet at Patrick 
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RMLV, the B-2 logistics support organization will provide the best frame of reference for 
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launch vehicles.  Within the Operations Group, Vandenberg AFB operates a Launch 
Squadron for the EELV program, a Launch Support Squadron, and the 1st Air and Space 
Test Squadron (ASTS) (Units at Vandenberg AFB, 2006).  The ASTS is the only 
organization within the AF with the capability for “full service Air Force Developmental 
Test and Evaluation…for missiles, launch vehicles and payload/launch vehicle 
integration” (30th Launch Group, 2006).  As such, this squadron may provide a 
reasonable initial organizational location for the RMLV, with the eventual development 
of a second Launch Squadron within the Operations Group.  An organizational structure  
incorporating the RMLV fleet into the 30th Space Wing would be similar to that at Patrick 
AFB, and is described in Figure 31 (changes denoted by dashed lines and italics): 
 
Figure 31.  RMLV Organization at Vandenberg AFB (Units at Vandenberg AFB, 2006) 
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ground support through contractor operations, so the B-2 organizational structure would 
provide the most accurate framework for RMLV ground support.  The organizational 
benefit of locating at Vandenberg AFB is the presence of the ASTS to support the RMLV 
as a newly-developed vehicle; however, the impact on organizational structure is the 
same at either location. 
Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to determine a currently-existing AF 
organizational structure for logistics support units that best matched the mission profile of 
the RMLV.  This objective was approached through a methodical process of comparing 
mission statements at the MAJCOM and Wing levels to identify “like responsibilities” 
that would distinguish certain organizations as suitable models for RMLV organization.  
In addition to the organization and vehicle mission statements, an assessment of 
similarities in the logistics support mission was factored into the evaluation of each 
organization.  As a result of these comparisons, an ICBM Wing, a B-2 Wing, and a 
Reconnaissance Wing supporting a UAV Squadron were each identified as providing a 
justifiable basis for RMLV ground support organization.  
Following this determination, the logistics support units for each of these wings 
were assessed to note similarities and differences in structure.  Finally, an assessment of 
the two proposed RMLV operating locations was conducted to determine the impact of 
incorporating the RMLV fleet and it logistics support units into the existing 
organizations.  The conclusion of this evaluation is that RMLV logistics ground support, 
at either of the assumed operating locations, will consist of: 
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1.  A Logistics Readiness Squadron under the Mission Support Group that is an 
augmented version of the unit already established in the Wing 
2.  A Maintenance Group, added to the Wing structure, made up of an RMLV 
Maintenance Squadron for flightline support, a Maintenance Squadron for 
backshop support, a Maintenance Operations Squadron, and a Munitions 
Squadron in accordance with B-2 organizational model.  
The manning implications of this organizational structure will be analyzed in the 
following chapter.
 2  The results of the 2005 LCOM analysis are an input to determining manpower requirements, and do not directly 
reflect Unit Manning Document authorizations.  Additionally, LCOM manpower numbers are intended specifically 
to support the requirements of the input scenario; this scenario, not current daily operations, forms the basis for 
comparison to project RMLV requirements. 
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VII.  Manpower Assessment 
 In accordance with AF procedures, both LCOM and AFMS data were utilized to 
determine RMLV manpower requirements.  Because logistics support functions are based in part 
on the size of the maintenance mission supported, total maintenance manpower requirements 
were calculated first.  Based on the results of this assessment, calculations were performed for 
supporting logistics functions such as supply and transportation.  The manpower requirements 
derived in this chapter were, of necessity, based upon a series of comparisons rather than on 
historical man-hour data.  First, existing LCOM results from the 2005 B-2 LCOM analysis2 were 
used as a framework for the development of maintenance manpower requirements.  Since UAVs 
provide insight into support for unmanned platforms, manpower information from a UAV 
organization was used to provide comparison data to further refine workcenter estimates as 
necessary.  In order to calculate total maintenance requirements, parametric relationships were 
established based on the relative contribution of individual workcenters to total aircraft and 
Shuttle maintenance requirements, relative vehicle complexity and fleet size, and relative surface 
area.  Since the parametric relationships were estimates, sensitivity analysis was performed to 
account for a range of possible values.  To calculate the remaining ground support workforce 
requirements, AF Manpower Standards were applied for supply, fuels, and transportation 
functions, again utilizing parametric relationships and sensitivity analysis as necessary.  The 
chapter concludes with a range of the total number of personnel required to support RMLV 
regeneration activities.
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B-2 LCOM Analysis 2005 
The B-2 LCOM study divides the 509th Maintenance Group into five major sub- 
organizations: Group Staff Agencies, Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Maintenance 
Squadron, Maintenance Operations Squadron, and Munitions Squadron.  Figure 32 
depicts the organizational structure in greater detail. 
 
 
 
 Figure 32.  509th B-2 Maintenance Group Organizational Structure  
(Air Combat Command, 2006) 
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This organizational structure was also the framework for the RMLV MXG 
organization.  Analysis of the LCOM study was conducted in two parts.  First, the 
scenario and assumptions of the study were compared to RMLV mission requirements to 
determine similarities and differences.  Second, the manpower determinations for each 
workcenter were reviewed to determine the applicability of the requirement to RMLV 
operations as reflected in MILEPOST. 
Scenario and Assumptions. 
 The study addresses manpower requirements for both sustained wartime and 
peacetime operations (Air Combat Command, 2006: 2).  Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) 
commitments were not modeled, so there were no manpower adjustments required to 
account for the non-expeditionary nature of the RMLV fleet.  For both scenarios, the total 
Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI) supported by the maintenance personnel was 16; 
however, in peacetime this PAI included both B-2s and T-38s while in wartime, the PAI 
consisted of an 8 PAI independent B-2 package and an 8 PAI dependent B-2 package 
(Air Combat Command, 2006: 6).  The most stringent requirement out of these scenarios 
determined the actual manpower requirement (Air Combat Command, 2006: 5).  Since 
the wartime scenario supporting 16 B-2s posed the most stringent requirement, there was 
no need to make adjustments to isolate the manpower requirements for the T-38 support 
provided under the peacetime scenario.  As a result, the RMLV fleet size of 6 was 
compared to the B-2 supported fleet size of 16, and the 6/16 ratio became part of a 
parametric relationship and sensitivity analysis established later in the Parametric 
Relationships section of this chapter. 
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 The peacetime scenario simulated three eight-hour shifts, five days per week, 
primarily in the production workcenters (Air Combat Command, 2006: 6).  The wartime 
scenario modeled two 12-hour shifts, seven days per week in all workcenters, based on 
the sortie rates in the War Mobilization Plan (Air Combat Command ND, 2006: 6).  
According to AF policy, these scenarios drive certain factor calculations that are used to 
modify manpower requirements.  The overload factor ensures that assets are utilized 
efficiently (Air Force, 2003: 14).  The man-hour availability factor is the average number 
of man-hours per month that personnel are available for primary duty, accounting for 
time spent each month on training, mandatory appointments, and other military 
requirements (Air Force, 2003: 13).  Additionally, LCOM assigned maximum direct 
workcenter utilization rates for both peacetime and wartime scenarios.  These factor 
calculations were assumed to be similar for the RMLV fleet, as they are AF-approved 
modifications, with the result that the LCOM manpower calculations were assumed to be 
fundamentally consistent with future RMLV workcenters.  However, an RMLV fleet that 
operates three eight-hour shifts, seven days a week does not align directly with either of 
these scenarios.  As a result, a shift factor was used in a parametric relationship and 
sensitivity analysis in the Parametric Relationships section of this chapter.   
Several assumptions factored into the LCOM calculation of daily flying and 
maintenance operations.  Sorties were programmed randomly throughout each 24-hour 
period (Air Combat Command, 2006: 15).  Maintenance workload data and planning 
factors were validated and verified during the LCOM planning stage (Air Combat 
Command D, 2006: 2).  Failure rates are annotated in the model as Maintenance Action 
Rates which reflect the mean sorties between maintenance actions, and were determined 
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by an earlier audit at Whiteman AFB (Air Combat Command, 2006: 2).  Spare parts 
availability was addressed in the model using a Total Non-mission Capable Supply rate 
of 7%, based on historical data (Air Combat Command, 2006: 11).  Additionally, the air 
abort rate was set at 2% within the model, based on historical data (Air Combat 
Command, 2006: 17).  Depot repair was included in the model, based on the three-level 
maintenance concept, with a turnaround time of 13 days (Air Combat Command, 2006: 
11).  Without specific operational, maintenance, and supply data for the RMLV, these 
assumptions were accepted as sufficient to determine RMLV manpower requirements. 
 Facilities and equipment are not part of the scope of this thesis; however, their 
impact on manpower was taken into consideration in the LCOM model.  LCOM modeled 
one engine test cell, located at Whiteman AFB, which was used for both peacetime and 
wartime workload (Air Combat Command 6: 11).  All other facilities and equipment 
were modeled according to current configuration and authorizations, which included an 
assigned hangar for each aircraft (Air Combat Command: 11).  As part of a study 
modeling projected resource utilization for varying numbers of annual RMLV launches, 
an approximate 1:1 ratio of fleet size to maintenance hangars was established as optimal 
to achieve required launch rates, and supports the assumption of individual vehicle 
hangars (Rooney, 2006: 8). 
 One factor of note for comparison to the RMLV is that the B-2 has an On-Board 
Test System (OBTS) which is supported by its own section, CIT/CEPS, under the 
Maintenance Group Orderly Room (Air Combat Command, 2006: 19).  The CIT/CEPS 
section for the B-2 is a variance to the manpower standard to provide “24-hour, 7 days a 
week software analysis support” to process and analyze OBTS data (Air Combat 
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Command, 2006: 29).  Assuming an IVHM system would be part of the RMLV design, a 
similar variance was applied.  
Workcenter Requirements. 
Table 11 summarizes, by squadron, the first step in the analysis that was 
performed to derive RMLV manpower requirements from the B-2 LCOM study results.   
Table 11.  RMLV Requirements Derived from 2005 B-2 LCOM Results 
Workcenter Areas of Responsibility 
LCOM Derived Total 
(accounts for workcenter, 
variance, and overhead 
adjustments) 
MXG Staff 
Commander, Support, Quality Assurance, Load 
Team Training and Evaluation 40 
MOS 
Analysis, Maintenance Operations Center, On-
Board Test System Analysis 84 
MXS Backshop Maintenance 501 
MUNS Weapons and Armament maintenance and support 164 
AMXS Flightline Maintenance and Weapons Loading 303 
MXG Total  1092 
 
Workcenters that did not apply to RMLV operations were removed.  These 
workcenters, and the justifications for omitting them, are listed at Appendix B.  Once 
these workcenters were removed, their respective overhead functions were adjusted 
proportionally.  Additionally, positive manpower variances awarded to the B-2 for 
reasons that were not applicable to the RMLV were subtracted.  Variance and overhead 
adjustments are recorded in Appendix C.  Further adjustments required to account for a 
number of differences between the RMLV and B-2 were established and analyzed in the 
Parametric Relationships section of this chapter. 
In summary, the 2005 B-2 LCOM analysis provided a starting point for 
establishing RMLV manning requirements.  Of the 1,536 personnel projected to support 
the B-2s under the scenario and assumptions of the study, 1,092 of them manned 
 104 
workcenters that would also be required to support RMLV operations.  A review of the 
LCOM study identified that adjustments would be required for the number of shifts and 
the fleet size; these and other adjustments were developed and applied in the Parametric 
Relationships section of this chapter.  In the next section, the results of the LCOM 
analysis for the Predator were assessed to determine if an unmanned platform revealed 
any necessary adjustments to these workforce numbers. 
UAV Comparison Data 
 To address any available insights provided by an unmanned platform, the 2005 
LCOM report for the MQ-1 Predator was also reviewed and analyzed.  Compared to the 
B-2, the Predator exhibited a smaller, simplified maintenance organizational structure, 
shown in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33. 57th MXG Predator Maintenance Group Organizational Structure 
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Scenario and Assumptions. 
The study addressed manpower requirements for wartime operations (Air Combat 
Command, 2005: 6), engaging two 12-hour shifts, seven days a week (Air Combat 
Command, 2005: 12).  As with the B-2, the modification factors driven by these 
operational conditions were assumed to apply accurately to the RMLV; however, 
adjustments would be required to account for eight-hour shifts.  AEF commitments were 
modeled, in the form of a continuous deployment of one system, which required five 
teams of personnel to support 120-day rotations every 20 months (Air Combat 
Command, 2005: 9).   This requirement was not applicable to the RMLV.  The model 
assessed support for three Predator Systems, each composed of 4PAI, 1 Ground Control 
Station (GCS), and 1 Predator Primary Satellite Link (PPSL) (Air Combat Command, 
2005: 6).  This total of 12 aircraft supported, along with additional ground systems, was 
also greater than the expected size of the RMLV fleet.   
 Predator sorties were scheduled at random on a 24-hour, 7-day schedule (Air 
Combat Command, 2005: 11).  The Predator executed two types of missions: 75% were 
Hunter-Killer sorties, for which the Predator was armed with Air-to-Ground Missiles, and 
25% were Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance sorties, for which the Predator was 
armed with a Synthetic Aperture Radar (Air Combat Command, 2005: 12).  While the   
B-2 organizational structure supported only maintenance and loading of weapons, the 
Predator’s radar support was assessed for the ability to provide a more accurate 
assessment of RMLV payload operations. 
Maintenance failure rates were determined based on Maintenance Data Collection 
data (Air Combat Command, 2005: 2), while “task times and crew sizes for both 
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scheduled and unscheduled maintenance were collected, verified and validated during a 
field audit at Indian Springs in January 2004” (Air Combat Command, 2005: 2).  Spare 
parts availability was addressed in the model using a Total Non-mission Capable Supply 
rate of 2.8%, based on historical data (Air Combat Command, 2005: 9).  Depot/contractor 
repair was included in the model with a turnaround time of 17 days (Air Combat 
Command, 2005: 9).  Additionally, LCOM modeled phase inspections at 100-hour 
intervals for the aircraft and 300-hour intervals for the engines (Air Combat Command, 
2005: 9).  Since the Predator System includes the GCS and PPSL, these equipment items 
were modeled as a constraint on Predator operation, and both scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance for them was included in the Predator model (Air Combat Command, 2005: 
11).  The specialized transportation and handling equipment required by the RMLV 
would likely introduce a similar constraint to modeling RMLV operations.  
 Facilities and equipment are not part of the scope of this thesis; however, their 
impact on manpower was taken into consideration in the LCOM model.  LCOM assumed 
full availability of maintenance facilities and support equipment (Air Combat Command, 
2005: 9). 
 Finally, as the Predator squadron is supported by the 57th MXG at Nellis AFB, its 
manning requirements form additional authorizations within existing MXG workcenters 
supporting the Weapons School, Test, and Thunderbirds aircraft (Air Combat Command, 
2005: 29).  While the RMLV will likely operate out of Vandenberg or Cape Canaveral, 
with an established wing support structure, neither location has an existing MXG 
supporting other platforms. 
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Workcenter Requirements. 
Table 12 provides a summary of the LCOM study results for the Predator.  Again, 
workcenters that did not apply to RMLV operations were removed.  These workcenters, 
and the justification for omitting them, are listed at Appendix B.  The LCOM results were 
not further adjusted for variations or overhead, however, since the Predator was only 
being used as a comparison platform, and not as a baseline for determination of RMLV 
requirements.  As an unmanned platform, the composition of the Predator’s 
organizational structure had the potential to reveal significant differences from the B-2 
structure that would alter the magnitude or proportional contribution of individual 
maintenance workcenters.  The information in Table 12 was used to identify  
significant trends that might reflect the need to make adjustments to the manpower 
requirements identified in the previous section. 
Table 12.  Predator Maintenance Group Manning 
Workcenter Areas of Responsibility LCOM Derived Total (accounts for workcenter adjustments) 
MXG Staff Quality Assurance 6 
MXO 
Analysis, Maintenance Operations Center, Planning, 
Scheduling, Documentation, Training 8 
EMS Backshop Maintenance, Weapons maintenance, support 66 
AMXS Flightline Maintenance and Weapons Loading 196 
MXG Total   276 
 
The Predator required a much smaller maintenance support unit than the B-2, with 
a composition that was much heavier on AMXS support, and much lighter on MXG, 
MXS, and MOS manpower requirements than its crewed counterpart.  However, key 
differences beyond the unmanned nature of the vehicle drove the proportional 
dissimilarity.  First, the Predator was supported by an existing MXG that also supported 
other airframes.  As such, MXG, MXS, and MOS requirements were shared among 
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airframes, while the on-aircraft nature of the AMXS mission required dedicated 
manpower for each platform.  As established in Chapter VI, Analysis of Organizational 
Structure, the RMLV is likely to be supported by an MXG at Vandenberg or Cape 
Canaveral that will not support other reusable platforms; therefore, manpower savings 
will not be available through consolidating MXS, MXG, or MOS functions.  Secondly, 
the expeditionary nature of the Predator contributed to its increased AMXS requirements 
compared to the RMLV.  The Predator MXG organization was built to support five teams 
of personnel to meet AEF rotation requirements, resulting in an overall increase in 
requirements.  The RMLV will not be expeditionary, and will not justify these personnel 
increases.   
Initially, it seemed possible that maintenance support for installation of the 
Predator’s radar payload would more accurately reflect RMLV payload operations than 
the B-2’s weapons loading.  However, since a majority of the Predator’s missions require 
ordnance payloads as well, no significant difference was noted in the Predator weapons 
workcenter that would render it more applicable to RMLV payload support. 
In summary, the sources of the differences in Predator manning compared to B-2 
manning were not found to be applicable to RMLV operations.  As such, no 
modifications were made to the manning requirements identified in the previous section.  
However, the idea of modeling GCS and PPSL as constraints on Predator availability will 
apply to future research modeling the effect of GSE on the RMLV in MILEPOST. 
Parametric Relationships 
 In order to establish some useful parametric relationships to further refine the 
RMLV maintenance manpower estimates, this section focused on a series of adjustment 
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factors, each developed based on research and then subjected to sensitivity analysis.  
First, a parametric factor addressing the number of shifts was developed and assessed.  
Second, the proportion of maintenance man-hours spent on individual maintenance 
functions for the Shuttle was compared to comparable B-2 workcenter contributions to  
allow the organizational structure to be adjusted to more accurately reflect the 
proportional sizes of workcenters for space vehicle maintenance.  Third, a comparison of 
estimated surface area allowed direct adjustment to the Structural Repair workcenter, a 
critical component in both B-2 and RMLV maintenance.  Fourth, the relative complexity 
of a space platform in comparison to the B-2 was derived from a comparison of total 
workforce sizes, allowing the overall workforce magnitude to be adjusted appropriately.  
Finally, the total workforce was adjusted for varying fleet sizes.   
Number of Shifts. 
Due to the stringent requirement for a 24-hour response and turnaround time for 
the RMLV, this research assumed a manning requirement for three shifts performing 24-
hour operations seven days a week.  In order to derive the third shift requirements from  
the B-2 LCOM study results, a shift factor of 1.5 was applied to each workcenter.  Any 
fraction of a manpower position was rounded up.  The results are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13.  Adjustments for Number of Shifts Factor 
B-2 
Workcenter 2 Shifts (LCOM Total) 3 Shifts (LCOM Total * 1.5) 
MXG Staff 40 61 
MOS 84 129 
MXS 501 755 
MUNS 164 249 
AMXS 303 456 
MXG Total 1092 1650 
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Adding a third shift required a personnel increase of approximately 550 
personnel.  At this stage in the manpower assessment, the possible design points listed in 
Table 14 have been established in accordance with the experimental design process 
outlined in Chapter IV, Methodology. 
Table 14.  Design Points for Number of Shifts Adjustmen 
Design Factor 
Point Shifts 
1 2 
2 3 
 
Both two-shift and three-shift manning options were explored as part of sensitivity 
analysis for the parametric relationships to follow.   
Space Vehicle Maintenance. 
 A second concern in assessing parametric relationships for the RMLV lies in the 
fact that the distribution of maintenance man-hours to the subsystems on an aircraft may 
not be the same as the distribution of maintenance man-hours to the subsystems on a 
space vehicle.  For example, the specialized thermal protection structures on a space 
vehicle may result in a much greater percentage of total maintenance man-hours 
dedicated to structural maintenance that what is reflected in the B-2 organization.  As a 
result, this factor compared the relative contribution of individual workcenters to total 
Shuttle maintenance with the relative contribution of individual workcenters to total B-2 
maintenance in order to determine required mathematical adjustments. 
An analysis of B-2 manning requirements as determined by the 2005 LCOM 
study resulted in the workcenter contribution ratios identified in Table 15, calculated by 
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dividing the manpower requirement for the workcenter by the total MXG manpower.  A 
full account of LCOM workcenter contributions is available at Appendix D. 
Table 15.  B-2 Percent of Total Manpower by Workcenter 
Workcenter Area of Responsibility % Total Manpower 
MXG Commander, Support, Quality Assurance, Load Team Training, Evaluation 3.52% 
MOS Analysis, Maintenance Operations Center, On-Board Test System Analysis 5.60% 
MXS Backshop Maintenance 34.18% 
MUNS  Weapons and Armament maintenance and support 17.25% 
AMXS Flightline Maintenance and Weapons Loading 39.45% 
 
B-2 Maintenance is heavily focused on flightline operations, with backshop repairs 
forming the remainder of almost 75% of total maintenance requirements.  This is 
consistent with an operation that demands rapid turnaround times and also requires heavy 
maintenance of specialized LO structural components during mission down-times.  Only 
25% of the entire maintenance workforce is devoted to payload operations (munitions), 
analysis, command and control, on-board test system monitoring, quality assurance, and 
all other support operations.  The rest of this section was devoted to comparing these 
functional proportions with known ratios for Shuttle maintenance operations to assess 
similarities and differences.  Two sources of information were utilized for Shuttle 
maintenance data: an RMLV modeling effort that compiled Shuttle maintenance data to 
develop failure and repair rate distributions, and a NASA publication that collected 
detailed Shuttle maintenance data to identify design root causes of long turnaround times. 
Shuttle Maintenance Analysis for RMLV Modeling. 
In developing a discrete-event simulation of turnaround time and 
manpower requirements for military reusable launch vehicles, AF Aeronautical Systems 
Center (ASC) personnel compiled historical Shuttle maintenance data from STS-85 by 
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functional area in order to develop probability distributions for RMLV component 
failures and maintenance actions, shown in Figure 34 (Rooney, 2005: 2).  This data is 
summarized in Table 16 and is compared to B-2 workcenter percentages to compare the 
contributions of specific maintenance actions to overall support requirements. 
Table 16.  Shuttle % of Man-hours  
      by Activity 
 
 
Figure 34.  Shuttle Mx Data by Activity  
(Rooney, 2005: 2) 
 
To provide the most accurate comparison, specific B-2 workcenters 
corresponding to the identified RMLV maintenance activities are listed in Table 17. 
Table 17.  B-2 Workcenters for Comparison 
Workcenter Area of Responsibility 
% Total 
Manpower 
MXS Structural Repair Section (highest single contributor) 11.91% 
MXS Electrics/Environmental Section 0.78% 
MXS Propulsion Flight 2.80% 
AMXS Weapons Loading Section 4.88% 
MXS Avionics Flight 2.34% 
MXS Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) Flight 6.45% 
 
Unfortunately, there is not a direct correlation between each maintenance activity 
identified in the ASC research and an aircraft maintenance workcenter supporting the    
B-2.  For instance, the Structural Repair workcenter would perform both TPS and 
Mx Activity 
Man-
hours 
Percent 
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TPS 39000 28.47% 
Fluids 34000 24.82% 
Payload/Cargo 23000 16.79% 
STR/Mech 20000 14.60% 
Avionics/Electric 11000 8.03% 
Other 6000 4.38% 
GSE 4000 2.92% 
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STR/Mech activities.  Shuttle Fluids maintenance, which includes “main engine 
pressurization and feed system, Orbital Maneuvering System and Reaction Control 
Systems (OMS/RCS), the Auxiliary Power Units (APU), actuation system, and Active 
Thermal Control System (ATCS)” (Rooney, 2005: 7), would be performed by the 
Electrics/Environmental section and Propulsion Flight workcenters.  Finally, 
Payload/Cargo functions are most closely approximated by the Munitions Squadron and 
the Weapons Loading section.  A detailed assessment of Shuttle maintenance disciplines 
and their aircraft maintenance counterparts, derived from LCOM and AF personnel 
guidance, is provided at Appendix E. 
The proportional Shuttle man-hour requirements, as summarized for 
projected RMLV maintenance, exhibited similar proportional characteristics to B-2 
maintenance; however, there were some striking differences.  Table 18 summarizes the 
comparison data, listing each Shuttle activity with its corresponding B-2 workcenters, 
and comparing the two to demonstrate the magnitude of differences. 
Table 18. Comparison of Shuttle and B-2 Maintenance Drivers 
Shuttle Mx Activity B-2 Workcenter Ratio Difference* 
TPS/Fluids/STR/Mech/
Avionics/Electric/ GSE AMXS/MXS 78.84%: 73.63% 5.21% (S) 
Fluids/Avionics/ Electric MXS Electrics/Environmental/ 
MXS Propulsion/MXS Avionics 32.85%: 5.92%  26.93% (S) 
Payload/Cargo MUNS/AMXS Weapons 16.79%: 22.13% 5.34% (B) 
TPS/STR/Mech MXS Structural Repair  43.07%: 11.91% 31.16% (S) 
Avionics/Electric MXS Electrics/Environmental/ 
MXS Avionics  8.03%: 3.12% 4.91% (S) 
GSE MXS AGE  2.92%: 6.45% 4.16% (B) 
*(S) indicates the Shuttle experiences a larger impact from the function; (B) indicates the B-2 
experiences a larger impact from the function 
 
First, an overall assessment of all AMXS- and MXS-aligned Shuttle functions (TPS, 
Fluids, Structures/Mechanics, Avionics/Electrics, and GSE) revealed that the proportion 
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was fairly similar, at approximately 75% of total maintenance requirements.  
Payload/Cargo operations and Shuttle GSE maintenance were within 5% of their B-2 
counterparts.   
An analysis of Fluid operations required combining the total with the 
Avionics/Electric activity because the Electronics/Environmental aircraft section and 
Propulsion Flight combine to perform the function of the Shuttle Fluid workcenter.  This, 
in turn, led to adding the B-2 Avionics Flight percentage to the aircraft proportion for a 
comparable workcenter total.  The result showed an impact from Fluids/Avionics/Electric 
operations on the Shuttle that was 27% greater than the parallel functions performed for 
the B-2.  By isolating the Avionics/Electric component and comparing it against the 
Avionics and Electrics/Environmental section of B-2 maintenance, it seemed that the 
greatest portion of this disparity was due to increased Shuttle requirements specific to 
fluids, rather than electrics or avionics.  This comparison will be examined in further 
detail in the next section, Shuttle Maintenance Analysis for Design Root Cause. 
As noted in Tables 16 and 17, TPS maintenance was the most significant 
contributor to Shuttle maintenance man-hours, while Structural Repair was the most 
significant single contributor to B-2 manpower requirements.  However, at almost 45% of 
total man-hours, the TPS/Structures contribution to Shuttle maintenance is 31% higher 
than the Structural Repair contribution to B-2 maintenance.  In order to observe the effect 
of Shuttle-like TPS on the B-2-based manpower structure, the following calculations 
were performed on the Table 13 manpower numbers to adjust the Structural Repair 
workcenter to reflect a 31% greater contribution to total maintenance man-hours: 
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a.  Workcenter calculations: 1.  The two-shift workcenter numbers resulted 
in a total of 184/1,092 personnel in the Structural Repair workcenter, accounting for 
16.85% of the total.  A 31% increase in this percentage resulted in a new manning level 
of 523 personnel.  2.  The three-shift workcenter numbers resulted in a total of 276/1,650 
personnel for these two workcenters, accounting for 16.73% of total manpower.  A 31% 
increase resulted in a new manning level of 788 personnel.   
b.  Overhead calculations: 1.  For two-shift operations, 339 additional 
personnel yielded a 70% increase over the previous MXS functional manning (MXS total 
– MXS/CC/CQ/MXM) of 486 personnel, which was distributed to the two MXS 
overhead sections.  The resulting 33% increase in the four-squadron total (350 additional 
personnel compared to 1,052) was applied to the MXG/CC workcenter.  2.  For three-
shift operations, 512 additional personnel compared to 732 previously assigned to 
functional workcenters also yielded a 70% increase, distributed to the two MXS overhead 
workcenters.  The resulting 33% increase in the MOS/AMXS/ MXS/MUNS total (529 
additional personnel compared to 1,589) was applied to the MXG/CC workcenter.  
c.  After addressing both two- and three-shift options, the resulting 
manpower requirements are displayed in Table 19.  Bold and italicized numbers indicate 
values that changed as a result of the application of this parametric adjustment. 
Table 19.  Adjustments for TPS Factor 
Workcenter 2 Shifts TPS Factor 1.31 3 Shifts TPS Factor 1.31 
MXG Staff 42 64 
MOS 84 129 
MXS 851 1284 
MUNS 164 249 
AMXS 303 456 
MXG Total 1444 2182 
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These totals showed a significant increase over the previous estimates of 
1,092 personnel for two shifts or 1,650 personnel for three shifts.  The magnitude of the 
manpower increase experienced by maintaining a Shuttle-like TPS system presents a 
strong argument for design alternatives that reduce thermal protection requirements.  
Additionally, the Structural Repair workcenter in the B-2 MXG baseline is already 
considerably larger than those in other maintenance organizations due to the LO support 
requirements.  In maintenance organizations supporting aircraft like the B-1, B-52, and F-
15E, where the Structural Repair workcenter accounts for less than 5% of total 
maintenance manpower (Air Combat Command, B-1, 2003: 104; Air Combat Command, 
B-52, 2003: 5-5; Air Combat Command, F-15E, 2003: 5-3); only the F-117 proportion, at 
9% approaches that of the B-2, again due to maintenance requirements for the stealth 
technology (Air Combat Command, F-117, 2001: 5-2).  As a result, minimizing or 
eliminating TPS requirements could result in a much smaller workcenter than indicated 
by the B-2 baseline.  Because research indicates that the RMLV will use reduced 
amounts of thermal protective material that are more durable and easier to repair and 
replace (Rooney, 2006: 4), these adjustments were not incorporated into further 
manpower calculations.  As a stand-alone calculation, the TPS factor was not entered into 
the design points structure. 
The next section will explore additional Shuttle maintenance data to 
further isolate significant workcenter differences.   
Shuttle Maintenance Analysis for Design Root Cause 
In order to more closely pinpoint these differences, the next comparison 
used more detailed Shuttle maintenance activity information, gathered for a NASA 
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technical publication addressing the design root causes for extended Shuttle turnaround 
times (McCleskey, 2005: iii).  This data, shown in Table 20, was collected across eight 
STS processing flows in 1997, and categorized by maintenance function in order to 
determine the Shuttle design characteristics that posed the greatest maintenance impact 
during turnaround operations (McCleskey, 2005: 19). 
Table 20.  Shuttle Percent of Man-hours by Activity (McCleskey, 2005: 19, 243-244) 
Workcenter 
 
Area of Responsibility 
% Total Man-
hours 
Structures, Mechanisms, 
& Vehicle Handling 
Orbiter Systems Observer, Quality 
Engineering, Orbiter Handling Equipment, 
Ground-Support Equipment (non-specific), 
Optical Systems, Mechanical Systems, 
Orbiter Structures, Pyrotechnic Systems 
33.69% 
Liquid Propulsion Shuttle Main Engines Engineering, Main 
Propulsion Systems, OMS-RCS 15.70% 
Thermal Management Freon and Water Cooling Loops, Tile, and 
Blankets 11.69% 
Power Management Orbiter Test Conductor, APU, Electrical 
Power Distribution, Orbiter Electrical, Fuel 
Cell Systems, Hydraulic Systems 
10.05% 
Safety Management & 
Control 
Purge, Vent & Drain Systems, Main 
Propulsion Systems, Main Engine Safety 
Purges 
8.31% 
Ground Interfacing 
Systems & Facilities Ground Support Equipment (non-specific) 7.26% 
Payload Accomodations Payload Installation/Removal Operations 4.08% 
Environmental Control 
& Life Support Orbiter Cooling and Life Support 3.65% 
Command, Control, & 
Health Management 
Orbiter Data Processing System, Orbiter 
Instrumentation Systems, Software 3.44% 
Communications Orbiter Communications Systems 0.87% 
Guidance Navigation & 
Control 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Systems 0.62% 
 
Again, no direct correlations to aircraft maintenance workcenters were available, due to 
the significant overlap of functions within individual Shuttle workcenters.  However, 
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some proportional relationships were still derived related to groups of aircraft 
maintenance workcenters.  The B-2 workcenters listed in Table 21 were used for 
comparison to this data set, chosen as indicated by the assessment of Shuttle maintenance 
disciplines and their aircraft maintenance counterparts at Appendix E. 
Table 21. B-2 Workcenters for Comparison 
Workcenter Area of Responsibility 
% Total 
Manpower 
AMXS Weapons Loading Section 4.88% 
MOS CIT/CEPS 0.72% 
MOS Maintenance Operations Center Section 1.17% 
MOS  Research Engineer Section 0.65% 
MXG Quality Assurance Section 2.02% 
MXS Electrics/Environmental 0.78% 
MXS Avionics Flight 2.34% 
MXS Fuels Section 1.30% 
MXS Propulsion Flight 2.80% 
MXS Pneudraulics Section .59% 
MXS Metals Technology Section 0.59% 
MXS Structural Repair Section 11.91% 
MXS Survival Equipment Section 0.46% 
MXS  Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) Flight 6.45% 
 
The Structures, Mechanisms, and Vehicle Handling Shuttle activity was the most 
comprehensive of the workcenters, encompassing a wide range of MXS, AMXS, and 
MOS functions, including AGE.  As a result, it was combined with Ground Interfacing 
Systems & Facilities, primarily responsible for GSE, to establish an accurate total ratio.  
Additionally, Command, Control & Health Management, Communications, and 
Guidance, Navigation & Control were all combined due to their reliance on the 
Electrics/Environmental and Avionics aircraft maintenance workcenters. 
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Table 22 summarizes the comparisons between this set of Shuttle 
maintenance activities and corresponding B-2 maintenance workcenters. 
Table 22.  Comparison of Shuttle and B-2 Maintenance Drivers 
Shuttle Mx Activity B-2 Workcenter Ratio Difference* 
Structures, Mechanisms, 
& Vehicle Handling/ 
Ground Interfacing 
Systems & Facilities 
AMXS Weapons Loading/ 
MOS MOC/MXG QA/MXS 
AGE/MXS Avionics/MXS 
Metals Technology/MXS 
Structural Repair/MXS 
Survival Equipment 
40.95%: 29.82% 11.13% (S) 
Liquid Propulsion MOS Research Engineer/ MXS Propulsion 15.70%: 3.45% 12.25% (S) 
Thermal Management MXS Electrics/Environmental /MXS Structural Repair  11.69%: 12.69% 1.00% (B) 
Power Management 
MOS CIT/CEPS/ MXS 
Electrics/ Environmental/ 
MXS Fuels/MXS 
Pneudraulics 
10.05%: 3.39% 6.66% (S) 
Safety Management & 
Control 
No specific workcenter identified.  AF aircraft maintenance policy 
holds each individual and workcenter responsible for proper safety 
training, awareness, and procedures (Air Force, 2006: 44). 
Ground Interfacing 
Systems & Facilities MXS/AGE 7.26%: 6.45% 0.81% (S) 
Payload Accomodations AMXS Weapons  4.08%: 4.88% 0.80% (B) 
Environmental Control 
& Life Support MXS Electrics/Environmental 3.65%: 0.78% 2.87% (S) 
Command, Control & 
Health Management/ 
Communications/     
Guidance, Navigation & 
Control 
MOS CIT/CEPS/MXS 
Electrics/Environmental/ MXS 
Avionics 
4.93%: 3.84% 1.09% (S) 
*(S) indicates the Shuttle experiences a larger impact from the function; (B) indicates the B-2 
experiences a larger impact from the function 
 
Unfortunately, this data set was more challenging to analyze for individual B-2 
workcenters, since most Shuttle functions required multiple workcenter skills, and many 
workcenters appeared across multiple functions.   
However, one comparison was clear, and supported the finding in the 
RMLV modeling dataset.  Liquid Propulsion, a similar Shuttle maintenance requirement 
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to the Fluids function analyzed above, applied directly to MXS Research Engineer and 
Propulsion Flight and demonstrated a 12% greater impact on maintenance man-hours for 
the Shuttle than for the B-2.  Because this dataset allowed for more specific isolation of 
the appropriate B-2 workcenter, the MXS Propulsion Flight and MOS Research Engineer 
were increased to contribute 12% more to total RMLV manpower requirements, and 
overhead functions were adjusted accordingly.   
The only other major disparity was in the arena of Structures, 
Mechanisms, and Vehicle Handling.  However, this Shuttle function incorporated too 
many aircraft workcenters to determine a specific parametric relationship.  It was clear 
that an adjustment factor would be required for the Structural Repair workcenter, but this 
factor will be determined through an estimated size comparison in the Surface Area 
section.   
To summarize, a comparison of the relative contributions of individual 
Shuttle maintenance activities to overall man-hour requirements revealed a general 
similarity to the contribution of individual B-2 maintenance workcenters to overall 
manpower requirements.  However, significant dissimilarities were noted.  First, 
manpower implications of a Shuttle-like thermal protection system were assessed, 
yielding results that strongly supported minimizing TPS requirements.  Second, a 
disparity in percent contribution was noted in Shuttle Liquid Propulsion, corresponding to 
the B-2 MXS Propulsion Flight and MOS Research Engineer workcenters.  An 
adjustment factor of 12% was used to increase the size of the Propulsion Flight, 
according to the following calculations, which are presented in detail by workcenter in 
Appendix F: 
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a.  Workcenter calculations: 1.  The two-shift workcenter numbers result 
in a total of 53/1,092 personnel for these two workcenters, accounting for 4.85% of total 
manpower.  The adjustment will require these workcenters to account for 16.85% of 
1,092 personnel, which amounts to 185 total personnel.  The 132 additional personnel 
were divided among the workcenters using the formula: 132*(workcenter personnel/53).  
107 personnel were assigned to Propulsion Flight, and 25 were assigned to the Research 
Engineer.  2.  The three-shift workcenter numbers result in a total of 80/1650 personnel 
for these two workcenters, accounting for 4.85% of total manpower.  The adjustment will 
require these workcenters to account for 16.85% of 1,650 personnel, which amounts to 
279 total personnel.  The 199 additional personnel were divided among the workcenters 
using the formula: 199*(workcenter personnel/80).  162 personnel were assigned to 
Propulsion Flight, and 37 additional personnel were assigned to the Research Engineer. 
b.  Overhead calculations: 1.  For two-shift operations, in Propulsion 
Flight, 107 additional personnel compared to 486 personnel previously assigned to 
functional workcenters (MXS total – MXS/CC/CQ/MXM) yielded a 22% increase, which 
was distributed to the overhead workcenters.  For the Research Engineer, 25 additional 
personnel accounted for a 32% increase over 79 functional workcenter personnel (MOS 
Total – MOS/CC/CQ), which was applied directly to the MOS/CC/CQ workcenter.  The 
resulting total yielded a 13% increase for the MOS/AMXS/MXS/MUNS total (138 
additional personnel compared to the previous four-squadron total of 1,052), which was 
applied to the MXG/CC workcenter.  2.  For three-shift operations, in Propulsion Flight, 
162 additional personnel compared to 732 personnel previously assigned to functional 
workcenters (MXS total – MXS/CC/CQ/MXM) yielded a 22% increase, which was 
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distributed to the overhead workcenters.  For the Research Engineer, 37 additional 
personnel accounted for a 31% increase over 121 functional workcenter personnel (MOS 
Total – MOS/CC/CQ), which was applied directly to the MOS/CC/CQ workcenter.  The 
resulting total yielded a 13% increase for the MOS/AMXS/MXS/MUNS total (208 
additional personnel compared to the previous four-squadron total of 1,589), which was 
applied to the MXG/CC workcenter.  
c.  After applying sensitivity analysis to account for two- and three-shift 
options, the resulting manpower requirements are displayed in Table 23. 
Table 23.  Adjustments for Propulsion Factor 
Workcenter 2 Shifts, Propulsion Factor 1.12 3 Shifts, Propulsion Factor 1.12 
MXG Staff 41 63 
MOS 111 169 
MXS 612 923 
MUNS 164 249 
AMXS 303 456 
MXG Total 1231 1860 
 
Bold and italicized numbers indicate those values that changed as a result of this 
parametric adjustment being applied to the appropriate workcenters.  The net result was 
an increase of 139 personnel over two shifts or 210 personnel over three shifts.   
At this stage in the manpower assessment, the possible design points listed 
in Table 24 have been established in accordance with the experimental design process 
outlined in Chapter IV, Methodology. 
Table 24.  Design Points for Propulsion Adjustment 
Design Factor 
Point Propulsion 
1 2 
2 3 
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Because the Propulsion Factor does not have a range of values, design 
points are the same as those established by the Shift Factor, and the results of this 
adjustment were combined under the heading of Shift Factor for remaining calculations 
These numbers provided the basis for required adjustments due to differences in 
Surface Area, a relationship that will be explored in the next section. 
Surface Area. 
 This parametric relationship accounted for the difference in size between the 
RMLV and the B-2, which directly affected the manpower requirements for the 
Structural Repair function, a significant contributor to total maintenance manpower 
requirements.  Unfortunately, since the RMLV is still in the design phase, its exact size is 
not yet specified.  Additionally, vehicle measurements were provided in length, height, 
and wingspan; however, surface area was a more accurate factor for Structural Repair 
manning, since the structures under maintenance are three-dimensional.  As a result, 
vehicle surface area was approximated from dimensional information for the B-2 and 
Shuttle orbiter, roughly calculated based on the geometry of each platform, depicted in 
Figure 35.   
  
 
Figure 35.  B-2 and Orbiter Discovery (B-2 Spirit, 2007; STS-116, 2007) 
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The B-2 is essentially triangular in shape, and the surface area was estimated as the sum 
of the areas of two triangles, approximating the upper and lower surfaces.  The orbiter 
main body was roughly calculated by summing two triangles, determined by the upper 
and lower wing surfaces, with three rectangular planes described by the orbiter length and 
height.  Additionally, it was assumed that the RMLV will be smaller than the orbiter, so 
the resulting factor was rounded down.  Surface area calculations are summarized in 
Table 25. 
Table 25.  Comparison of B-2 and Orbiter Surface Area 
Platform Dimensions 
B-2 Orbiter-Endeavor 
Length  (Nose-to-Tail) 69 ft 122.17 ft 
Wingspan 172 ft 78.06 ft 
Height  17 ft 56.67 ft (diameter) 
Surface Area 
Calculation 2 (1/2) (Wingspan) (Length) 
2 (1/2) (Wingspan) (Length) + 3 
(Height) (Length) 
Estimated Surface Area 11868 sq ft 30307 sq ft 
 
Based on these rough calculations, the orbiter surface area was approximately 2.6 times 
greater than the surface area of the B-2.  As a result, the B-2 Structural Repair section 
was doubled, and overhead support was adjusted accordingly.   
 While the Shuttle Orbiter provided the only operational reusable comparison 
platform for surface area, other reusable launch vehicles have reached a design stage that 
allowed for further surface area comparison.  Specifically, the Kistler K-1 fully reusable 
two-stage-to-launch vehicle was considered “the farthest along and the most technically 
feasible of the privately-funded commercial launch vehicle projects of the late 1990’s” 
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(Kistler K-1, 2007).  Although the program has stalled out, the development team had 
solidified the preliminary design and had begun development and testing. The first stage, 
depicted in Figure 36, was cylindrical in shape, 60.2 feet long, and 22 feet in diameter.  
 
Figure 36.  Kistler K-1 Conceptual Design (Kistler K-1—Summary, 2007) 
This equated to an estimated surface area of 4,200 square feet, approximately 35% of the 
estimated surface area of the B-2.  The RMLV, as currently envisioned, will be a vertical 
take-off, horizontal landing platform that will require aerodynamic features such as wings 
and tail stabilizers.  As such, it was not likely to be as small as the K-1 first stage, and the 
lower bound factor for the sensitivity analysis was rounded up slightly to 0.5. 
While a Surface Area Factor of 2 was the primary assumption of this research for 
remaining workforce calculations, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to account for 
Surface Area Factors of 0.5, 2, and 2.5.  The following calculations were applied to the 
Structural Repair workcenter to address differences in vehicle surface area: 
a.  Workcenter calculations: Both two- and three-shift workcenter numbers 
for Structural Repair were increased by factors of 0.5, 2, and 2.5. 
b.  Overhead calculations:  1.  For two-shift operations, a factor of 0.5 
resulted in a 16% decrease in the MXS (92 fewer personnel compared to 593 functional 
workcenter personnel); a factor of 2 yielded a 31% increase (184 additional personnel 
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compared to 593); and a factor of 2.5 yielded a 47% increase (276 additional personnel 
compared to 593); these adjustments were applied to MXS overhead workcenters.  The 
resulting changes of -8%, +16%, and +24% in the four-squadron totals (-96, +191, and 
+286 personnel compared to 1,190) were applied to the MXG overhead workcenter. 
c.  The resulting manpower requirements are shown in Table 26. 
Table 26.  Adjustments for Surface Area Factor 
Workcenter 
Propulsion 
Factor 1.12 Surface Area = .5 Surface Area = 2 Surface Area = 2.5 
  2 Shifts 
MXG Staff 41 40 43 43 
MOS 111 111 111 111 
MXS 612 516 803 898 
MUNS 164 164 164 164 
AMXS 303 303 303 303 
MXG Total 1231 1134 1424 1519 
  3 Shifts 
MXG Staff 63 62 65 66 
MOS 169 169 169 169 
MXS 923 779 1209 1351 
MUNS 249 249 249 249 
AMXS 456 456 456 456 
MXG Total 1860 1715 2148 2291 
 
At this stage in the manpower assessment, the possible design points listed 
in Table 27 have been established in accordance with the experimental design process 
outlined in Chapter IV, Methodology. 
Table 27.  Design Points for Surface Area Adjustment 
Design Factors 
Point Shift Surface Area 
1 2 0.5 
2 2 2.0 
3 2 2.5 
4 3 0.5 
5 3 2.0 
6 3 2.5 
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Further manpower calculations continued to assess both two- and three-shift options, but 
utilized the central value of 2 as the best assessment for the Surface Area Factor. 
Relative Complexity. 
 One of the most challenging differences to capture between B-2 and RMLV 
manning requirements was the greater vehicle complexity associated with a spacecraft.  
In order to establish a parametric relationship to approximate the net impact of this factor, 
it would be ideal to compare the total number of personnel performing ground support 
operations between subsequent Shuttle launches to the total number of personnel required 
for a B-2 turnaround.  However, this information was not available from the United 
Space Alliance (USA) due to proprietary concerns.  In its place, two estimations were 
performed.  First, the approximate total number of USA employees was compared to the 
B-2 Bomb Wing, which had a similar scope of responsibilities.  Second, the size of the 
Shuttle launch crew was used to estimate a total workforce requirement for comparison.   
United Space Alliance employs approximately 10,000 personnel (USA Quick 
Facts, 2007) responsible for Shuttle processing, maintenance, and operations to include: 
mission planning, logistics and supply chain operations, software engineering, ground 
system design engineering, launch and recovery operations, mission control, training, 
flight crew equipment preparation and maintenance, and integration (Capabilities, 2007).  
Similarly, the 509th Bomb Wing employs approximately 3,900 personnel (509th Mission 
Support Squadron, 2007), and is primarily responsible for all operations and maintenance 
activities supporting the B-2 (Whiteman AFB Mission, 2007).  In addition to orbiter 
support and maintenance, USA is also heavily engaged in support for the International 
Space Station, Extra Vehicular Activity Systems, and Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle Stage 
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1 studies (About USA, 2007).  The 509th Bomb Wing supports an AF Reserve A-10 unit, 
an Army National Guard Apache helicopter unit, and a variety of base operation and 
personnel support functions in addition to its primary mission (Whiteman AFB, Missouri, 
2007).  In general, USA and the 509th Bomb Wing each perform similar functions 
supporting a primary platform, with a scope of duties that broadens considerably beyond 
the primary mission.  This rough comparison resulted in the estimate that total Space 
Shuttle support requires approximately 2.5 times as many personnel as total B-2 support. 
A more detailed comparison began with the Space Shuttle launch team, and 
extrapolated total workforce numbers based on the following relationship: Shuttle Launch 
operations accounted for 16.26% of total maintenance man-hours for eight launches in 
1997 (McCleskey, 2005: 32).  The Space Shuttle launch team is “a highly organized and 
disciplined group of approximately 500 professionals” (The Space Shuttle Launch Team, 
2007), implying a total workforce size of approximately 3,075 personnel.  The 2005 
LCOM study estimated 1,536 personnel required to sustain B-2 operations under the 
modeled conditions.  As a result, it was estimated that Shuttle maintenance support would 
require approximately two times as many personnel as B-2 maintenance support. 
Again, due to the imprecise nature of these estimates, the manpower estimates 
accounting for vehicle complexity were performed at factors of 1.5, 2, and 2.5.  A lower 
complexity factor, such as 1.5, may result from the fact that the Shuttle was hampered by 
both advancing age and crew considerations, neither of which will apply to the RMLV.  
The following calculations were performed to assess Vehicle Complexity: 
a.  Workcenter and Overhead calculations.  For both two- and three-shift 
alternatives, using the manpower values derived at Surface Area Factor 2, each 
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workcenter was adjusted using the formula: Complexity Factor*(workcenter personnel).  
All fractions of a manpower authorization were rounded up. 
b.  The resulting manpower requirements are summarized in Table 28. 
Table 28.  Adjustments for Complexity Factor 
Workcenter Surface Area = 2 Complexity = 1.5 Complexity = 2 Complexity = 2.5 
  2 Shifts 
MXG Staff 43 66 86 109 
MOS 111 170 222 281 
MXS 803 1209 1607 2011 
MUNS 164 249 328 413 
AMXS 303 456 606 759 
MXG Total 1424 2150 2849 3573 
  3 Shifts 
MXG Staff 65 99 130 164 
MOS 169 257 339 426 
MXS 1209 1817 2419 3025 
MUNS 249 377 498 626 
AMXS 456 686 912 1142 
MXG Total 2148 3236 4298 5383 
 
The Complexity Factor established a wide range of manpower values, spanning more 
than 2,000 personnel between its lowest and highest settings.  As such, reductions in 
vehicle complexity have the potential to yield significant manpower savings.  The high 
magnitude of manpower requirements was mitigated in the next section, which addressed 
the RMLV’s smaller fleet size.   
At this stage in the manpower assessment, the possible design points listed in 
Table 29 have been established in accordance with the experimental design process 
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outlined in Chapter IV, Methodology.  While the Shift Factor continued to be assessed at 
two values, the Surface Area Factor was only assessed at its central value. 
Table 29.  Design Points for Complexity Adjustment 
Design Factors 
Point Shift Surface Area Complexity 
1 2 2 1.5 
2 2 2 2.0 
3 2 2 2.5 
4 3 2 1.5 
5 3 2 2.0 
6 3 2 2.5 
 
Remaining workforce calculations continue to address two- and three-shift 
alternatives, but assume the central Complexity Factor of 2, determined as the best 
estimate of this factor based on the research in this section. 
 Fleet Size. 
 The RMLV fleet size was assumed for the purposes of this research to consist of 
six boosters established as a requirement in the PRDA.  However, fleet size has been 
identified in previous research as a parametric variable whose optimal value varies based 
upon annual launch requirements, and fleet sizes varying from one to seven vehicles were 
assessed in resource evaluations (Rooney, 2006: 7).  As a result, this research conducted 
an assessment of manpower requirements for both two- and three-shift operations for 
fleet sizes ranging from one to seven vehicles using the following calculations: 
a.  Workcenter and Overhead calculations.  For both two- and three-shift 
options, each workcenter was adjusted using the formula: Fleet Size Factor*(workcenter 
personnel).  Fleet Size Factors were determined using the ratio of the number of RMLVs 
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(one to seven) to the number of B-2s supported in the LCOM manpower assessment (16).  
All fractions of a manpower authorization were rounded up. 
b.  The resulting manpower requirements are summarized in Table 30. 
Table 30.  Adjustments for Fleet Size Factor 
Workcenter 
Complexity 
= 2 
Fleet Size 
= 1/16 
Fleet Size 
= 2/16 
Fleet Size 
= 3/16 
Fleet Size 
= 4/16 
Fleet Size 
= 5/16 
Fleet Size 
= 6/16 
Fleet Size 
= 7/16 
  2 Shifts 
MXG Staff 86 7 12 18 23 28 34 39 
MOS 222 19 32 46 59 75 88 102 
MXS 1607 111 207 310 405 512 607 711 
MUNS 328 30 47 69 85 110 128 149 
AMXS 606 41 78 117 153 192 230 268 
MXG Total 2849 208 376 560 725 917 1087 1269 
  3 Shifts 
MXG Staff 130 10 18 26 34 42 50 58 
MOS 339 26 46 69 88 109 132 152 
MXS 2419 160 309 463 608 765 916 1068 
MUNS 498 40 69 100 128 163 194 223 
AMXS 912 60 117 174 230 288 344 402 
MXG Total 4298 296 559 832 1088 1367 1636 1903 
 
These results demonstrated that the reduced RMLV fleet size considerably reduced the 
manpower requirements calculated in this research.  Varying fleet size also yielded a 
wide range of workforce sizes, as manning requirements were highly dependent on the 
number of platforms supported.  For a six-vehicle fleet performing 24-hour operations, 
the total MXG value assessed in this chart was 1,636 personnel.  The Additional 
Sensitivity Analysis section of this chapter was used to shed further light on the range of 
RMLV manpower support requirements within the MXG. 
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 At this point, based on the best-estimate determinations of research data for each 
factor value, the design points in Table 31 have been sampled according to the 
experiment design outlined in Chapter IV, Methodology. 
Table 31.  Sampled Design Points 
Design Factors 
Point Shifts* Surface Area Complexity Fleet Size 
1 2 2 2 1 
2 2 2 2 2 
3 2 2 2 3 
4 2 2 2 4 
5 2 2 2 5 
6 2 2 2 6 
7 2 2 2 7 
8 3 2 2 1 
9 3 2 2 2 
10 3 2 2 3 
11 3 2 2 4 
12 3 2 2 5 
13 3 2 2 6 
14 3 2 2 7 
 
Design Point 13, representing three-shift operations of a six-ship fleet of RMLVs with 
Surface Area and Complexity Factors two times greater than the B-2, was the baseline 
manpower estimate of the MXG workforce size, totaling 1,636 personnel.  While the 
selection of these design points was supported by factor-level selections based upon step-
by-step research following the manpower assessment process, the combination of factors 
and levels encompassed a much wider range of design points than have been captured up 
to this point.  The complete set of design points is included at Appendix I.  In the 
Additional Sensitivity Analysis section, a random sampling of design points was 
conducted to address sample points not specifically covered by the research progression.  
First, a final stand-alone calculation assessed the impact of Integrated Vehicle Health 
Management (IVHM) Technology on the baseline manpower estimate. 
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 IVHM. 
The utilization of an Integrated Vehicle Health Management system, developed 
and coordinated into the early stages of the design process, has the potential to greatly 
reduce RMLV maintenance manpower requirements.  The C-17, for instance, utilizes an 
automated system that collects “engine health data, built-in-test data, and structural 
integrity data” that can be downloaded directly to ground systems for analysis and 
response (Boeing C-17, 2006).  The improved technology allowed the Dover AFB MXG 
to reduce its AMXS manning by approximately half (Losurdo, 2006).  The F-22 promises 
to improve automated maintenance capability even further with an even more extensive 
built-in-test capability that extends to individual line-replaceable units and an Integrated 
Maintenance Information System that integrates aircraft maintenance data with the 
required Technical Orders and forms to act as a single source of information for the 
maintainer (F-22 Raptor, 2006).  These features are projected to contribute to a 50% 
savings in total operational and support costs over the first 20 years of the platform’s life 
cycle (F-22 Raptor, 2006).  The potentially significant impact of IVHM on overall 
manpower requirements is depicted in Table 32, which applies varying degrees of 
IVHM-related manpower reductions to the baseline estimate of 1,636 personnel. 
Table 32. Adjustments for IVHM Impact 
Workcenter 
IVHM, No 
Impact 
IVHM, 10% 
Reduction 
IVHM, 20% 
Reduction 
IVHM, 50% 
Reduction 
MXG Staff 50 49 48 46 
MOS 132 132 132 132 
MXS 916 829 741 461 
MUNS 194 194 194 194 
AMXS 344 310 276 173 
MXG Total 1636 1514 1391 1006 
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Because an IVHM system reduces the requirements for troubleshooting and inspections, 
functions performed by the AMXS and MXS workcenters which comprise over 75% of 
the total MXG workforce, the potential manning impact of IVHM utilization is 
significant.  As such, investment in IVHM technology presents a design alternative that 
yields a high cost savings in manpower.  
 Additional Sensitivity Analysis. 
 A range of MXG manning requirements was assessed by setting factor 
combinations to their highest and lowest values, yielding the results shown in Table 33. 
Table 33.  Establishing an MXG Range 
Workcenter All Factors Low 
Fleet Size 6, All 
Others Low 
Three Shifts, 
Fleet Size 6,   
All Others Low 
Fleet Size 6,    
All Others 
High 
All Factors 
High 
MXG Staff 4 17 36 64 74 
MOS 16 68 101 165 191 
MXS 69 363 447 1274 1488 
MUNS 24 97 147 239 280 
AMXS 30 165 261 431 503 
MXG Total 143 710 992 2173 2536 
 
In addition to establishing the full range by setting all factors at their lowest and highest 
values, this calculation also established ranges of values for two major assumptions of 
this research:  a fleet size of six vehicles and a fleet size of six vehicles with three-shift 
operations.  While an MXG manned at 1,636 positions was considered to be the best 
estimate of manpower requirements, the size of the total workforce could range from 143 
personnel for a single vehicle to over 2,500 personnel for a fleet of seven.  For a six-
RMLV fleet, personnel requirements for the MXG could be expected to fall between 710 
and 2,173 total personnel, based upon research synthesizing Shuttle and aircraft 
maintenance requirements.  An MXG with 710 personnel would support two shifts of 
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operations.  The range of requirements for an MXG supporting three shifts of operations 
was 922 to 2,173 total personnel.   
In addition to these hand-selected factor-level combinations, six design points 
were sampled at random to generate additional data outside of those points considered 
relevant and interesting to this research process.  The results for the six additional 
samples are summarized in Table 34. 
Table 34.  Random Sample of Design Points 
Workcenter 
Shifts = 3;     
Surface Area = .5; 
Complexity = 2.5; 
Fleet Size = 4 
Shifts = 3;    
Surface Area = .5; 
Complexity = 1.5; 
Fleet Size = 4 
Shifts = 2;    
Surface Area = 2; 
Complexity = 2.5; 
Fleet Size = 2 
MXG Staff 40 32 15 
MOS 109 88 41 
MXS 496 393 259 
MUNS 163 128 57 
AMXS 288 230 98 
MXG Total 1096 871 470 
Workcenter 
Shifts = 3;    
Surface Area = 
2.5; Complexity = 
2.5; Fleet Size = 3 
Shifts = 2;    
Surface Area = .5; 
Complexity = 2; 
Fleet Size = 3 
Shifts = 3;    
Surface Area = 2; 
Complexity = 2.5; 
Fleet Size = 1 
MXG Staff 33 17 12 
MOS 86 46 32 
MXS 642 202 198 
MUNS 125 69 46 
AMXS 216 117 75 
MXG Total 1102 451 363 
 
When combined with the purposeful sampling of design points generated by this 
research, a regression analysis (Appendix J) yielded the following equation: 
Y = 354.63(Shifts) + 66.77(Surface Area) + 483.48(Complexity) + 217.02(Fleet Size) - 1941.76 
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The analysis of this equation revealed, however, that the Surface Area variable was not 
significant in the regression (p-value = .39).  The analysis was conducted again without 
the Surface Area Factor, resulting in the following equation: 
Y = 365.41(shift) + 513.15(complexity) + 217.95(fleet size) - 1913.36 
This equation can now be used to provide a manpower estimate for an RMLV MXG 
varying factor values. 
In the next section, AFMS calculations were applied to determine the manning 
requirements for the remaining RMLV ground support workcenters. 
Ground Support Workforce 
RMLV Logistics Support Functions. 
 Remaining RMLV ground support functions operating under the LRS, as 
identified in Chapter VI, Analysis of Organizational Structure, were addressed by four 
manpower standards: Base Supply, responsible for all spares support (Air Force, AFMS 
41A0, 2003: 1); Fuels Management, responsible for all petroleum, oil, lubricants, 
propellants, and cryogenics support (Air Force, AFMS 41D1, 2003: 1); Vehicle 
Maintenance, responsible for repair and maintenance of all vehicles and equipment (Air 
Force, AFMS 42B1, 2003: 1); and Vehicle Operations, responsible for all vehicle 
management and dispatch operations (Air Force, AFMS 42A1, 1997: 1).  The direct 
application of these standards requires historical data in each of the functional areas that 
is not yet available for the RMLV.  However, by applying parametric relationships to 
AFMS average man-hour calculations, the AFMS was executed to provide an estimate of 
ground support manning requirements.  Appendix G contains the calculation process, 
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average monthly man-hour summary, and applicable excerpt from the Standard 
Manpower Table for each AFMS. 
For all standards, a MAF of 149.6 and an overload factor of 1.077 were utilized 
where required.  These factors correspond to a normal 40-hour workweek (Air Force, 
AFI 38-201, 2003: 55).  While RMLV support will be a 24-hour operation, each shift will 
work a normal 40-hour week, and multiple shifts were captured within the AFMS for 
each individual workcenter.  This section applied AFMS calculations to evaluate the 
manpower requirements for each workcenter in turn, concluding with an overall 
assessment of the RMLV ground support workforce. 
 Base Supply. 
 The Base Supply workload factor is based on the average monthly number of 
transactions processed for due-out releases, establishing due-outs, issues from stock, 
receipts, turn-ins, and warehouse location changes (Air Force, AFMS 41A0, 2003: 4).  
This data would normally be available in a Consolidated Transaction History generated 
by the Standard Base Supply System database (Air Force, AFMS 41A0, 2003: 4).  Since 
historical data was not yet available for the RMLV, the average monthly man-hours 
established in the AFMS for Materiel Requests (due-outs), Materiel from Stock (issues), 
Materiel Receipt (receipts and due-out releases), and Materiel Storage (warehouse 
locations changes) were used to approximate the average monthly man-hours an RMLV 
Supply function would devote to these transactions (Air Force, AFMS 41A0, 2003: 52).   
Additionally, two variances were authorized to Whiteman AFB specifically to 
support the unique requirements imposed by Low Observable structural material.  These 
variances were added to the average monthly man-hours for supply transactions, and the 
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total was adjusted by the Complexity Factors identified in the previous section and a 
Fleet Size factor of 6/16.  This parametric relationship was used because the number of 
spare parts required is impacted by the complexity and number of supported platforms.  
Table 35 lists the steps used to apply the Base Supply AFMS (central values in bold). 
Table 35.  Application of Base Supply Manpower Standard 
Base Supply: AFMS 41AO 
Ref Action Calculation Derivation 
1.3.5, 
1.4 Man-hour Equation Y= .8529X 
X = average monthly number of 
specified supply transactions 
2.1 Step 1: Add 2 for flight supervision 2   
2.2 Step 2: Add 1 for flight administration 1   
2.3 Step 3: Add 1 for funds management 1   
2.4 Step 4: Determine after-hours support from Table 1 2.177 
Assumes 1 flying squadron, 24-
hour operations 
2.5 Step 5: Determine average monthly transactions from CTH 
Not    
Available   
2.6 Step 6: Compute Monthly Man-hours 8581.52 
Total of average monthly 
process time for those processes 
assigned against the relevant 
transactions 
  Apply Parametric 
4827.11, 
6436.14, 
8045.18 
Adjusted by Vehicle Complexity 
(1.5, 2, 2.5) and Fleet Size 
(.375) parametric 
2.7; 
A4.16 
Step 7: Add applicable variance man-
hours 
5157.49, 
6766.52, 
8375.56 
+ 330.38 for Whiteman Low 
Observable Contract Support 
2.8 Step 8: Divide man-hours by MAF 
32.01,  
42.00,  
51.98 
 
MAF = 149.6, overload  = 1.077 
2.9 Step 9:  Add fixed manpower from steps 1-4 
38.187, 
48.17, 
58.157 
  
2.10 Step 10: Exercise Participation Credit Not Applicable 
In this research, RMLV exercise 
participation is not addressed. 
2.11 Step 11: Deployment Participation Credit 
Not 
Applicable RMLV is non-deployable. 
2.12 Step 12: Add results of steps 10 and 11 to step 9, and round up. 49 Range is 39 to 59  
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The result of applying the AFMS for Base Supply operations was a workcenter 
staffed by 49 personnel broken down by rank and level of expertise in Table 36. 
Table 36.  RMLV Supply Support from Standard Manpower Table  
(Air Force, AFMS 41A0, 2003: 34) 
Title AFSC Rank 
Manpower 
Requirement 
Supply 021S3 Capt 1 
Supply 021S3 Lt 1 
Supply Management Supt 2S0XX CMSgt 0 
Supply Management Supt 2S0XX SMSgt 1 
Supply Mgt Craftsman 2S07X MSgt 2 
Supply Mgt Craftsman 2S07X TSgt 5 
Supply Mgt Journeyman 2S05X SSgt 12 
Supply Mgt Journeyman 2S05X SrA 15 
Supply Mgt Apprentice 2S03X A1C 12 
Total     49 
 
 Fuels Management. 
 The Fuels Management workload factor is based on the historical monthly 
average of fuel receipts and fuel transfers (Air Force, AFMS 41D1, 2003: 3-4).  Since 
this information was not yet available, the average monthly man-hours established in the 
AFMS for Receiving and Distribution (Air Force, AFMS 41D1, 2003: 38) were used to 
approximate the average monthly man-hours devoted to receipts and transfers.   
In order to correctly size the Fuels Management flight, a parametric relationship 
was developed comparing the fuel loads of the B-2 and the Shuttle Orbiter Main Engines.  
The solid-fuel second stage was not assessed because it would not require fuels personnel 
support.  The implications of a liquid-propellant second stage are addressed in Chapter 
VIII, Conclusions and Future Research.  The resulting parametric relationship was: 
 535,000 lbs (SSME): 200,000 lbs (B-2) = 2.675 
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Accordingly, the average monthly man-hours from the AFMS were increased by a factor 
of 2.675.  Sensitivity analysis was conducted using bounding values of 2 and 3.5.  Table 
37 summarizes the steps to apply the Fuels AFMS (central values are in bold). 
Table 37.  Application of Fuels Management Manpower Standard 
Fuels Management: AFMS 41D1 
Ref Action Calculation Derivation 
1.3.8, 
1.3.9.1
1.3.9.2 
Man-hour Equation 
Y = 948.758 + 
1053.6149X1   
+ 97.5441X2 
X1 = average monthly gallons of 
fuel received; X2 = average 
monthly number of fuel transfers 
2.1.1 Step 1: Determine number of shifts 3 3 Shifts for 24-hour operations 
2.1.2 Step 2: Determine type of delivery mode Truck 
All propellant deliveries at 
Vandenberg are by commercial 
trailer (30th Space Wing, 1998: 2) 
2.1.3; 
1.3.7 
Step 3: Determine fractional 
manpower from Table 1 based on 
steps 1 and 2 
5.33   
2.2.1-
2.2.5 
Determine values for X1 and X2 
based on historical data Not Available   
  
Sum average monthly receiving and 
distribution man-hours; Apply 
Parametric 
8426.20, 
11270.04, 
14745.85 
(Receiving (1535.59) + 
Distribution (2677.51)) * 2, 
2.675, 3.5 
2.2.6 Step 6: Calculate average monthly man-hours and divide by MAF 
62.67, 81.68,   
104.91   
Y=948.758 + 11270.04 (total avg 
monthly man-hours for receiving 
and distribution); MAF = 149.6 
2.3.1 Step 1: Add steps 3 and 6 68.00, 87.01,   110.24   
2.3.2 Step 2: Add 2 for overhead mgt 70.00, 89.01,   112.24   
2.3.3 Step 3: Add 1 for overhead admin 71.00, 90.01,   113.24   
2.3.4 Step 4: Add 14 for Resource Control Center 
85.00, 104.01,   
127.24   
2.3.5 Step 5: Add 4 for Checkpoint Operation process 
89.00, 108.01,   
131.24   
2.3.6 Step 6: Add 4 for Quality Control and Inspection process 
93.00, 112.01,   
135.24   
2.3.7 Step 7: Add 2 for Fuels Flight Support process 
95.00, 114.01,   
137.24   
2.3.8 Step 8: Calculated Variance man-hours divided by MAF 4.69 
+701.76 for Cryogenics; MAF = 
149.6 
2.3.9 Step 9: Add Variance authorizations to step 7 
99.69, 118.70,   
141.93   
2.3.10 Step 10: Exercise Participation Credit N/A 
In this research, RMLV exercise 
participation is not addressed 
2.3.11 Step 11: Deployment Participation  N/A RMLV is non-deployable. 
2.3.12 Step 12: Add results of steps 10 and 11 to step 9, and round up. 119  Range is 100 to 142 
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The Fuels Management flight supporting the RMLV fleet would be composed of 
119 personnel, with the rank and expertise levels described in Table 38. 
Table 38.  RMLV Fuels Support from Standard Manpower Table 
(Air Force, AFMS 41D1, 2003: 26) 
Title AFSC Rank 
Manpower 
Requirement 
Supply Mgmt Officer 23S4 Maj 1 
Supply Operations Officer 23S3 Capt  0 
Fuels Manager 2F000 CMSgt 1 
Fuels Superintendent 2F091 SMSgt 1 
Fuels Craftsman 2F071 MSgt 8 
Fuels Craftsman 2F071 TSgt 13 
Fuels Journeyman 2F051 SSgt 25 
Fuels Journeyman 2F051 SrA 35 
Fuels Apprentice 2F031 A1C 33 
Info Mgmt Journeyman 3A051 SSgt 1 
Info Mgmt Journeyman 3A051 SrA 1 
Total     119 
  
Vehicle Maintenance. 
 The Vehicle Maintenance workload factor is based on the total number of vehicle 
and equipment authorizations on base, which are typically documented in a Vehicle 
Authorization List (Air Force, AFMS 42B1,2003: 3).  Since this document has not yet 
been developed for the RMLV, the average monthly man-hours established in the AFMS 
for Refueling Vehicle and/or Equipment Maintenance and Repair, Special Purpose 
Vehicle and/or Equipment Maintenance and Repair, and General Purpose Vehicle and/or 
Equipment Maintenance and Repair (Air Force, AFMS 42B1,2003: 53) were used to 
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approximate the average monthly man-hours that will be devoted to RMLV fleet 
maintenance.  Man-hours for Fire Department Vehicles and 463L Materiel Handling 
Equipment Vehicles were not included in the calculation, as they are not specific to the 
RMLV, and were assumed to be supported by the existing Vehicle Maintenance structure 
at Vandenberg AFB or Cape Canaveral AFS.  Finally, monthly man-hours were adjusted 
by the range of Complexity Factors identified in the previous section and a Fleet Size 
Factor of 6/16.  This parametric was used because the number of vehicles and equipment 
required for ground support operations is impacted both by the number and complexity of 
the platforms supported. 
Additionally, three workcenters within Vehicle maintenance required independent 
manpower calculations.  Manning authorizations for the Maintenance Control and 
Analysis workcenter and the Material Control workcenter were derived from staffing 
patterns based on the total number of authorized vehicles (excluding equipment) on base.  
To apply these staffing patterns, the B-2 vehicle fleet size of 650 vehicles was used as a 
baseline estimate of total authorized vehicles (509th Logistics Readiness Squadron, 
2006), and was adjusted by the range of Complexity Factors and a Fleet Size factor of 
6/16 to approximate RMLV vehicle authorizations.  The result was a total of 488 
authorized vehicles as an input to the staffing pattern.  This application also assumed that 
the number of authorized and assigned vehicles were equal.  The final Vehicle 
Maintenance workcenter, Vehicle Maintenance Management, was determined from a 
staffing pattern based on the number of personnel authorized under the preceding 
calculations.   
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Table 39 summarizes the steps followed to apply the Vehicle Maintenance AFMS 
(central values are in bold). 
Table 39.  Application of Vehicle Maintenance Manpower Standard 
Vehicle Maintenance: AFMS 42B1 
Ref Action Calculation Derivation 
1.3, 1.4 Man-hour Equation Y = 4.6349X - 1513.41 
X = total number of vehicle 
and/or equipment equivalents 
assigned to flight for 
maintenance 
Table 
A5.1 
Determine total average 
monthly man-hours 3881.50 
Total of applicable avg monthly 
process times 
  Apply Parametric 
2183.34,   
2911.13,   
3638.91 
Complexity (1.5, 2, 2.5) and 
Fleet Size parametric (0.375) 
2.1 Step 1: Compute equation. 
669.93,     
1397.72,   
2125.50 
Y = adjusted avg monthly man-
hours - 1513.41 
2.2 Step 2: Determine variance man-hours Not   Applicable   
2.3-2.5 
Steps 3-5: Determine 
contractor, civilan, foreign 
national positions 
Not  Applicable   
2.6 Step 6: Divide by MAF, round up 5, 10, 15 
Assume all military positions; 
MAF = 149.6 
2.7 Step 7: Add civilian and military requirements Not  Applicable   
2.8 
Step 8: Determine MC&A 
requirements using Tables 2 
and 3 
7 Authorized Vehicles = Assigned Vehicles = 650*2*0.375 = 488 
2.9 
Step 9: Determine Materiel 
Control requirements using 
Table 5 
3 Assigned Vehicles = 488 
2.10 
Step 10: Determine VM 
Management requirements 
using Table 1 
2 VM personnel = 10 + 7 + 3 = 20 
2.11 
Step 11: Determine total VM 
flight requirements, 
summing steps 6, 8, 9, and 10 
22  Range is 17 to 27 
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The Vehicle Maintenance Flight supporting RMLV operations would require 22 
personnel with the ranks and levels of technical expertise specified in Table 40. 
Table 40.  RMLV Vehicle Maintenance Support from Standard Manpower Table 
(Air Force, AFMS 42B1, 2003: 35) 
Title AFSC Rank 
Manpower 
Requirement 
Veh Mx Craftsman 2T370 MSG 1 
Veh Mx Craftsman 2T370 TSG 2 
Veh Mx Journeyman 2T35X SSG 6 
Veh Mx Journeyman 2T35X SRA 10 
Veh Mx Apprentice 2T33X A1C 3 
Total     22 
  
Vehicle Operations for Installations with Flying Missions. 
 The Vehicle Operations workload factor is based on total base military and 
civilian personnel authorizations (Air Force, AFMS 42A1, 1997: 2).  In order to derive an 
estimate of total base population including the RMLV ground support organization, the 
current military and civilian base populations of Vandenberg AFB and Patrick AFB were 
combined with the previously determined RMLV MXG, Base Supply, Fuels, and Vehicle 
Maintenance requirements.  Since supply, fuels, and vehicle maintenance functions are 
pre-existing at both locations, it was assumed that any flight management positions are 
already staffed, and only functional positions would be added to total flight 
authorizations.  As a result, all positions above the rank of MSgt were subtracted from 
those flights.  The resulting equations were: 
3,331 (military) + 1,459 (civilian) + 1,634 (MXG) + 46 (Supply) + 116 (Fuesl) + 22 
(VM) = 6608 (Friends of Vandenberg AFB, 2007) 
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Low value = 3,331 (military) + 1,459 (civilian) + 1,155 (MXG) + 37 (Supply) + 
97 (Fuels) + 17 (VM) = 6,096 
High value = 3,331 (military) + 1,459 (civilian) + 2,173 (MXG) + 54 (Supply) + 
139 (Fuels) + 27 (VM) = 7,183 
2,519 (military) + 1,071 (civilian) + 1,634 (MXG) + 46 (Supply) + 116 (Fuel) + 22 (VM) 
= 5408  (Hass, 2003: 183) 
Low value = 2,519 (military) + 1,071 (civilian) + 1,155 (MXG) + 37 (Supply) + 
97 (Fuels) + 17 (VM) = 4,896 
High value = 2,519 (military) + 1,071 (civilian) + 2,173 (MXG) + 54 (Supply) + 
139 (Fuels) + 27 (VM) = 5983 
The average of the base totals, approximately 6,000 total base personnel, was utilized to 
calculate Vehicle Operations manpower requirements, as outlined in Table 41.  Low and 
high averages of 5,500 and 6,580 were used to establish a range; central values are 
denoted in bold. 
Table 41.  Application of Vehicle Operations Manpower Standard 
    
Ref Action Calculation Derivation 
2.3, 
2.4 Man-hour Equation 
Y = 1232.91    
+ 1.01X 
X = total number of AF military 
and civilian authorizations, not 
including contractors 
3.1 Step 1: Determine base population 
5,500,       
6,000,        
6,580 
Average of Vandenberg/Patrick 
AFB populations with RMLV 
support manning added 
3.2 Step 2: Compute man-hours 
6787.91, 
7292.91, 
7878.71   
3.3 
Step 3: Divide by MAF, overload, 
round up 43, 46,49  MAF = 149.6, overload = 1.077 
3.4 
Step 4: Apply Variances and sum 
for total authorizations 46 Range is 43 to 49  
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The Vehicle Operations flight supporting the RMLV would require 46 personnel 
with the rank structure and skill levels assigned in Table 42. 
Table 42.  RMLV Vehicle Operations Support from Standard Manpower Table 
(Air Force, AFMS 42A1, 1997: 3) 
Title AFSC Rank 
Manpower 
Requirement 
Transportation 24T3 Capt 1 
Vehicle Ops Manager 2T100 CMSgt 0 
Vehicle Ops Superintendent 2T191 SMSgt 1 
Vehicle Ops Craftsman 2T171 MSgt 2 
Vehicle Ops Craftsman 2T171 TSgt 3 
Vehicle Ops/Dispatch Journeyman 2T151 SSgt 8 
Vehicle Ops/Dispatch Journeyman 2T151 SrA 15 
Vehicle Ops/Dispatch Apprentice 2T131 A1C 15 
Information Mgt Journeyman 3A051 SSgt 1 
Total     46 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter, RMLV ground support manpower requirements were determined 
using LCOM and AFMS calculation methods in accordance with AF policy.  
Calculations were largely based on B-2 support organizations, determined in Chapter VI, 
Analysis of Organizational Structure, to be the most appropriate comparison platform.  
Parametric relationships based on comparisons between B-2 and Shuttle data were used 
to adjust manpower calculations to appropriately account for the characteristics of a space 
launch vehicle, and sensitivity analyses were performed where possible to establish 
ranges of manpower values.   
Ground support operations for an RMLV fleet will require a Maintenance Group 
staffed with between 922 and 2,173 personnel for 24-hour operations, and supply, fuels, 
and transportation manpower totaling between 199 and 277 personnel.  Based on the best 
estimates of this research, the total support numbers include 1,636 MXG personnel and 
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236 LRS personnel.  Assuming that the RMLV operates out of Vandenberg AFB or 
Patrick AFB, where the Logistics Readiness Squadron and Safety office are already 
established, calculated supervisory positions in these areas would not be required.  This 
would result in a total impact to base population for RMLV ground support operations of 
1,864 additional personnel.  Chapter VIII, Conclusions and Future Research, will address 
the training and life cycle cost implications of these results, discuss the impact of design 
alternatives, and recommend areas for future research.   
 
 148 
VIII.  Conclusions and Future Research 
By comparing current aircraft and Space Shuttle operations, it has been possible 
to estimate the size and organizational structure of an RMLV ground support workforce 
that will support the regeneration activities identified in the MILEPOST simulation 
model.  This organization is designed to be attached to existing operations at Vandenberg 
AFB or Cape Canaveral AFS, and will consist of a Maintenance Group modeled after   
B-2 operations and a parametrically sized Logistics Readiness Squadron workforce that 
can be incorporated into an existing squadron.  The anticipated organizational structure 
and manpower numbers, totaling 1,872 personnel, are depicted in Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 37.  RMLV Ground Support Organization 
While these numbers represent the baseline estimate of total logistics manpower 
requirements arrived at by this research process, a range of maintenance workforce 
values was also assessed to address variation in RMLV design factors. 
Supporting 
Wing 
RMLV MXG 
1,636 
RMLV LRS 
236 
MXG Staff 
50 
MOS 
132 
MXS 
916 
MUNS 194 
AMXS 344 
Supply 
49 
Fuels 
119 
Veh Maint 
22 
Veh Ops 
46 
 149 
Figure 38 depicts the evolution of the maintenance workforce as it has been 
transformed from supporting a B-2 unit in order to support a future RMLV unit.  It is 
interesting to note the change in proportion of the individual maintenance workcenters.   
B-2 MXG Manning
MXG Staff
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MUNS
AMXS
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Figure 38:  RMLV MXG Development 
The AMXS workcenter supporting an RMLV fleet will comprise a much smaller 
percentage of total maintenance operations, while the MXS workcenter will make up a 
much greater portion of the MXG.  The RMLV fleet is projected to be much smaller than 
the B-2 fleet, necessitating fewer flightline maintenance manning resources, while the 
increased maintenance requirements of the more complex propulsion system and 
structural elements require increased manning resources in the backshop.  In addition, the 
MOS workcenter grows slightly in proportion due to the involvement of the Research 
Engineer section in the engineering support element of Shuttle propulsion operations.  
Finally, the MUNS workcenter decreases slightly due to reduced maintenance 
requirements associated with second stages and payloads that are delivered ready-to-
integrate.  If an IVHM system is incorporated that yields a 50% improvement in 
maintenance capability, the MXS and AMXS squadrons reduce proportionately in 
1,536 1,636 1,006 
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comparison to the other workcenters, and total manpower requirements reduce 
considerably. 
Figure 39 depicts a range of MXG workforce sizes and compositions representing 
all factors at their lowest values, the lowest-value six-ship fleet supporting three-shift 
operations, and all factors at their highest values. 
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Figure 39.  MXG Manpower Range 
Without careful design consideration, a combination of large surface areas and significant 
complexity with a fleet size of six vehicles causes manpower requirements to inflate 
quickly.  However, by maintaining design factors like size and complexity at low levels, 
even a full-sized fleet operating three shifts can achieve lower maintenance manpower 
requirements than the baseline estimate. 
 Additionally, logistics support manpower requirements can be expected to vary 
between 199 and 277 personnel for a fleet size of six RMLVs.  These numbers are also 
affected by vehicle complexity and by size-related factors like fuel consumption. 
143 992 2,173 
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 Throughout the step-by-step manpower assessment and sensitivity analysis, it was 
clear that certain factors caused a greater impact on manpower numbers than others.  
Figure 40 provides a visual representation of the impact of combinations of tested factors 
on the manpower response variable. 
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Figure 40.  Impact of Test Factors on Manpower Requirements 
These comparisons show that while the number of shifts and the relative surface area of 
the RMLV have some impact on total manpower numbers, the more dramatic changes are 
caused by adjustments in fleet size, relative vehicle complexity, and the incorporation of 
varying levels of IVHM.  Design alternatives that address these factors will have the 
greatest impact on total logistics support manpower requirements. 
To conclude the evaluation of RMLV ground support operations, this chapter will 
address the life cycle and training cost implications of the projected manpower, the 
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impact of future design alternative decisions on this manpower estimate, and future 
research efforts that will further refine the logistics assessment of RMLV design 
candidates. 
Life Cycle Cost  
 The life cycle costs associated with logistics manpower support for the RMLV are 
comprised mainly of personnel and training costs.  AF Personnel Costs are derived from 
annual personnel budget planning factors, while estimates of the cost of training support 
are based on historical data regarding training support contracts established upon the 
introduction of new weapons systems into the AF inventory. 
AF Cost of Personnel. 
 The AF maintains an estimate of the average annual cost of personnel by rank, 
attached at Appendix H, organized under three pay rate categories: Standard Composite 
Pay Rate w/PCS, Accelerated Annual Pay Rate per Workyear, and Accelerated Annual 
Pay Rate (Direct Workhour).  Accelerated Annual Pay Rate (Direct Workhour) is to be 
used only when costing based on actual time worked.  Accelerated Annual Pay Rate per 
Workyear, which “represents the total cost of one full-time military member,” provides 
the most comprehensive estimate of annual cost and will be the pay rate used for this cost 
estimate (Air Force, AFI 65-503, 1994: 4).   
 The manpower output data generated by the LCOM report for MXG 
authorizations, which formed the basis for the RMLV MXG manpower estimate, is not 
detailed to the rank-level.  In addition, the use of parametric relationships to size the 
workforce would require a new LCOM simulation to generate the rank structure 
associated with the adjusted estimate.  As a result, average values for officer and enlisted 
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personnel were utilized, with the assumption that there are six total officer positions for 
the central value of the manpower estimate: two at the MXG, and one each at the MOS, 
MXS, AMXS and MUNS agencies, assigned against the squadron Commander positions.  
The AFMS documents used to calculate LRS agency requirements designated rank-
specific manpower structures, and specific annual cost data was assigned against these 
estimates.  A summary of personnel cost calculations is presented in Table 43.   
Table 43.  Annual Cost of Logistics Ground Support Personnel 
Org Rank 
Unit Cost 
(K) 
Qty    
Low 
Qty   
Avg 
Qty 
High 
Total Cost 
Low (K) 
Total Cost 
Avg (K) 
Total Cost 
High (K) 
MXG Officer $128.32 5 6 8 $641.60 $769.92 $1,026.56 
  Enlisted $67.46 1150 1630 2165 $77,579.00 $109,959.80 $146,050.90 
LRS O-4 Major $142.54 0 1 1 $0.00 $142.54 $142.54 
  O3 Captain $118.10 3 2 2 $354.30 $236.20 $236.20 
  O2 Lieutenant $99.36 0 1 2 $0.00 $99.36 $198.72 
  
E9 Chief Master 
Sergeant $117.81 1 1 2 $117.81 $117.81 $235.62 
  
E8 Senior Master 
Sergeant $101.73 3 3 3 $305.19 $305.19 $305.19 
  
E7 Master 
Sergeant $90.24 11 13 15 $992.64 $1,173.12 $1,353.60 
  
E6 Technical 
Sergeant $79.44 19 23 26 $1,509.36 $1,827.12 $2,065.44 
  E5 Staff Sergeant $69.49 45 53 57 $3,127.05 $3,682.97 $3,960.93 
  
E4 Senior 
Airman $58.65 64 76 87 $3,753.60 $4,457.40 $5,102.55 
  
E3 Airman First 
Class $50.91 53 63 82 $2,698.23 $3,207.33 $4,174.62 
Total (K) 1354 1872 2450 $91,078.78 $125,978.76 $164,852.87 
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According to this estimate, an average personnel budget of approximately $126 billion 
per year would be required to staff the RMLV logistics ground support organization.  By 
integrating the RMLV LRS agencies into an operational LRS at Vandenberg or Patrick 
AFB, the AF would save almost $1 billion (the sum of all LRS positions above the rank 
of Master Sergeant).  The bulk of the personnel expenditure is concentrated on the 
sizeable MXG organization; any design or operational considerations that reduce the 
MXG footprint for RMLV support will greatly benefit the overall cost of the program. 
Training Cost. 
The cost of training personnel in RMLV-specific maintenance and equipment 
operations will be a significant portion of total life cycle cost.  The AF currently has 
established training programs for each required AFSC; however, additional specialized 
training will be required to address the unique aspects of RMLV logistics support.   
Historically, the introduction of new platforms into the AF inventory has been 
met with different solutions.  When the B-2 became operational in 1993 (B-2 Spirit, 
2007), Structural Repair personnel at Whiteman AFB completed specialized training in 
maintenance of Low Observable materials upon their arrival to the unit.  This approach 
posed considerable challenges to the maintenance operation.  While the training program 
itself was based upon accurate contractor maintenance data, the opportunity to actively 
apply individual maintenance techniques was infrequent due to relatively low sortie rates 
and low occurrences of individual types of failure.  Additionally, the AF personnel 
rotation system resulted in high turnover rates and a high percentage of personnel with 
low experience levels at any given time.  This led to a Structural Repair workforce that 
experienced difficulty in achieving proficiency, which lengthened repair times, and drove 
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Whiteman AFB leadership to seek a training solution.  The solution manifested itself in 
the form of a partnership with Northrop Grumman, and a contract for production 
personnel, who had gained LO repair proficiency on the production line, to integrate into 
the Structural Repair organization to provide continuity and expertise (B-2 Visit, 2006).  
The dissimilarity of the RMLV from other AF weapons systems may necessitate a similar 
arrangement to address repair proficiency, and the cost of such a contract will need to be 
figured into total life cycle cost. 
 With the introduction of newer platforms like the C-17 and F-22, procurement of 
contracted maintenance support entails significant initial and recurring costs.  In support 
of the C-17, for example, the AF first awarded a comprehensive five-year maintenance 
support contract to United Industrial Corporation in 1997 (United Industrial Wins, 2007). 
Follow-on contracts continued with a $22.3 million contract to upgrade trainers to Block 
12 in 2001 (United Industrial Wins, 2007) and a $5.6 million upgrade contract in 2003, 
which brought the total contract value to $206.4 million over those first six years (United 
Industrial Corporation, 2007).  Upgrades are a continuing necessity, however, and in 
2005, the AF awarded a $70 million contract for the production of six new maintenance 
trainers to be used at new maintenance training facilities at Travis AFB, Hickam AFB, 
and Elmendorf AFB in 2008 (Air Force Buys, 2007).  Subsequently, in 2006, the AF 
awarded a $30.2 million contract for two additional trainers to be delivered in 2009 and 
2010, with an option for a $14.9 million aircraft engine maintenance trainer (United 
Industrial’s AAI Services Subsidiary Receives, 2007).    
The F-22A, approved for full-rate production in 2005 (F-22A Raptor, 2007), will 
be supported by maintainers trained in a newly-constructed $19.7 million training facility 
 156 
beginning in 2008 (Officials Break Ground, 2007).  Follow-on costs for contracted 
training systems and upgrades are yet to be determined, but may easily follow the pattern 
established by the C-17.  In 2002, Boeing contracted with Link Simulation and Training 
for $55.9 million over two contracts to build full mission trainers, with the potential for 
executing an eight-contract series valued at over $200 million (Link Simulation & 
Training, 2007).  In 2006, a new contract was established with United Industrial 
Corporation for $48.5 million to produce maintenance training systems specific to 
landing gear, armament, and aft fuselage components (United Industrial’s AAI Services 
Corporation, 2007), and just this year, an additional $6.7 million contract was awarded to 
United Industrial for an upgraded landing gear trainer (United Industrial’s AAI Services 
Subsidiary Wins, 2007).  These costs occur in addition to the funding required for facility 
construction and modification, and represent a significant, on-going logistics cost 
consideration.   
To summarize, the cost implications for the RMLV ground support workforce can 
be expected to include approximately $630 billion in AF cost of personnel and well over 
$200 million in training support costs for the first five years of operation.  
Impact of Design Alternatives 
 As the design process for the RMLV matures, certain initial design alternatives 
can result in significant impacts to the manpower estimates derived in this research.  
Specifically, the choice of method for the RMLV to return to the launch-site will 
determine TPS requirements, which will directly impact the Structural Repair manpower 
support, the most significant single contributor to total manning requirements.  
Additionally, an Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) system will impact total 
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MXG manpower requirements, reducing overall manpower required for system 
troubleshooting.  Finally, decisions regarding the use of expendable or reusable second 
stages, and liquid or solid second-stage propellant, will significantly impact total 
manpower requirements.  
Jet Fly-Back vs. Rocket Boost-Back. 
 Current Shuttle TPS maintenance operations form a significant portion of total 
man-hours, and the impact of a Shuttle-like TPS system was examined in Chapter VII, 
Manpower Assessment.  This type of TPS requirement is consistent with a vehicle that, 
following separation, “aerodynamically decelerates to subsonic speeds, turns, and uses 
airbreathing jet engines to cruise back to the spaceport for a powered landing” (Snead, 
2006: 32).  Using this model of RMLV operations, known as the jet fly-back model, TPS 
maintenance requirements using current technologies would be very similar to those 
experienced by the Shuttle (Rooney, 2005: 9), and could result in significant increases to 
manpower estimates, particularly in the Structural Repair workcenter. 
 Another option under consideration for the RMLV return-to-launch-site activity 
involves turning the booster after separation, executing a controlled burn until the vector 
aligns with the launch site, and concluding with an unpowered reentry and glide back for 
horizontal landing (Hellman, 2005: 4).  The primary advantage to this approach, known 
as the rocket boost-back model, is that significantly less thermal protection would be 
required in comparison to the jet fly-back method (Hellman, 2005: 14).  Additionally, the 
vehicle would require more fuel to execute the second controlled burn, but would not 
require jet engine support (Hellman, 2005: 14).  This design alternative has the potential 
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to significantly decrease the MXG footprint of RMLV operations, particularly in the 
arena of Structural Repair. 
Structural Repair support is a significant contributor to total workforce 
requirements for both the B-2 and the Shuttle.  In fact, when the B-2 Structural Repair 
personnel implemented new technology for maintenance of their LO structures, the fleet 
experience a 15% increase in airframe availability and a 50% decrease in maintenance 
man-hours expended per flying hour (Boston, 2006).  Similarly, improved technologies 
or design alternatives affecting RMLV TPS requirements will significantly impact 
Structural Repair manpower requirement.  Additionally, since fuels and engine 
workcenters are impacted by return-to-launch-site alternatives, implementing a rocket 
boost-back design method would require recalculation of the manpower estimate.   
IVHM. 
 The type and extent of IVHM system utilized in the RMLV has the potential to 
impact total MXG manning numbers.  The manpower estimate in this research is based 
on the B-2’s OBTS, which collects maintenance indicator data during flight operations 
for analysis and action on the ground (Air Combat Command, 2006: 29).  However, 
integrated health management systems as envisioned for developing aerospace platforms 
extend beyond simply collecting diagnostic information, and offer prognostic assessment 
and automated inspections (Ofsthun, 2002: 22).  An IVHM system performing the full 
range of functions would reduce the number of AMXS and MXS personnel required for 
trouble-shooting and inspections, and would require recalculation of the manpower 
estimate. 
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Second Stage Alternatives. 
 This research has been based on the assumption that the RMLV will be a hybrid 
launch vehicle, with a reusable first stage and an expendable second stage.  As such, the 
manning requirements for the second stage are combined with the manning requirements 
for the payload, and treated as a workcenter that essentially stores, inspects, and then 
integrates the second stage and payload in the same manners as the B-2 Munitions 
Squadron handles its weapons and armament.  A reusable second stage would effectively 
double most workcenter requirements, adding another vehicle that requires the complete 
range of recovery, maintenance, and pre-launch operations, while the workforce 
responsible for payload storage, inspection, and integration would decrease slightly. 
 Given an expendable second stage, the choice between liquid and solid propellant 
remains a significant factor in manpower requirements.  Current manpower requirements 
are based on liquid fuel support only for the first stage of the RMLV, while the second 
stage is assumed to be delivered ready-for-use, essentially modeled after a solid-
propellant system.  If an expendable stage is chosen that requires liquid propellant and 
on-site fueling, the fuels support for storage and distribution would double. 
 In summary, manpower determinations in this research are modeled on an RMLV 
with a reusable first stage utilizing a combination of rocket and jet propulsion, and an 
expendable second stage delivered and stored ready-for-use.  Some degree of IVHM is 
included in the manpower estimate, modeled on the B-2 experience with its OBTS.  
Different design decisions in these areas will have a significant impact on the manpower 
estimates, and results will have to be recalculated.  In the next section, opportunities for 
future research will be discussed that will allow timely and accurate recalculation to 
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account for these and other alternative decisions that will occur throughout the design 
phase. 
Future Research 
 The primary purpose of this research was to provide foundational information that 
future researchers can use to improve the manpower fidelity of the MILEPOST model.  A 
crucial aspect of future research will be the ability to transform the manpower estimate 
derived in this thesis into a MILEPOST resource allocation method, resulting in the 
capability within MILEPOST to generate manpower support estimates for different 
design alternatives.  The AF LCOM manpower tool provides insight on the process of 
allocating maintenance resources to individual simulation activities.  Additionally, to 
round out the fidelity of the MILEPOST model, future research will be required to 
address similar estimation and allocation projects for facility, equipment, and materiel 
resources.  MILEPOST will then provide a comprehensive model that allows the 
generation of turnaround time and total resource consumption based on scenarios 
specifying design considerations and operational requirements. 
 MILEPOST activities have been designated in the manner that best reflects 
ground processing activities that affect turnaround time.  These activities do not lend 
themselves to a one-to-one correspondence with manpower, as activities often require 
multiple personnel, and personnel from multiple AFSCs.  Additionally, AF maintenance 
activities are organized by Work Unit Code (WUC), a five-digit designator that describes 
the “sub-system problems and repair actions associated with a piece of equipment or a 
system” (Air Force, AFI 21-103, 2005: 46).  WUCs allow maintenance organizations to 
identify specific components that are causing system downtime, and will not correspond 
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directly either to MILEPOST activities or to specific manpower requirements.  Therefore, 
in order to allocate the logistics manpower resources identified in this research to 
individual MILEPOST activities, a conversion process will have to be developed.  This 
conversion process can be based upon the LCOM solution to allocating maintenance 
manpower resources. 
 LCOM requires users to submit historical maintenance data to derive input 
information for the simulation.  This historical data for existing airframes is easily 
extracted from the Core Automated Maintenance System, and is converted by the LCOM  
Data Preparation Subsystem and Data Structuring Subsystem into the format depicted in 
Figure 41. 
JCN WUC TAKEN DATE START STOP TIME  CREW REASON 
171152 46A00 Y 6017 900 1130 2.5HR 2 Troubleshooting 
171152 24AD0 S 6027 1530 1730 2.0HR 2 Remove for Access 
171152 46ADE R 6028 800 1830 10.5HR 2 Remove/Replace 
171152 24AD0 S 6028 2230 30 2.0HR 2 
Reinstall After 
Access 
171152 11GSE Q 6029 230 300 0.5HR 2 Close after Access 
171152 46A00 X 6029 330 530 2.0HR 2 Functional Check 
Mean Time To Repair 10.5hr (0800-1830) 
Mean Corrective Time 19.5hr (2.5+2.0+10.5+2.0+0.5+2.0) 
Mean Discrepancy Length 288.5hr (0900 on 6017 to 0530 on 6029) 
• DPSS converts MDC action code Y to LCOM Action Code T – So  
LCOM task T46A00 is 2.5hr with a crew of 2 
• DPSS sums and converts MDC action codes S to LCOM Action Code  
X – So LCOM task X24ADO is 4.0hr with a crew of 2 
• DPSS sums and converts MDC action codes Q+R to LCOM Action Code  
R – So LCOM task R46A00 is 11.0hr with a crew of 2 
• DPSS Converts MDC action code X to LCOM Action Code V - So LCOM  
task V46A00 is 2.0hr with a crew of 2 
 
Figure 41.  Maintenance Data Collection Format  
(Aeronautical Systems Center, 2004: 62) 
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The activities listed above constitute one complete repair activity, or task, from start to 
finish, assuming there are no time gaps between subsequent tasks (Aeronautical Systems 
Center, 2004: 64).  Each action taken code is converted into an LCOM activity code with 
its associated WUC.  For the maintenance actions listed above, the LCOM series of tasks 
is F46A00, T46A00, X24AD0, R46A00, and V46A00 (Aeronautical Systems Center, 
2004: 64)  This series within LCOM generates a total repair time for a crew of two for 
this repair activity based on corresponding aircraft maintenance activities and their 
historical completion times.  If the simulation is run with unlimited resources, the total 
task time for the sequence should equal the mean corrective time, 19.5 hours 
(Aeronautical Systems Center, 2004: 65).  If constraints on personnel, facilities, and 
equipment are introduced series time will increase, approaching 288.5 hours as resources 
are constrained to match the exact availability at the location that generated the 
maintenance data (Aeronautical Systems Center, 2004: 65).   
To accomplish a similar function in MILEPOST, future researchers will first need 
to establish a list of MILEPOST tasks and corresponding MILEPOST Action Codes, 
compiled based on the activities listed in the MILEPOST model.  Subsequently, 
researchers will need to establish a WUC listing to differentiate among workcenters 
performing the same Action Code on different systems.  For example, troubleshooting in 
the engine backshop will need to be distinguished by WUC from troubleshooting during 
aircraft recovery.  The workcenter identification portion of the WUCs will be based upon 
the required workcenters identified in the logistics support organizational structure 
identified in this research.  Finally, each Action Code/WUC combination utilized in the 
sequence of MILEPOST regeneration activities will require a repair time assignment 
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based on a given crew size, determined by more detailed research based on aircraft and 
Shuttle data.  At this point, the Action Code/WUC assigned to each MILEPOST 
regeneration activity will have associated manpower resources, allowing users to 
determine total manpower support associated with a given vehicle design candidate.         
In order to provide more detailed manpower information, each LCOM task is 
assigned specific AFSCs, as shown in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42.  Task Report with AFSC by Quantity  
(Aeronautical Systems Center, 2004: 214) 
AFSCs assigned for the purposes of the LCOM simulation may or may not correspond to 
AF standard AFSCs.  For example, in the Joint Service FX-99 Generic Fighter Model 
described in the User’s Manual, all personnel are consolidated under six generalized 
AFSCs, created based upon the location of maintenance; for example, 1FLTL is the 
AFSC for all flightline maintenance (Aeronautical Systems Center, 2004: 460).  Alternate 
crew configurations may be identified for the same task, with alternate completion times 
if necessary; for example, a less-experienced crew assigned to the same activity could 
result in a longer repair time (Aeronautical Systems Center, 2004: 69).   
In order to utilize this method in MILEPOST, future researchers will need to 
designate AFSCs against each MILEPOST Action Code/WUC combination utilized by 
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the regeneration activities.  This research provides a comprehensive pool of AFSCs that 
will be utilized; future research will need to determine, based on aircraft and Shuttle data, 
the number of personnel within a given AFSC that are required by each task.  At this 
point in the research, each MILEPOST regeneration activity will be allocated AFSC-
specific resources, enabling the simulation to provide detailed workforce requirements as 
an output, and allowing constraints to be adjusted by AFSC.  This research may begin 
with generalized AFSC assignments, as depicted in the LCOM FX-99 Model, that will 
become more refined as additional maintenance data becomes available.  
A similar research process will be required for facilities, equipment, and materiel 
resources such as propellant and spares to first estimate baseline requirements and then 
assign them as allocable resources for MILEPOST simulation runs.  Since a level of 
depot maintenance was assumed in the manpower analysis, based on the three-level 
maintenance assumptions in the B-2 LCOM manpower data, future research will also 
need to address the depot maintenance manpower requirements to support a fleet of 
RMLVs.  Finally, an analysis of basing should be conducted to determine the optimal 
basing location for the RMLV fleet. 
Summary 
 The MILEPOST model provides a simulation framework to estimate regeneration 
times for Reusable Military Launch Vehicles with varying design characteristics.  While 
critical, regeneration time is not the only factor under consideration in the design phase of 
a weapons system.  Logistics support requirements comprise a significant portion of total 
life cycle costs; as a result, this research set out to determine a baseline estimate of the 
logistics ground support workforce requirements for the RMLV, given current design and 
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operational parameters.  It has been determined that a fleet of six RMLVs, operating out 
of either Vandenberg or Patrick AFB, can be adequately supported under the existing 
AFSC structure with approximately 1,870 personnel aligned under a Maintenance Group 
and Logistics Readiness Squadron consisting of Base Supply, Fuels, Vehicle 
Maintenance, and Vehicle Operations Flights.  The estimated cost of personnel and 
training for this workforces is $630.2 billion for the first five years. 
 As a baseline estimate, personnel numbers and total cost will vary considerably as 
the RMLV’s design and operational characteristics are finalized.  The MILEPOST model 
was designed as a method to account for these changes and provide updated regeneration 
time data as scenario factors and design characteristics are adjusted.  As a result, the 
primary purpose of establishing this baseline estimation was to identify workcenter and 
AFSC resources that can be allocated within MILEPOST using a method modeled after 
the LCOM simulation process.  Future research based on this information will result in an 
RMLV simulation model that addresses both manpower and regeneration time estimates 
for a variety of RMLV design candidates engaged in a range of operational scenarios. 
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Appendix A.  MILEPOST AFSC Matrix 
 
Recovery Operations (Martindale, 2006) 
Landing, Taxi, and Initial Safing (0)  
Activity Platform AFSC 
Landing, Wheels Stop  N/A N/A 
RMLV Taxi to Recovery Apron F-16 2AXXX 
Reaction Jet Drive and Drag Chute Safing Shuttle shortfall 
APU Shutdown Not Automatic Shuttle 2A6X6 
APU Shutdown   Shuttle 2A6X6 
APU Shutdown Automatic Shuttle 2A6X6 
LOX Safing Shuttle 2A6X4 
Does Design Include Hypergolics?  Yes (1) Shuttle 2A6X6  
Hypergolic Detection Self-Contained on 
RMLV?  Yes Shuttle 2A6X6   
Ground Crew Receives Safety Self-
Assessment Shuttle 2A6X6   
Pass Safety Assessment Shuttle 2A6X6   
Hypergolic Detection Self-Contained on 
RMLV?  No Shuttle 2A6X6 
Forward Safety Assessments Shuttle 
1S0X1, 
2A6X6 
Aft Safety Assessments Shuttle 
1S0X1, 
2A6X6 
Pass Safety Assessment Shuttle 
1S0X1, 
2A6X6 
Doesn't Pass Safety Assessment Shuttle 
1S0X1, 
2A6X6 
Mx Delay Safety for Haz Gas Shuttle 
1S0X1, 
2A6X6 
Does Design Include Hypergolics?  No (2) Shuttle N/A 
Maintenance Actions Required to Prepare RMLV for Transportation (3)  
Activity Platform  AFSC 
Send to Haz Gas Purge Shuttle shortfall 
Haz Gas Purge Req'd?  Yes Shuttle shortfall 
Connect Haz Gas Monitor and Purge Ducts Shuttle shortfall 
Initiate Haz Gas Purge and Monitor Shuttle shortfall 
Haz Gas Purge Req'd?  No Shuttle  N/A 
Send to Coolant GSE Shuttle shortfall 
RMLV Designed with Hot Structures?  Yes Shuttle shortfall 
RMLV Designed with Hot Structures?  No Shuttle shortfall 
Connect Coolant GSE Shuttle shortfall 
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Secure NH3 Coolant, Activate Ground 
Cooling Shuttle shortfall 
Send to Lock Pins and Vent Plugs F-16 2AXXX   
Install Ground Lock Pins and Vent Plugs F-16 2AXXX   
Send to Inspection and Configuration   2AXXX   
Superficial TPS and Debris Inspection Shuttle 2AXXX   
Configure for Handover to Spaceport Ground 
Control Shuttle 2AXXX   
External Stores and Final Safety Call (4)  
Activity Platform  AFSC 
Can RMLV Return with External Stores?  Yes F-16 2WXX1  
Is RMLV Returning with External Stores?  Yes F-16 2WXX1  
Position External Store GSE F-16 2WXX1   
Separate External Stores F-16 2WXX1   
Load and Remove External Stores F-16 2WXX1   
Can RMLV Return with External Stores?  No Shuttle N/A 
Is RMLV Returning with External Stores?  No Shuttle N/A 
Safe to Proceed with Total Downgrade? No   1S and 2A 
Mx Delay for Safety Downgrade   1S and 2A 
      
Send to Safing Sequence (5)   N/A 
Safing Sequence (6)  
Activity Platform  AFSC 
OMS RCS System Safing Shuttle 2A6X1 
Tank Vent RMLVME Shuttle shortfall 
MPS Configuration Shuttle 2A6X1 
Does Design Include Hypergolics 2?  Yes Shuttle 
2A6X6 
(EPU on the 
F-16) 
Hydrozine Circulation Pump Safing Shuttle 
2A6X6 
(EPU on the 
F-16) 
Hypergolic Detection Self-Contained on RMLV 
2?  Yes Shuttle 
2A6X6 
(EPU on the 
F-16) 
Stow Air Data Probes Shuttle 
2A6X6 
(EPU on the 
F-16) 
Does Design Include Hypergolics 2?  No Shuttle N/A 
Hypergolic Detection Self-Contained on RMLV 
2?  No Shuttle N/A 
INS Recorder and CW Safing Shuttle 2A5X3 
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RMLV Preparation for Transportation (Simultaneous with Safing 
Sequence) (6)  
Activity Platform  AFSC 
Send to Vacuum Vent Duct Inerting Shuttle shortfall 
Vacuum Duct Inerting Required?  Yes Shuttle shortfall 
Initiate Vacuum Duct Inerting Shuttle shortfall 
Vacuum Duct Inerting Required?  No Shuttle N/A 
Send to Protective Cover Installation Shuttle 2AXXX  
MPS and RMLV Protective Covers Required?  
Yes Shuttle 2AXXX   
Install MPS and RMLV Protective Covers Shuttle 2AXXX   
MPS and RMLV Protective Covers Required?  
Yes Shuttle 2AXXX   
Send to Position Tow Coupling Shuttle 2A6X2  
Position Hookup Tug Shuttle 2A6X2  
Monitor On-Board Systems Shuttle 2A6X2  
Final Tow Preparations (7)  
Activity Platform 2A6X2  
Attach Tow Tug to RMLV Shuttle 2A6X2  
Check Tow Tug Connections Shuttle 2A6X2  
Final Tow Preps Shuttle 2A6X2  
Towing Operations (8)  
Activity Platform  AFSC 
Tow RMLV Shuttle 2A6X2  
RMLV Exit to Mx Shuttle 2A6X2  
 
Ground Maintenance Operations (Pope, 2006) 
Disconnection from the Launch Vehicle 
Activity Platform AFSC 
Connect to Stage 1 
aircraft (B-
2) 2A6X2 
Transport to Mx Bay aircraft 
2A6X2, 
2AXXX 
Position Stage 1 in Mx Bay aircraft 2AXXX 
Grounding Procedures aircraft 2AXXX 
Disconnect from Stage 1 aircraft 2A6X2 
Diagnostics 
Activity Platform AFSC 
Interrogate Mx Reporter aircraft 2A5X3 
Position Maintenance Stands aircraft 2AXXX 
Electrical Connections 2 aircraft 2AXXX 
Battery Testing aircraft 
2A6X6 
(E&E) 
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Batteries Good?  No aircraft 
2A6X6 
(E&E) 
Replace Batteries aircraft 
2A6X6 
(E&E) 
Batteries Good?  Yes aircraft 
2A6X6 
(E&E) 
Charge Batteries aircraft 
2A6X6 
(E&E) 
MA Parallel Processes N/A N/A 
Avionics Testing aircraft 2A5X3  
Flight Controls aircraft 2A5X3  
Sensor Equipment aircraft 2A5X3  
Upper Stage Testing 
Activity Platform AFSC 
Upper Stage Electrical Connecting Point Testing Shuttle 
2A6X6 
(E&E) 
Parallel Process 1 N/A N/A 
Parallel Process 2 N/A N/A 
Drag Chute Shuttle shortfall 
Visual Check TPS Shuttle 2A7X3  
Tile and Blanket R-Square Shuttle 2A7X3   
Thermal Barrier Repair Shuttle 2A7X3   
Gap Filler R-Square Shuttle 2A7X3   
Sealant Application Shuttle 2A7X3   
Curing Shuttle 2A7X3   
Recheck TPS Shuttle 2A7X3   
RMLV Systems Check Aircraft 2AXXX 
Waterproof TPS Shuttle 2A7X3   
Parallel Process 2 N/A N/A 
Modular Motor R-Square?  Yes Shuttle 2A6X1 
Connect Motor Stand Shuttle 2A6X1 
Disco Electronics from Stage 1 Shuttle 2A6X1 
Disco Mechanics from Stage 1 Shuttle 2A6X1 
Remove Motor Shuttle 2A6X1 
Disco Stand Shuttle 2A6X1 
Place New Motor and Stand Shuttle 2A6X1 
Mech Connect Motor to Stage 1 Shuttle 2A6X1 
Elect Connect Motor Shuttle 2A6X1 
Connection Test Shuttle 2A6X1 
Disco Stand and Remove Shuttle 2A6X1 
Modular Motor R-Square?  No shuttle  2A6X1 
Engine Diagnostics shuttle 2A6X1 
Pumps and Fuel System shuttle 2A6X4  
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Engine Controls shuttle 2A6X1   
Nozzles shuttle 2A6X4    
Linkage shuttle 2A6X1   
Number of Motors = 3?  Yes   2A6X1   
Engine Checkout shuttle 2A6X1   
Number of Motors = 3?  No   2A6X1   
Engine Check Good?  No, Return to 
Modular Motor R-Square? shuttle 2A6X1   
Engine Check Good?  Yes shuttle 2A6X1   
Parallel Process 1 N/A N/A 
Parallel Process 2 N/A N/A 
Stage 2 Mechanical Connections aircraft 2A5X1 
Stage 2 Area Hardware aircraft 2A5X1 
Buffer Plug R-Square aircraft 2A5X1 
Parallel Process 3 N/A N/A 
Lubricator Check aircraft 2A6X5  
Filters aircraft 2A6X5  
LRU R-Square aircraft 
varies by 
LRU 
Parallel Process 3 N/A N/A 
Hydraulic Condition aircraft 2A6X5  
Filters aircraft 2A6X5  
Parallel Process 2 N/A N/A 
Preplanned Maintenance aircraft 
varies by 
action 
TCTO Actions aircraft 
varies by 
action 
Landing Gear and Tires 
Shuttle/Bom
ber 2A6X6,  
Move to Integration?  No shuttle 2AXXX 
MA Storage Reinspection shuttle 2AXXX 
Move to Integration?  Yes shuttle 2A6X2 
 
Pre Launch Operations (Stiegelmeier) 
Preintegration (Simultaneous with RMLV Maintenance) 
Activity Platform AFSC 
Preintegration?  Yes ICBM N/A 
Attach Handling Fixture to Payload EELV 
2T2X1, 
2A6X2 
Align Payload with Second Stage EELV 
2T2X1, 
2A6X2 
Make Mechanical Connections EELV 
2T2X1, 
2A6X2 
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Make Electrical Connections EELV 2A6X6 
Second Stage and Payload Integration Check ICBM 2A6X6 
Preintegration?  No, Proceed to F Delta II N/A 
Vehicle Integration, Preliminary Considerations 
Activity Platform  AFSC 
(F) Integrate on Pad?  Yes Delta II N/A 
Move Vehicle to Launch Pad, Proceed to G Delta II 2A6X2 
Integrate on Pad?  No EELV N/A 
Vehicle in Integration Facility?  Yes, Proceed to 
(H) EELV N/A 
Vehicle in Integration Facility?  No EELV N/A 
Move Vehicle to Integration Facility, 
Proceed to (H) EELV 2A6X2 
(G) Vehicle Integration, Integrate on Pad 
Activity Platform  AFSC 
Preintegration?  Second Stage and Payload 
Preintegrated ICBM N/A 
Attach Handling Fixture to RMLV Delta II 2A6X2 
Erect and Position RMLV Delta II 2A6X2 
Attach Handling Fixture to Second 
Stage/Payload Delta II 2A6X2 
Position Second Stage/Payload Delta II 2A6X2 
Make Mechanical Connections Delta II 
2T2X1, or 
2A6X2 
Make Electrical Connections Delta II 2A6X6 
Preintegration?  No Preintegration Delta II N/A 
Attach Handling Fixture to RMLV Delta II 2A6X2 
Erect and Position RMLV Delta II 2A6X2 
Attach Handling Fixture to Second Stage  Delta II 
2T2X1, 
2A6X2 
Erect and Position Second Stage Delta II 2A6X2 
Make Mechanical Connections Delta II 
2T2X1, or 
2A6X2 
Make Electrical Connections Delta II 2A6X6 
First, Second Stage Integration Check Delta II 2A6X6 
Payload Clean Room Required?  Yes Delta II N/A 
Prep Clean Room Delta II  
Payload Clean Room Required?  No Delta II N/A 
Attach Payload Handling Equipment Delta II 2A6X2 
Lift and Align Payload Delta II 2A6X2 
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Make Mechanical Connections Delta II 
2T2X1, or 
2A6X2 
Make Electrical Connections Delta II 2A6X6 
Entire Vehicle Integration Check, Proceed to I Delta II 2A6X6 
(H) Vehicle Integration, Integrate off Pad 
Activity Platform  AFSC 
Preintegration?  Second Stage and Payload 
Preintegrated ICBM N/A 
Horizontal or Vertical Integration?  Vertical Atlas V N/A 
Attach Handling Fixture to RMLV Atlas V 2A6X2 
Erect and Position RMLV on MLP Atlas V 2A6X2 
Attach Handling Fixture to Second 
Stage/Payload Atlas V 2A6X2 
Erect and Position Second Stage/Payload Atlas V 2A6X2 
Make Mechanical Connections Atlas V 
2T2X1, or 
2A6X2 
Make Electrical Connections Atlas V 2A6X6 
Preintegration?  Second Stage and Payload 
Preintegrated ICBM N/A 
Horizontal or Vertical Integration?  Horizontal Delta IV N/A 
Attach Handling Equipment to Second 
Stage/Payload Delta IV 2T2X1 
Position/Align Second Stage/Payload Delta IV 2T2X1 
Make Mechanical Connections Delta IV 
2T2X1, or 
2A6X2 
Make Electrical Connections Delta IV 2A6X6 
Preintegration?  No Preintegration   N/A 
Horizontal or Vertical Integration?  Vertical Atlas V N/A 
Attach Handling Fixture to RMLV Atlas V 2A6X2 
Erect and Position RMLV on MLP Atlas V 2A6X2 
Attach Handling Fixture to Second Stage Atlas V 2A6X2 
Erect and Position Second Stage Atlas V 2A6X2 
Make Mechanical Connections Atlas V   
Make Electrical Connections Atlas V 2A6X6 
Preintegration?  No Preintegration   N/A 
Horizontal or Vertical Integration?  Horizontal Delta IV N/A 
Attach Handling Equipment to Second 
Stage Delta IV 2T2X1 
Position/Align Second Stage Delta IV 2T2X1 
Make Electrical Connections Delta IV 2A6X6 
Preintegration?  No Preintegration Delta II N/A 
First and Second Stage Integration Check EELV 2A6X6 
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Launch Now?  No Shuttle N/A 
Storage Shuttle 2A6X2 
Reaccomplish Preflight and Additional Mx Shuttle 2AXXX 
Launch Now?  Yes EELV N/A 
Install Payload Now or On Pad?  On Pad, Go to 
Load Hypergolic Fuel Delta IV N/A 
Install Payload Now or On Pad?  Now Atlas V N/A 
Payload Clean Room Required?  Yes   N/A 
Prep Clean Room   ??? 
Payload Clean Room Required?  No   N/A 
Attach Payload Handling Equipment Atlas V 2T2X1 
Position and Align Payload Atlas V 2T2X1 
Make Mechanical Connections Atlas V 
2T2X1, or 
2A6X2 
Make Electrical Connections Atlas V 2A6X6 
Entire Vehicle Integration Check Atlas V 2A6X6 
Launch Now?  No Shuttle N/A 
Storage Shuttle 2A6X2 
Reaccomplish Preflight and Additional Mx Shuttle 2AXXX 
Launch Now?  Yes EELV N/A 
Load Hypergolic Fuel?  Yes Shuttle N/A 
Load Hypergolic Fuel  Shuttle 2F0X1 
Load Hypergolic Fuel?  No EELV N/A 
Ordnance Installation?  Yes Shuttle N/A 
Install Ordnance Shuttle 2WXX1 
Ordnance Installation?  No Shuttle N/A 
Final Closeouts and Transport Preparations Shuttle 2AXXX 
Attach Transporter Shuttle 2A6X2 
Transport Vehicle to Pad, Proceed to J Shuttle 2A6X2 
(J) Launch Pad Operations for Vehicle Not Integrated on Pad 
Activity Platform  AFSC 
Vertical or Horizontal Integration?  Horizontal Delta IV N/A 
Attach Erecting Mechanism?  Yes Zenit 2 N/A 
Attach Erecting Mechanism  Zenit 2 2A6X2 
Attach Erecting Mechanism?  No Delta IV N/A 
Erect Vehicle and Secure to Launch Platform Delta IV 2A6X2 
Move Transporter/Erecting Mechanism Away 
from Pad Delta IV 2A6X2 
Vertical or Horizontal Integration?  Vertical Atlas V N/A 
Install Payload on Pad?  Yes Delta II N/A 
Payload Clean Room Required?  Yes Delta II N/A 
Prep Clean Room   ??? 
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Payload Clean Room Required?  No Delta II N/A 
Attach Payload Handling Equipment Delta II 2A6X2 
Lift and Align Payload Delta II 2A6X2 
Make Mechanical Connections Delta II 
2T2X1, or 
2A6X2 
Make Electrical Connections Delta II 2A6X6 
Entire Vehicle Integration Check, Proceed to I Delta II 2A6X6 
Install Payload on Pad?  No, Proceed to I Atlas V N/A 
(I) Launch Pad Operations 
Activity Platform  AFSC 
Umbilical Options 1 Shuttle N/A 
Propellant Connections Shuttle 2A6X4 
Umbilical Leak Check Shuttle 2A6X4 
Electrical and Comm Connections Shuttle 2A6X6 
Verify Electrical and Comm Connectivity Shuttle 2A6X6 
Umbilical Options 2 Atlas V N/A 
Propellant Connections Atlas V 2A6X4 
Umbilical Leak Check Atlas V 2A6X4 
Umbilical Options 3 -- no connections required Zenit 2 N/A 
Hypergolic Fuel?  Yes Shuttle N/A 
Load Hypergolic Fuel Shuttle 2F0X1  
Hypergolic Fuel?  No EELV N/A 
RP-1?  Yes 
Atlas 
V/Zenit 2 N/A 
Which Stages Get RP-1?  First Only Atlas V N/A 
Fuel RP-1 First Stage Atlas V 2F0X1  
Which Stages Get RP-1?  First and Second Zenit 2 N/A 
Parallel?  Yes Zenit 2 N/A 
Parallel RP-1 Fueling Zenit 2 N/A 
Fuel RP-1 First Stage Zenit 2 2F0X1  
Fuel RP-1 Second Stage Zenit 2 2F0X1  
End RP-1 Fueling Zenit 2 N/A 
Parallel?  No Zenit 2 N/A 
Fuel RP-1 First Stage Zenit 2 2F0X1 
Fuel RP-1 Second Stage Zenit 2 2F0X1  
RP-1?  No Shuttle N/A 
Ordnance on Pad?  Yes Shuttle N/A 
Install/Arm Ordnance Shuttle 2WXX1 
Ordnance on Pad?  No   N/A 
Final TPS Inspection, Proceed to K Shuttle 2AXXX 
(K) Launch Pad Operations, Propellant Loading 
Activity Platform  AFSC 
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Stages in Parallel, Fuel and Oxidizer in Parallel HLV 2F0X1 
Stage 1/Stage 2 HLV 2F0X1 
Oxidizer/Fuel HLV 2F0X1 
LOX Chill/Fuel Chill HLV 2F0X1 
Load LOX/Load Fuel HLV 2F0X1 
End Propellant Loading HLV 2F0X1 
Stages in Parallel, Fuel and Oxidizer Not in Parallel HLV 2F0X1 
Stage 1/Stage 2 HLV 2F0X1 
LOX Chill HLV 2F0X1 
Load LOX HLV 2F0X1 
Fuel Chill HLV 2F0X1 
Load Fuel HLV 2F0X1 
End Propellant Loading HLV 2F0X1 
Stages Not in Parallel, Fuel and Oxidizer Not in 
Parallel HLV 2F0X1 
RMLV LOX Chill HLV 2F0X1 
Load LOX RMLV HLV 2F0X1 
RMLV Fuel Chill HLV 2F0X1 
Load Fuel RMLV HLV 2F0X1 
Second Stage LOX Chill HLV 2F0X1 
Load LOX Second Stage HLV 2F0X1 
Second Stage Fuel Chill HLV 2F0X1 
Load Fuel Second Stage HLV 2F0X1 
End Propellant Loading HLV 2F0X1 
Terminal Countdown Shuttle 
2AXXX 
(MOC) 
Launch   N/A N/A 
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Appendix B.  Aircraft Maintenance Workcenters Omitted from RMLV 
Organization 
 
Function Justification 
Non-Applicable B-2 Functions 
MS, Egress Section No crew to require Egress equipment support 
MS, Survival Equipment No crew to require Survival Equipment support 
MUNS, Munitions Materiel 
Requirement specifically for a munitions accountabilty 
officer 
MUNS, Munitions 
Accountability 
Requirements specifically to maintain a munitions 
accountability automated system 
MUNS, Mobility Plans No mobility commitment 
MUNS, Production 
No production of payloads or second stages, only 
reception and maintenance 
MUNS, Conventional 
Maintenance 
Specific to maintenance performed on conventional 
munitions 
MUNS, Precision Guided 
Munitions 
Specific to maintenance performed on precision-guided 
munitions 
MUNS, Special Weapons Flight maintains nuclear and other specialized weapons 
MUNS, NOCM Nuclear Ordnance Commodity Management 
AMXS, MXAB 
Entire AMU deleted.  Only one required to support 
RMLV fleet. 
Non-Applicable MQ-1 Functions 
AMXS, Mission Flight 
Primarily responsible for maintenance of Ground 
Control Station and Predator Primary Satellite Link, 
systems that do not apply to the MILEPOST-modeled 
portion of RMLV ground operations 
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Appendix C.  Adjustment for Variances, Overhead, and Shifts 
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Appendix D.  Percent Contribution of B-2 Workcenters 
 
 
 
Note:  Shaded lines indicate functions that comprise more than 1% of total maintenance 
manpower, and were considered significant. 
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Note:  Shaded lines indicate functions that comprise more than 1% of total maintenance 
manpower, and were considered significant. 
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Appendix E.  Alignment of Shuttle Disciplines/System Codes with B-2 LCOM Workcenters 
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Appendix F.  MXG Parametric Adjustments 
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Appendix G.  AFMS Excerpts 
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Appendix H.  FY07 AF Personnel Cost Chart 
 
 216 
 
 217 
 
 218 
Appendix I.  Enumeration of Design Points 
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Appendix J.  Regression Analysis 
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